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

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literature

CULTURE

[lɪŋˈgwɪstɪks]

Dear Readers,

we are very happy that the second issue of our journal can finally reach you. A lot has changed since October 1998 when the first FOLIO appeared: first of all, (as someone has already said) we are seven. It makes a world of difference, because there is always plenty of work around the journal and a bigger editorial team will hopefully make it possible to publish, as planned, two issues per term. We regret to tell you that we intend to skip the one but last (i.e. the summer) term altogether; otherwise we wouldn't make up for the long time we spend preparing the first issue and we would never be able to present the *crème de la crème* of our essays right after the end of a term (which is neat, isn't it?). Hence, the next two issues will contain papers from the winter semester 98/99 and we will do our best to publish them till May, so be prepared for a lot of brilliant stuff to read this spring! The other changes in the management of our journal concern mainly the computer equipment and we hope that the professional and user-friendly DTP software we use now will help us make fewer and fewer mistakes (please see a representative selection from the first issue and our consequent apologies on page 2).

We are eagerly waiting for your comments, inquiries, words of bitter criticism or unrestrained worship; you can contact us either by mail (you will find the address on page 2) or, if possible, leave a message addressed to FOLIO in the pigeonhole belonging to the *Koło Naukowe* of our Institute. And, to answer one of the most frequent questions now, please remember that each issue of our journal is available in our Institute's Reading Room so that anyone could get access to it even when it is out of print.

Last but not least we would like to thank Bartek Cichocki and Kuba Wąsik, our friends from the Institute of History, Warsaw University, who publish *Teka Historyka* – a scholarly journal of long tradition and ambitions very similar to ours. We are very grateful for their help and their thoughtfulness and we heartily encourage you to get acquainted with their fascinating periodical, especially that papers connected with the culture and history of the English-speaking countries also appear in the journal.
Have a nice reading and watch out for FOLIO No.3!

The Editors

Literatu
re...

Aleksandra Majewska

What Can be Seen in the Mirrors of Modern British Poetry?*

We encounter them every day and almost everywhere. They are found in bathrooms and halls, lifts, shops and cars. They are both small ones and big ones. They are both ordinary and ornamented. Mirrors. Smooth and cold surfaces of glass which reflect but which can slightly distort images of things and people. Mirrors are important in our lives not only because we can see ourselves or others in them: over centuries, we have ascribed to them some symbolic qualities.[1] Thus mirrors symbolise love – they are attributes of Venus, the ancient goddess of love and beauty, sirens and water nymphs (together with their combs). Especially when in the hands of women, they stand for femininity, vanity and passivity. Females with their looking-glasses are seductive, coquettish and frivolous. Variability of reflections in mirrors makes them similar to the Moon and its phases and thus they are connected with womanhood. When in the hands of men, mirrors mean effeminacy and weakness. There would be no soothsaying without them. In mirrors a clairvoyant or a fortune-teller can see the future as well as the past or present events. They are often used to check faithfulness and truth (e.g. in Chaucer's *The Canterbury Tales* a magic mirror makes it possible to differentiate between friends and foes, faithful and unfaithful lovers). Sometimes mirrors are mysterious symbols of unconscious memories, tools of self-knowledge and self-recognition. They can also reflect our souls together with our worries, feelings and recollections. Mirrors can symbolise the duality and divisions in the universe and in ourselves. They stand for pride, conceit, lust, and self-content. Mirrors are the tools of Satan but, on the other hand, a mirror is an attribute of

* The paper has been submitted for the course 113: *Readings in Post-War British Poetry* run by Ms Marzena Sokołowska, MA.

the Blessed Mary: her immaculateness and virginity. She is 'spectrum sine macula', i.e. a mirror without a blemish. Even God himself is reflected in Christ as if in a mirror. Blessed souls (in Dante's *The Divine Comedy*) can read the future and people's thoughts in God like in a looking-glass. Mirrors can also symbolise wisdom, contemplative life (e.g. Rachel), the Truth, reflection and caution. A mirror is sight, but the sixth sense too. Although they are fragile, mirrors can stand for such 'monstrous' concepts as life and even the whole world (e.g. 'Świat jest zwierciadłem z którego wyziera jego własna twarz', W.M. Thackeray).

This multiplicity of meanings results from various occurrences of the symbol in the world's literature. Mirrors frequently appear in prose as well as in poetry. So let us have a look in those which we can find in modern British poetry. And what can be seen there?

The First Look

The mirror can be a witness of everyday chores as in Robert Graves's 'The Face in the Mirror'. Graves simply describes his face reflected in a looking-glass while shaving.[2]

Gray haunted eyes, absent-mindedly glaring
From wide, uneven orbits; one brow drooping
Somewhat over the eye

Because of a missile fragment still inhering,
Skin deep, as a foolish record of old-world fighting.

Crookedly broken nose – low tackling caused it;
Cheeks, furrowed; coarse gray hair, flying frenetic;
Forehead, wrinkled and high;
Jowls, prominent; ears, large; jaw, pugilistic;
Teeth, few; lips, full and ruddy; mouth, ascetic.

I pause with razor poised, scowling derision
At the mirrored man whose beard needs my attention,
And once more ask him why
He still stands ready, with a boy's presumption,
To court the queen in her high silk pavilion.

The person's eyes catch our attention first. They are grey with a worried or frightened expression in them. The eyes stare angrily and fiercely but also

unconsciously from the other side of the looking-glass. One of the brows bends downwards and slightly covers the eye. It had been caused by a shell splinter which since then has stayed deep under the skin; so deep that it has almost become a natural part of the face. Then the nose: broken or crooked as if from bending too low over the table. The cheeks and his high forehead are grooved with deep wrinkles, which are like long and narrow furrows made by a plough. His hair is grey and 'flying' in all directions as if the person cannot take control over it. His jaw is big and square, like one of a boxer, and thus the jowls are projecting. The ears are large, too. He has only got a few teeth in his mouth, which looks like a mouth of an ascetic. The lips are full but of a pale colour: not red but rather reddish.

It is the face of an older man, who is going to shave. But the person speaking clearly distinguishes himself – 'I' from his image in the mirror – 'he'. The speaker seems to be disgusted with the bearded person to whom he has to attend to with a sharp razor. He twists his face in anger, ridiculing and mocking 'the mirrored man', but, in fact, he mocks himself. The person is fully aware of his age and abilities but standing in front of the mirror, with the razor suspended and balanced in the stillness, he cannot get rid of his dreams. He is facing them as he is facing himself, however: with the cold precision and objectivity of an experienced observer. Although one part of him, the mirrored one, is like a boy who still believes in the fulfilment of dreams, e.g.: the dream of love, of being attractive and handsome, the other part, the real one, is fully aware of the truth. Shaving off the beard will not make him a young courtier or lover. He may play with the idea, but he readily stares back at him from the soulless surface of the looking glass. The person not only reflects on his looks but also on his life. A simple morning activity, an image projected by the mirror are pretexts for 'deeper' thoughts and revealing self-knowledge and self-consciousness. It finally occurs to him that the mirror is not simply a witness of an everyday chore. It 'takes part' in human reflection on the nature of life.

The Second Look

The person speaking in Thomas Kinsella's poem 'Mirror in February' is almost the same situation as the one in Graves's 'The Face in the Mirror'. However, what we can see here is slightly different than the previous image in the mirror.

> The day dawns with scent of must and rain,
> Of opened soil, dark trees, dry bedroom air.

Under the fading lamp, half dressed – my brain
Idling on some compulsive fantasy –
I towel my shaven jaw and stop, and stare,
Riveted by a dark exhausted eye,
A dry downturning mouth.

It seems again that it is time to learn,
In this untiring, crumbling place of growth
To which, for the time being, I return.
Now plainly in the mirror of my soul
I read that I have looked my last on youth
And little more; for they are not made whole
That reach the age of Christ.

Below my window the awakening trees,
Hacked clean for better bearing, stand defaced
Suffering their brute necessities,
And how should the flesh not quail that span for span
Is mutilated more? In slow distaste
I fold my towel with what grace I can,
Not young and renewable, but man.

It is an early February morning. Since it is raining the air smells of dampness and acidity of wet soil. The speaker, half-dressed, has just finished shaving. The lamp gives dim light but even in the half-darkness his gaze is caught by the image in the mirror. Although the eye and the mouth are frightening, he is 'hypnotised' by them and cannot stop looking at the surface of the looking-glass. What the speaker sees there, however, is again, as in Graves's poem, only a pretext to reflect on something deeper than just the appearance. There is always some 'compulsive fantasy', some thought: irresistible and impossible to be stopped or controlled, which catches the brain while one is staring at their image on the smooth glass surface. It is usually a thought about the passing of time. Whenever we meet our faces in mirrors, as the speaker does, we are taught the lesson of becoming older, of growing and falling apart. And the process, as we know it, will never cease. Such reflections allow us to reach deeper into ourselves and physical, literal mirrors become then 'mirrors of our souls'. In some of them, the speaker can see himself: no longer young but still not 'complete'. He has reached the age of Christ (33 years old) but has not experienced everything, thus he is not 'made whole' yet.

The comparison between the nature of trees and man seems to be crucial in the poem. The speaker can see the trees from his window. They stand at dawn bare of leaves, as if without faces. All they do is surrender to the power

of nature, the cycle of seasons. This chain of seasonal changes, on the other hand, makes the speaker more aware of the changes which take place in him. Especially in February, when the winter is the most severe and the spring seems most distant, thoughts of passing away and death appear easily. They may make the body tremble with fear, but, as the speaker notices, we – human beings have the grace to face the unavoidable. In the careful and slow folding of the towel, he 'encloses' the whole essence of humanity: consciousness. The trees may gain their youth in spring, they may be reborn into their new existence but they can be no more than 'brutes' silently suffering the destructiveness of time. Man can reflect on himself and his place in the crushing wheel of passing years. That is true: he is not endlessly young, he is not immortal but he is graceful and aware of facing the 'necessities' of life and death.

Thus, in the mirror we can see not only our faces but also our humanity, which is reflected deep in the mirror of our souls.

The Third Look

We can see ourselves as real, 'full' human beings while looking in mirrors. Can we see there, ourselves as gods? Peter Redgrove's 'Intimate Supper' offers us an example of such view:

He switched on the electric light and laughed,
He let light shine in the firmament of his ceiling,
He saw the great light shine around and it was good,
The great light that rilled through its crystalline pendentives,
And marvelled at its round collection in a cheval glass,
And twirled the scattered crystal rays in his champagne glass.
He spun the great winds through his new hoover
And let light be in the kitchen and that was good too
For he raised up the lid of the stock-pot
And dipped a deep spoon in the savours that were rich
And swarming, and felt the flavours live in his mouth
Astream with waters. He danced to the fire and raked it and created
red heat
And skipped to the bathroom and spun the shining taps
Dividing the air from the deep, and the water, good creature,
Gave clouds to his firmament for he had raked the bowels
Of the seamy coal that came from the deep earth.
And he created him a Leviathan and wallowed there,
Rose, and made his own image in the steamy mirrors
Having brooded over them, wiping them free

Again from steamy chaos and the mist that rose from the deep,
But the good sight faded
For there was no help, no help meet for him at all,
And he set his table with two stars pointed on wax
And with many stars in the cutlery and clear crystal
And he set thereon fruits of the earth, and thin clean bowls
For the clear waters of the creatures of earth that love to be cooked
And until the time came that he had appointed
Walked in his garden in the cool of the evening, waited.

The poem clearly imitates the Biblical description of God's creation of the world. The person depicted is obviously given some 'divine' qualities. He is a modern god, who 'makes' light by switching on the lamp on the ceiling, wind with the help of a vacuum cleaner or water by turning on the taps. In fact, he prepares the title 'intimate supper' for the most important of his 'creations' – a woman. He cooks and tastes the stock, makes a pie and rakes the coals for a hotter flame. Then he prepares a bath and plunges in it like a Biblical sea-monster. Finally, he lays the table: there are two candles, crystal glasses and the cutlery, fruit and bowls for soup. When everything is ready and there is still some time left until the appointed meeting, the 'modern god' goes to the garden, his Eden, where he rests and waits.

The mirrors in the poem give evidence for our human imperfectness. They are steamed because of the heat from the hot water so as the person cannot clearly see himself. Even when wiped, the mirrors offer only a blurred vision. So it is not possible to see the whole truth, everything, in the mirror. There is always something which distorts the view and gives us, however human or 'divine' we may imagine ourselves, only a 'partial' image. From those offered pieces we have to try to compose a picture, as complete as possible.

The Fourth Look

So mirrors can be jigsaw-puzzles which are scattered pieces that we have to gather and make fit together. In Brian Patten's poem entitled 'Into My Mirror Has Walked', we are faced with such a difficult task.

Into my mirror has walked
A woman who will not talk
Of love or of its subsidiaries,
But who stands there,
Pleased by her own silence.

The weather has worn into her
All seasons known to me,
In one breast she holds
Evidence of forests,
In other, of seas.

I will ask her nothing yet
Would ask so much
If she gave a sign –

Her shape is common enough,
Enough shape to love.
But what keeps me here
Is what glows beyond her.

I think at times
A boy's body
Would be as easy
To read light into,
I think sometimes
My own might do.

The person is standing in front of a mirror. But apart from his own reflection there, he can see a mysterious woman. She is silent and is surrounded by light, which glows from beyond her. Who is she? This is the first question, the first piece to be put on the jigsaw-board. For sure, she is a woman; not a specific one but a representative of the whole sex. That is why she has no individual characteristics, no distinctive features, but she is a dark shape, an outline against the brightness of the light. She also embodies the secrets of femininity, the wildness of forests, the passion of seas and the changeability of seasons. Who is the speaker then? He is young but not yet a man although clearly not a child any more. He stands on the threshold of manhood and becomes aware of the existence of love. He is curious and has many questions but he has no courage to ask until the silent woman lets him speak. What is the mystery? It is light that glows from behind the figure of the woman. This light underlines what is common for all women and because of that it makes a familiar shape and feeling more universal and 'mysterious'. It adds new dimensions to something already well-known. It is the light which keeps the speaker in front of the mirror. He hopes that his body will be able, at some time, to absorb the light and fathom the mystery which is hidden in it. He thinks that any boy's body, when the time comes and the woman gives him a sign, is capable of sharing the light with a woman. When will the time come?

> When I was a child, I spoke as a child, I understood as a child, I thought as a child but when I became a man, I put away childish things.
> For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face; now I know in part; but then shall I know as also I am known.[3]

For the time being, however, there are still many, too many, pieces to the puzzle to fit together: Is the mysterious light love? If so, what kind of love is it? Maybe it is only one of love's 'subsidiaries'? They must wait to be put in their proper places.

The mirror gives no easy solution. It may only reveal the existence of the mystery of love...

The Fifth Look

...as it may reveal the mystery of death (as in Michael Davitt's 'The Mirror'). Amor and Thanatos: both seem to be imprisoned in the smooth and cold surface of the mirror.

Michael Davitt

THE MIRROR

in the memory of my father

I

He was no longer my father
but I was still his son;
I would get to grips with that cold paradox,
the remote figure in his Sunday best
who was buried the next day.

A great day for tears, snifters of sherry,
whiskey, beef sandwiches, tea.
An old mate of his was recounting
their day excursion
to Youghal in the Thirties,
how he was his first partner
on the Cork/Skibbereen route
in the late Forties.
There was a splay of Mass cards

on the sitting-room mantelpiece
which formed a crescent round a glass vase,
his retirement present from CIE.

2

I didn't realize till two days later
it was the mirror took his breath away...

The monstrous old Victorian mirror
with the ornate gilt frame
we had found in the three-storey house
when we moved in from the country.
I was afraid that it would sneak
down from the wall and swallow me up
in one gulp in the middle of the night...

While he was decorating the bedroom
he had taken down the mirror
without asking for help;
soon he turned the colour of terracotta
and his heart broke that night.

3

There was nothing for it
but to set about finishing the job,
papering over the cracks,
painting the high window,
stripping the door of the crypt.
When I took hold of the mirror
I had a fright. I imagined him breathing through it.
I heard him say in a reassuring whisper:
I'll give you a hand, here.

And we lifted the mirror back in position
above the fireplace,
my father holding it steady
while I drove home
the two nails.

The speaker has just lived through his father's death. After the burial, there is a small funeral banquet – an opportunity for a drink and remembrance of the dead. Soon after that it comes home to the son that an old Victorian mirror

is responsible for his father's death.

The mirror itself is quite mysterious. It is huge and very old with an overdecorated and shiny frame. It was in the house when the speaker's family moved in a few days before. From the very beginning, there was something odd about the mirror which made the speaker afraid of it and imagine the monstrous thing devouring him during the night. Now it seems that the nightmare had come true. While decorating the bedroom, the speaker's father wanted to take down the mirror and died. Of course, there is a rational explanation too; the mirror was too heavy and the father, an older man, who did not ask anybody for help, had a heart attack because of the strain.

When the son sets out to finish the decorating, he has to face the mirror himself. While hanging it again, the mirror proves to be unusual, even magical. The speaker sees his father there; he can even hear his voice – the suggestion of helping him with the mirror. Finally, the father holds the heavy Victorian looking-glass while the son hammers in two nails to hang it over the fireplace.

Despite the rational explanation of his father's death, there is something irrational about the mirror. It calls up images of the dead as if its surface not only reflected objects and people, but also absorbed and stored them, allowing, in some special circumstances, to perceive them again. Moreover, it is not only a 'picture', a 'still life'. The 'resurrected' father appears to be quite 'physical', real. Does the mirror have a quality of mixing life and death? Can the mirror conquer death? This is the mystery which is revealed to us and is yet to be solved.

Mirrors. We may see ourselves in them, brooding over our humanity and existence. Our images are never exact, however. There is always something partial in them, imperfect, turned over or blurred, which makes the discovery of the Truth impossible. We can see strange figures or the dead in our looking-glasses – perhaps symbols of some 'deeper' mysteries, which we would like to solve. Mirrors are instruments of our cognition and witnesses of our usual chores as well as Love, Life and Death. We encounter them everyday and almost everywhere. What will we see when we take a look in our mirrors next time..?

Notes

[1] Kopaliński, W. *Słownik symboli.* Warszawa 1990

[2] The poem is very autobiographical. It contains an episode in which Robert Graves

took part during the First World War – he was severely injured in a shell blast. The mentioned 'missile fragment' is a reminder of the accident.

It is also interesting to compare the description of the poet's face given here with one presented in his autobiography *Goodbye to All That.* However, it must be kept in mind that the description in the book is of a much younger Graves. (Graves, R. *Goodbye to All That.* Penguin, 1984 pp. 10-11)

> My height is given as six feet two inches, my eyes as grey, and my hair as black. To 'black' should be added 'thick and curly'. I am untruthfully described as having no special peculiarity. For a start, there is my big, once aquiline nose, which I broke at Charterhouse when foolishly playing rugger with soccer players. (I broke another player's nose at that game.) That unsteadied it, and boxing sent it askew. Finally, it was operated on by an unskilful army surgeon, and no longer serves as a vertical line of demarcation between the left and the right sides of my face, which are naturally unassorted – my eyes, eyebrows, and ears being all set noticeably crooked, and my cheekbones, which are rather high, being on different levels. My mouth is what is known as 'full', and my smile is tight-lipped: when I was thirteen I broke two front teeth and became sensitive about showing them. My hands and feet are large. I weigh about twelve stone four. My best comic turn is a double-jointed pelvis; I can sit on a table and tap like the Fox sisters with it. One shoulder is distinctly lower than the other, because of a lung wound. I do not carry a watch because I always magnetize the main-spring; during the war when an order went out that officers should carry watches and synchronize them daily, I had to buy two new ones every month. Medically, I am a good life.

[3] Corintians: 3, 11-12, King James's Bible

Stanisław Gieżynski

The Heterosexual and the Homoerotic in the Chosen Poems of Walt Whitman's 'Children of Adam' and 'Calamus' Sequences*

Following Ezra Pound one may claim that if there exists one good poem on a certain subject, there is no need to write about it anymore. This thesis does not hold true for most of poets and especially not for those who write about love. The subject seems to have become one with the notion of poetry itself and is rather exploited. Nevertheless, people write about love, and what is more important, they are read. Walt Whitman's 'Children of Adam' and 'Calamus' sequences seem to be especially interesting in this respect, because they deal with two basic aspects of human sexuality and eroticism: the love of the opposite sex and the homosexual. Using the chosen poems, this paper's aim will be to discuss and juxtapose these two ways of loving as presented by Whitman.

The poet's approach to sexuality appears to prefigure the classic Freudian formula. It may be best observed in the poem 'Spontaneous me'. It opens with a vivid and colorful description of nature: the hills, the sun, the grass. Suddenly, it becomes a 'poem of the privacy of the night, and of men like me'. The following passages constitute a string of erotic images and through widely used enumerations the reader gets the feeling of speeding up, moving faster and faster: 'love- thoughts, love- juice, love- odour, love- yielding, love-climbers, and the climbing sap'. This is just a preparation, the sensorial and

* The paper has been submitted for the course 127: *Poetry of Walt Whitman and Emily Dickinson* run by Professor Agata Preis-Smith.

psychic part of erotic excitement, which turns physical: 'Arms and hands of love, lips of love, phallic thumb of love, breasts of love, bellies press'd and glued together with love'. In this poem, human sexuality is wild, unconstrained, spontaneous and, above all, natural. Erotic images are mixed with visions of nature: 'the smell of apples, aromas from crush'd sage'. This is the celebration of the id, a natural urge for procreation. However, there soon appears another element in the poem, quite easily identifiable with the superego. A feeling of being ashamed of one's actions, the burden of social norms and regulations combined with an awkward understanding of humanity as a negation of instincts and basic needs introduce to the poem a dramatic tension. The unidentified lovers, a man and a woman start to behave strangely: 'The young man that flushes and flushes, and the young woman that flushes and flushes' and 'the young man all colour'd, red, ashamed, angry'. Faced with the decision of what should prevail, the id or the superego, the poet turns to nature: 'Should I skulk or find myself indecent, while birds and animals never skulk or find themselves indecent'. The final decision is in favor of nature and the instinct; the poem ends with both sexual and emotional relief.

In 'Spontaneous me' the need for sexual pleasure is stressed, while the procreation aspect of sex is only touched upon. In another poem 'A woman waits for me' Whitman studies the role of a woman in connection with giving birth to children. In this piece, a woman is deprived of womanhood: 'Their flesh has the old divine suppleness and strength'. The poet presents a long list of qualities that his women must possess: 'they know how to swim, row, ride, wrestle, shoot...'. From these enumerations emerges a vision of a person who cannot be called a woman. Whitman seems to be looking for a reproductive machine and the idea of an *übermensch* comes to mind dangerously quickly. The poet is obsessed with the thought of having children, strong infants that will build a new America, as he himself states: 'I pour the stuff to start sons and daughters fit for these states' and 'On you I graft the grafts of the best- beloved of me and America'. Although he talks about love ('but I love you'), this seems to be a very egoistic and selfish feeling, governed by the reproductive instinct.

The emotional aspect of the relationship between men and women appears in the closing part of the 'Children of Adam'. A good example here is 'Once I passed through a populous city'. The scene is clearly defined - a man in a far away city meets a woman. It is probably just a one-night stand; but now, at the moment of speaking, the 'I' remembers only this woman, not the city or his purpose: 'All else has long been forgotten by me'. The poem seems to illustrate the need of emotional contact with others. It is deprived of sexuality, there is only some unidentified longing for this brief time of inner peace with 'the woman'. The poem concludes: 'I see her close beside me with silent lips

sad and tremulous'.

The motif of emotional contact is fully developed in the 'Calamus' sequence. The homosexual relationship as perceived by Whitman seems to be rather platonic. The physical contact is reduced to kissing and holding hands, which evokes in the reader the impression of the innocence and, at the same time, the truthfulness of the feelings described. An interesting poem here is 'When I heard of the close of the day'. The speaking 'I' (Whitman himself) is not happy, despite his life accomplishments. The situation changes when he finds out that his lover is going to visit him. The poet presents the reader with a set of images of the sunrise on the beach, which seem to be rather trivial ('When I saw the full moon in the west grow pale and disappear in the morning light'), but they serve the specific purpose of evoking positive emotions in the reader. Whitman presents himself in this situation as a careless boy, an innocent and chaste being: 'When I wandered alone on the beach, and undressing bathed, laughing with the cool waters'. When the lover finally comes, physical love is indicated in the following way only: 'the one I love most lay sleeping by me under the same cover in the cool night' and 'his arms lay lightly around my breast'.

The only erotic means in the poem seems to be the ocean. The young boy bathes in the great womb and next he finds sexual fulfillment – this seems to be an obvious interpretation. However, there is more to it. The ocean is also the source of all life on Earth. The reunion with the lover is accompanied by the strong presence of the ocean: 'I heard the hissing rustle of the liquid and sands as directed to me whispering to congratulate me'. In this view, the homoerotic is very natural, as if approved by the greatest life- giving power on the planet.

Another aspect of male relationships is conveyed in the poem entitled 'I dream'd in a dream'. This piece seems to be connected with the very nature of such a relationship. The emotional bonds between men are constructed in a specific way: the heritage of generations of warriors and hunters put its mark on the behavior of all men. Mutual trust, courage and above all equality seem to be the leading concepts in understanding male friendship. Whitman is well aware of it when he says: 'I dream'd in a dream I saw a city invincible to the attacks of the whole rest of the earth/ I dreamed that was the new city of Friends'. This is a highly idealistic and utopian vision of brotherhood of all men, somehow reminding one of the socialist idea of the community of all nations. In this poem all men are brothers, equal to each other, joined together because of the recognition of their likeness and led by their 'robust love'. The love that is vigorous, hearty and forceful, just as men in Whitman's view are. The poem is a praise of masculinity and the special feeling that, according to the poet, binds all men together.

It may be clearly seen that the key concept in Whitman's treatment of love and sex is nature. Nature approves of both the heterosexual and the homosexual. However, the homoerotic poems are much gentler, delicate and emotional than the heterosexual. It seems that Whitman recognizes the need of contacts between men and women, but perceives them on a purely biological level, claiming the superiority of fine 'robust love' between men.

Renata Orłowska

William Faulkner's Sutpen: a Case of Enslavement to a Flawed 'Design'*

In the case of Sutpen it is difficult to talk of an open conflict with himself like that of Quentin and Christmas. Throughout the novel he was depicted as a hard, ruthless man, determined to remove all persons or things that he regarded as obstructions to his design, which was to become a planter and found a dynasty. Such a perception of the protagonist seems to be supported by the way he was introduced in the novel. Unlike Quentin and Christmas, Sutpen was never allowed to speak for himself. The reader got to know him through the eyes of the narrators, who tried to reconstruct Sutpen's story in order to answer the questions that they themselves were haunted by.

Miss Rosa Coldfield told Quentin about Sutpen because for forty-three years she was tormented by the question as to why this demon, as she called Sutpen, had humiliated her so much and apparently had never regretted it. She must have lived for those forty-three years in a state of inner fury, outrage, despair and desire to know why he had behaved then the way he had. Having decided to tell Quentin about herself and Sutpen, she might have expected her listener to help her answer the question, since someone from outside should have a more objective approach than a person who was the most involved. She could have also hoped that Quentin, as the grandson of General Compson, who used to be Sutpen's only friend, might be able to supply her with some details unknown to her of the life of the man who was to be her husband and which

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could have explained the motives of his behaviour. But it was also possible that she just wanted to voice her own reflections and find an answer herself because some people tend to believe that expressing verbally one's anxieties and doubts gives the troubled person a broader perspective on the subject, as if putting him or her in the position of a more objective judge of the things. Listening to his/her own words one may acquire a more detached perspective than during a voiceless brooding over some facts.

Quentin might have sought the reasons for the defeat of the South in the Civil War in the events that had led to Sutpen's failure. He tended to perceive the history of Sutpen's rise and fall as the epitome of the history of the South. The Canadian, Shreve, tried to reconstruct the story of Thomas Sutpen in order to understand the mentality of Southerners. Quentin, on the other hand, might have seen in Sutpen his kin. Their kinship was based on the fact that they both lived in the South, though Sutpen had come from a different region of the country, but decided to make himself a Southern gentleman. Being and becoming Southerners largely contributed to the misfortune of them both because to be a typical Southerner meant strict adherence to the Southern Code based on necessity of the premarital virginity of white women, the courage of white men, the imperative to defend women's honour, the superiority of the white race over the black one and the prohibition of miscegenation.

However, those were just the speculations of the narrators who told the story of Sutpen. The fact that all the narrators agreed upon was that Sutpen had a certain design, which he did not accomplish, and that he failed on the whole. A close analysis of the accounts of all the narrators of Sutpen's story revealed that his failure might have had its roots in an inner conflict he had suffered from after the incident at the front door of the rich planter's house. In order to fully comprehend the significance of that incident it is necessary to recall some other facts from Thomas Sutpen's life.

He was born in Virginia Highlands. In that place there were different social rules than in the deep South where he came later. We could probably risk the statement that Faulkner described the place as a democratic, even though somewhat primitive country. The main criteria for the evaluation of people there were one's strength and efforts. Nevertheless, the stronger ones did not use their advantage in order to humiliate the weaker or to exploit them. Being the stronger there was rather something one could boast about, but it was not connected with a significant economic dominance over the weaker.

> Because where he lived the land belonged to anybody and everybody and so the man who would go to the trouble and work to fence off a piece of it and say 'This is mine' was crazy; and as for objects, nobody had anymore of them

> than you did because everybody had just what he was strong enough or energetic enough to take and keep, and only that crazy man would go to the trouble to take or even want more than he could eat or swap for powder or whiskey. (Absalom, 1964, p.221)[1]

The life style of those mountain people might seem primitive. Their minimalist needs delayed economic progress, and indeed those people seemed backward in comparison with the inhabitants of the Tidewater, if we were to judge them by economic standards. On the other hand, one could say that they stood on a higher level of development as far as humanistic values were concerned. Stamina, as a criterion for evaluation of people seems more just than the colour of one's skin or the amount of material possessions. It is also worth emphasising that the mountain people seemed to be on a higher stage of development than the Southerners from the point of view of social organisation. Southerners, who claimed to be on a higher economic level than the primitive mountaineers, went back to the ancient times if we judge them from the point of view of a social system because it was in the ancient times that the social organisations had been based on slavery.

At the age of about fourteen Thomas Sutpen came from such a 'mountain paradise'[2] to the Tidewater, which differed so much from the place where he was born.

> ... he didn't even know there was a country all divided and fixed and neat with a people living on it all divided and fixed and neat because of what color their skins happened to be and what they happened to own... (p.221)

From the very beginning of living in a new place until the incident at the front door, young Thomas did not suffer spiritually or physically because of the change. But one day he was sent with a message from his father to the house of the plantation owner for whom his father was working. Having lived so far among the people whose houses had just one door, Thomas would naturally go to the front door of the big plantation house. At the front door he was stopped by a Negro who ordered him to go to the back door before he could start to tell what was that he came with. It was a turning point in Thomas's life. Just like Christmas, who did not attach any value to one's racial origin before the incident with the dietitian, so Thomas did not feel worse because he did not possess the objects the planter had. Although he already had been in the Tidewater for some time, he still lived according to the principles that were in power in the mountains. Furthermore, he had the same expectations in respect to the people in the new country as he would from the ones he used to know. He

expected the rich planter to be proud of his house, as the mountaineer would be proud of a new fine rifle. But it never occurred to him that the rich man could use his wealth to humiliate one who did not have it.

> ... never for one moment thinking but what the man would be as pleased to show him the balance of his things as the mountain man would have been to show the powder horn and bullet mold that went with the rifle. (p.229)

Sutpen not only felt humiliated by the affront but suddenly became aware of the social position he and his family occupied in the new place. With the awareness of social inferiority came the moral crisis and the inner conflict. As Sartre might have put it, Sutpen, like Christmas, 'recognised himself in the Other's gaze.'[3] He started to perceive himself, his family and the rest of poor white people in the way the rich planter in all probability perceived them. Young Sutpen adopted the view of the Southern planters who considered poverty a reason for shame and judged people by their financial status.

> ... he himself seeing his own father and sisters and brothers as the owner, the rich man (not the bigger) must have been seeing them all the time – as cattle, creatures heavy and without grace, brutally evacuated into a world without a hope or purpose for them, who would in turn spawn with vicious prolixity, populate, double, treble and compound, fill space and earth with a race whose future would be a succession of cut-down and patched and made-over garments bought on exorbitant credit because they were white people, from stores where niggers were given the garments free... (p.235)

The incident had a very strong impact upon the rest of Thomas's life because it occurred in puberty, which like early childhood is a period of increased sensitivity. The effect of this negative experience in Thomas's adolescence was, to a certain extent, similar to the results brought about by Christmas's experiences of early childhood and adolescence. It is also noteworthy that the development of inner conflicts of all three protagonists that the thesis is dealing with, namely Quentin, Christmas and Sutpen, was enhanced by lack of parental guidance. Young Thomas, after the accident at the front door, was in strong need of the counsel of somebody older than himself. Unfortunately, he could not count on help of his mother because she was already dead and his father was apparently well adjusted to the new conditions and, even if he was vaguely aware of their situation, which from an economic point of view seemed worse than that of the slaves, he found a tranquilliser in alcohol or gave vent to his anger by beating the slaves. Left completely to himself, Thomas felt the necessity of making some choice which would enable him to

'live with himself for the rest of his life...' (p.234)

Sutpen's problem can be perceived as the dilemma of an existential hero. Just like an existential hero, Sutpen must have felt the burden of freedom which was connected with the necessity of making some choice and loneliness, a condition typical of existential heroes, made the burden even heavier. Deprived of the advice of somebody older, Sutpen decided to solve his conflict by means of the only code he knew, which was the old 'rifle code'. The name of the code came from the fact that the possession of a good rifle was one of a few situations he could imagine in which one man, the one who had the fine rifle, could have an advantage over the other one, that did not have it.

> He thought 'If you were fixing to combat them that had the fine rifles, the first thing you would do would be to get yourself the nearest thing to a fine rifle you could borrow or steal or make, wouldn't it?' and he said Yes. 'But this ain't a question of rifles. So to combat them you have got to have what they have that made them do what the man did. You got to have land and niggers and a fine house to combat them with. You see?' and he said Yes again. (p.238)

That was how Sutpen's design was conceived. He began to think in a way typical of Sartre's man/woman, who having recognised himself/herself in the Other's gaze put all his/her effort into the defiance of his/her image as seen by the Other. Unfortunately, the way in which he chose to resolve his inner conflict in the long run turned out to be a disastrous one. His design became a contradiction of his former beliefs. Sutpen decided to defeat the rich planter and the people of his kind by using the weapon they did. However, in the process of acquiring that weapon he transformed himself into the kind of man whom he despised and whom he knew to do wrong. In order to combat those rich planters, he bought a hundred square miles of land, although he used to think that a man should have just enough possessions to be able to satisfy his essential needs such as eating, self-protection and entertainment in a form of hunting or drinking whisky. When he arrived in Jefferson, he went to the trouble of building a large mansion and filling it with luxuries that could compete with or even surpass those that other Southern planters possessed.

In his general design he resembled Flem Snopes. Though the latter did not intend to found a dynasty; he was going to get rich to attain upper-middle class status, and not that of an aristocrat. It must be emphasised that becoming rich was not Sutpen's ultimate goal. Sutpen considered wealth only as a tool necessary to found a dynasty. Faulkner himself denied the similarity between Sutpen and Flem Snopes's designs.

> ... only Sutpen had a grand design. Snopes's design was pretty base – he just wanted to get rich, he didn't care how. Sutpen wanted to get rich only incidentally. He wanted to take revenge for all the redneck people against the aristocrat who told him to go around to the back door. He wanted to show that he could establish a dynasty too – he could make himself a king and raise a line of princes.[4]

With the acquisition of wealth came the power over other people and the possibility to use them. Sutpen started treating people like objects, although he several years earlier had rebelled against a perception of him as a part of the plantation's chattel.

As Hyatt H. Waggoner observed, 'For Sutpen other people were objects to be manipulated, related to him in an "I-it" relation. He not only never achieves, he never once approaches, an "I-Thou" relation.'[5] In his treatment of Wash Jones he mirrored the rich planter from the Tidewater, whom he had seen lying all day in a hammock without his shoes, while a black slave had kept bringing him water which he had fetched from a mile away spring. When Sutpen became a rich planter himself, Wash Jones had to bring him water from a mile away spring, while he was lying in a hammock without his shoes on.

Sutpen treated the members of his family with the same ruthlessness as his servants or slaves. A wife was for him just one element of his design, like a big house, land and slaves. During his talk with Quentin's grandfather he said:

> I had a design. To accomplish it I should require money, a house, a plantation, slaves, a family – incidentally of course, a wife. (p.263)

It is worth emphasising that a wife was mentioned in the last place. The adverb 'incidentally' indicates that a wife was treated as means to achieve his design.

Wife was quite important for him yet not as a person but mainly as a female who could give birth to a male heir who could become a scion of Sutpen's dynasty. Such an attitude towards a spouse was well reflected by the way Sutpen treated his first and second wives. He repudiated his first wife and son because they had black ancestors, which made them unsuitable to his design.

That act of his may seem to prove that he absorbed the racist views of the Jefferson community he came to live in. However, a closer analysis of the text of *Absalom, Absalom!* and of the opinions of its author showed that Sutpen did not become a typical hardened racist. Apparently, he did not repudiate Charles because of any personal contempt towards him but decided that he

could not found a dynasty on a part Negro son. Faulkner explained that issue answering the question whether Sutpen acknowledged Clytemnestra as his daughter:

> ... that would not have mattered because Clytemnestra was a female. The important thing to him was he should establish a line of dukes, you see. He was going to create a dukedom. He'd have to have a male descendant. He would have to establish a dukedom which would be his revenge on the white Virginian who told him to go to the back door. And so he – to have a Negro, half-Negro, for his son would have wrecked the whole dream. If he couldn't – if he had thought that that would ever be exposed that Bon was his son, he may have killed Bon himself. If it had ever come to that point, he would have destroyed Bon just as he would have destroyed any other individual who got in his way.[6]

In one respect Sutpen was not a racist. Unlike many other Southerners, Sutpen was not afraid of the touch of a Negro. He fought with his black slaves as if in order to establish his superiority over them on the basis of sheer physical strength rather than the colour of skin, which can be perceived as a remnant of the mountain code. The fact that he fought with his black slaves half-naked offered a contrast with the stance of Rosa Coldfield, who was outraged because Clytie dared to touch her. Cleanth Brooks remarked that

> Some of Sutpen's white neighbours come to watch the fights as they might come to watch a cockfight. But it is significant that they come as to something extraordinary, a show, an odd spectacle; they would not think of fighting with their own slaves.[7]

Brooks also commented that

> Sutpen does not confine himself to black chattel slavery. He ruthlessly bends anyone that he can to his will. The white French architect whom he brings into Yoknapatawpha country to build his house is as much a slave as any of his black servants: Sutpen hunts him down with dogs when he tries to escape.[8]

His second wife, Ellen, and children: Judith and Henry also seemed to be first of all elements of his design. Ellen was a mother of his children and served him as an umbrella of respectability. During his proposal to Rosa Sutpen himself admitted that he was not a good husband to her sister. Similarly, Judith and Henry had to be totally submitted to his design.

He viewed the possibility of the marriage of Charles and Judith in the first place as a threat to his design and only later as a source of unhappiness for

his children who would enter an incestuous relationship. What was worse, he made his son Henry the murderer of his brother, and his daughter a widow, before she had the chance to be a bride.

The critic Melvin Backman noted the irony in the outcome of Sutpen's efforts to establish a dynasty. He wrote that in attempt to build a dynasty Sutpen had lost his family.[9]

When the war ended, Charles was killed, Henry gone and Sutpen was afraid that he might not manage to complete his design because of a lack of time. Therefore, he became even more ruthless and keen on having a male heir. Hence, he did not hesitate to make Rosa, who was an orphan and destitute after the death of her father, an outrageous proposal suggesting that they would first have a child and if it was a boy then they would get married. When the outraged fiancée left his house, he seduced Milly, the fifteen-years-old grand-daughter of his dependant Wash Jones. But when she gave birth to a girl, he rejected her and the child treating her worse than an animal. He said to her: '"Well, Milly; too bad you are not a mare too. Then I could give you a decent stall in the stable..."' (p.286)

When he conceived his design, he probably did not expect what evil deeds he would have had to commit in order to complete it. Moreover, it is doubtful whether he became aware of the evil he had done afterwards. When he was talking to General Compson after Charles Bon had come with Henry to Sutpen's hundred, he did not try to justify himself but wanted to find out where he had made the mistake. When Henry brought Charles to Sutpen's Hundred for the first time Sutpen did not perceive it as

> retribution, no sin of the father come home to roost; not even calling it bad luck, but just a mistake... just an old mistake in fact which a man of courage and shrewdness... could still combat if he could only find out what the mistake had been.[10]

Cleanth Brooks called Sutpen's innocence

> the innocence of modern man. For like modern man, Sutpen does not believe in Jehovah. He does not believe in goddess Tyche. He is not the victim of bad luck. He has simply made a 'mistake'.[11]

Sutpen seemed to be one of adult males about whom Brooks wrote that 'their innocence amounts finally to a trust in rationality – an overwhelming confidence that plans work out, that life is simpler than it is.'[12] In other words Sutpen can be viewed as the victim of rationalism.

According to Quentin's Grandfather, because of his innocence Sutpen believed that 'the ingredients of morality were like the ingredients of pie and cake and once you had measured them and balanced them and put them into the oven it was all finished and nothing but pie or cake could come out.' (p.263) That type of rationalism was also combined with incorrigible optimism, whereas such an optimism made Sutpen live in the future and ignore the past, which seemed equally harmful as Quentin's obsession with the past. Apparently, Sutpen forgot that the deeds we committed in the past tend to influence the future. He became only vaguely aware of that truth when he started looking for the mistake which he must have made at some point.

Although Sutpen seemed to be a hardened realist, his stubborn pursuit of the design was a pursuit of an abstraction. Sutpen committed an error that Alfred North Whitehead would call the 'Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness'[13] which means 'mistaking the abstract for the concrete.'[14] Panthea Reid Broughton, who employed Whitehead's terms as useful in dealing with Faulkner's characters explained that committing the 'Fallacy of Misplaced Contreteness'

> Man not only lifts the abstraction from experience, but he tends to assign reality status to the abstraction and deny the existence of ultimate reality which, according to Whitehead is 'not static matter but the flux of physical existence.'[15]

According to Broughton Sutpen

> is committing his version of Whitehead's fallacy of misplaced concreteness; for Sutpen refuses to renew his code's [of logic and morality] reference to the maelstrom of experience. Denying that experience, he endows the fixed code with more validity than the changing reality it is supposed to interpret.[16]

As mentioned above, Sutpen kept on pursuing his design which can be perceived as an abstraction conceived by a humiliated child. He tried to 'assign reality status to the abstraction' by rationalistic means such as accumulation of material possessions and an effort to have a male heir. Nevertheless, he was not able to adjust (his code) to the maelstrom of new experience. He could have made some changes in his design when faced with the black origin of his wife and child. Had he recognised them instead of striving to found a dynasty of 'white dukes'[17] he would have taken better moral revenge on the people like the Virginian planter because he could have proved that he had been able to surpass them both on economic and moral grounds. He could modify his design

acknowledging Charles Bon, who came to knock at his door, and reminded Sutpen of a boy symbol that he dreamt of. Because Sutpen conceiving his design thought that some day when he was already rich a poor white boy would knock at his front door as he had done several years ago. The moment would signify that he was already equal to the rich planter from the Tidewater.

> ... he stood there at his own door, just as he had imagined, planned, designed, and sure enough and fifty years the forlorn nameless and homeless lost child came to knock at it and no monkey-dressed nigger anywhere under the sun to come to the door and order the child away; (p. 267)

Sutpen, however, did not acknowledge Bon even though he thought he was ready to take in the boy who would come to knock at his door.

> ... now he would take that boy in where he would never again need to stand on the outside of a white door and knock at it: and not at all for mere shelter but so that that boy, that whatever nameless stranger, could shut that door himself forever behind him on all that he had ever known, and look ahead along the still undivulged light years in which his descendants who might not even ever hear his (the boy's) name, waited to be born without even having to know that they had once been riven forever free from brutehood just as his own (Sutpen's) children were –' (p.261)

These words of Sutpen, who spoke them to General Compson during the war, confirmed the fact that Sutpen again committed the 'fallacy of misplaced concreteness' because he was ready to accept an abstraction but not new experience, brought by reality, embodied by Charles Bon. In his 'mistaking of the abstract for the concrete' Sutpen resembled Quentin, for whom his dreams, recollections and imaginary disputes with his father were more real than the events that were going on around him. On the other hand, in his stubborn pursuit of the design and rejection of Bon for the second time Sutpen reminded us of Christmas, who refused the possibility of settling down by having a child by Joanna Burden because it would mean denying all the years during which he lived in such a way so that to make himself a villain.

Sutpen's inability to accept Charles Bon and his instrumental treatment of other people may be an illustration of what Panthea Broughton called 'conceptualising.'[18] She wrote that Faulkner's characters

> refuse to acknowledge their companions' living breathing humanity... these characters cannot see human face for the abstract mask they have invented. They confront not the man but the abstraction, not an amorphous fluctuating personality, but conveniently projected, fixed concept.[19]

Sutpen tended to perceive Charles as an embodiment of his mistake, an obstruction or possible threat to his design rather than a rejected son seeking love and tacit recognition from the father. Similarly, Rosa was for him first of all a young female, possibly but not certainly capable of giving him the male descendant.

The way Sutpen treated other people reveals still another flaw of his choice which he shared with Quentin and Christmas. Namely, he desired to be somebody he was not. He set his mind on becoming a planter even though he realised that because of his heritage and lack of education he did not fulfil the criteria which granted the title. Yet he decided to gain and learn those things which were essential for a Southern planter. He acquired land and slaves and taught himself 'good manners'. As stated earlier, he adopted to a certain extent the community values such as racism and evaluation of people on the basis of their material possessions, which he considered unfair. However, in order to be more precise, it should be said that Sutpen did not adopt the whole Southern ideology, but only those principles which he regarded as necessary for his design. Unfortunately, those were mostly the negative principles. In the case of Sutpen we can speak about a clash of ideologies, which also contributed to his inner conflict.

Until his arrival in the Tidewater Sutpen had been growing up under the influence of an ideology which could be classified as a democracy or even liberalism.[20] The ruling system there was plantocracy.[21] So far the focus of the thesis has been on emphasising the superiority of mountain culture over the Southern. But now it seems advisable to show how the mixture of different aspects of the systems based on two different ideologies, influenced Sutpen's psyche contributing to the development of his inner conflict and leading to the ultimate failure. The main principles of liberalism are social equality, reward based on merit, individualism and independence. Promoting individualism and independence 'liberalists would also feel less inherent obligation to an extended family and or to society in general but would work to benefit themselves and their own family.'[22] Consequently, liberals' ethos entails lower moral responsibility for the fate of others.

The system of plantocracy was based on the ideology of paternalism, which

> assumes an inherent inequality among humans and stresses the organic unity of a society in which each individual accepts his or her place in a stratified social order. Paternalism takes as its model the extended, patriarchal household, and places a code of honor and a sense of responsibility upon the leaders of family and society. Paternalists tend to believe that some people, mostly men, are simply better than others by nature; these 'better' men should

> rule, should make decisions for others; in fact, they are morally obliged to take care of and make decisions for those who, they feel, cannot do so for themselves, and to regulate the behaviour of those who, in their eyes, might otherwise wreak havoc on society.[23]

Sutpen was influenced by both of those ideologies. Unfortunately, it seems that he mostly took the negative principles from those two systems of beliefs, or tried to apply the contradictory rules. On the other hand, he believed in the equality of all people, but on the other, he rejected the possibility of founding a dynasty on a part Negro son. He coveted the splendours due to a rich planter, yet he refrained from obligations connected with the position of a rich patriarch. Wash Jones accepted his inferiority to Colonel Sutpen, yet he expected protection and a kind of fatherly care on the part of his master whom he perceived as a God-like figure. Whereas Sutpen humiliated Jones as a patriarch would, by ordering Jones to bring him water from a mile away spring while he was lying in a hammock, or not allowing him to enter the house before the Civil War, yet he did not feel responsible for the fate of his dependant, which was reflected by the stance he took after Milly gave birth to his daughter. At that point he remained a 'liberal'. Therefore, Sutpen can be called a false Southern aristocrat because he managed to imitate only the basic forms of behaviour typical to a Southern aristocrat such as good manners. Nevertheless, the exaggerated politeness with which he asked for a match to a cigar or offered the cigar betrayed the fact that it was a pattern of behaviour that he had to teach himself either from a book or imitating other Southern planters.

Sutpen tried to impose his own meaning to the concept of tradition by means of acquiring land, slaves and imposing mansion. He also went into trouble of securing a tombstone for his wife and himself. According to Cleanth Brooks,

> Sutpen would seize upon 'the traditional' as a pure abstraction – which, of course, is to deny its very meaning. For him the tradition is not a way of life 'handed down' or transmitted from the community, past and present, to the individual nurtured by it. It is an assortment of things to be possessed, not a manner of living that embodies certain values and determined men's conduct.[24]

The critic Kevin Railey juxtaposed him to General Compson, a model Southern aristocrat, who adhered to the positive principles of paternalism. He lent Sutpen a cotton seed when the latter came to Jefferson, helped Judith buy the tombstones for her relatives and tried to give a hand to Charles Etienne Bon.[25]

However, finding in *Absalom, Absalom!* an enduring hero who could be juxtaposed with Sutpen would be more difficult than in the cases of Quentin in *The Sound and the Fury* and Christmas in *Light in August*. Donald M. Kartiganer opposed Sutpen to Charles Bon. Charles Bon could hardly be considered an enduring hero since he did not survive, yet the juxtaposition of him and Sutpen seems to be quite suitable because, although he died, he remained faithful to the moral values that Sutpen discarded in pursuit of his design. Kartiganer emphasised that Charles Bon was capable of love, forgiveness, and respect for the individual.[26] Kartiganer reminded of Bon's refusal to abandon the octoroon mistress and his child, which he contrasted with the manner in which Sutpen treated his first wife and son, Rosa Coldfield and finally Milly Jones. He also justified Charles's relationship with the octoroon mistress, opposing it to the Southern planters' brutal treatment and sexual abuse of women slaves. 'But we do save that one, who but for us would have been sold to any brute who had the price, not sold to him for the night like a white prostitute but body and soul for life.'[27] Further, Kartiganer wrote about Charles's love for his brother Henry, whom Bon covered with his cloak to protect him from cold although he knew that Henry would kill him. What is more, he replaced the picture that Judith gave him with the one of his octoroon mistress so that his fiancée would not suffer so much after his death. To ease her pain he was ready to sacrifice his good name. Kartiganer also quoted Peter Swiggart, according to whom the basic conflict in *Absalom, Absalom!* was 'a conflict between two conceptions of human dignity, one based on social abstractions and involving the effort to control nature by rational means, and the other based on isolated human element.'[28]

Swiggart's theory seems to be a very sound argument which enables to distinguish and emphasise once again one of the main reasons for Sutpen's inner conflict and failure. Both Sutpen and Charles strove for recognition of their human dignity. But they must have had different concepts of human dignity and tried to achieve it in different ways. Sutpen had been denied his human dignity by the rich planter's slave who ordered him to go to the back door. He then tried to regain his dignity by accumulation of material possessions and objectification of other human beings, which brought the results contrary to the expected ones. He was feared by the community of Jefferson, but he was not liked. Neither was he considered the gentleman which he attempted to become. According to Rosa, people feared him because he was wealthy, which equalled being powerful, but they despised him in their hearts for his unknown heritage and past. Whereas the way he treated people dehumanised not only them, but also himself. The process of dehumanisation of Sutpen was also reflected by the change in his physical appearance.

> He was not portly yet, though he was now getting on toward fifty five. The fat, the stomach, came later. It came upon him suddenly, all at once, in the year after whatever it happened to his engagement to Miss Rosa and she quitted his roof... The flesh came upon him suddenly, as though what the negroes and Wash Jones, too, called the fine figure of a man had reached and its peak after the foundation had given away and something between the shape of him that people knew and uncompromising skeleton of what actually was had gone fluid and, earthbound, had been snubbed up and unrestrained, balloonlike, unstable and lifeless, by the envelope which it had betrayed. (p.81)

The key word in the above quotation is 'balloonlike.' A balloon is filled with air which may symbolise inner vacuum. In pursuit of his design, Sutpen forgot of inner values such as love, pity, compassion, respect for the other individual and the readiness to sacrifice for others. It seems that what was left of him was just body which could be symbolised by the balloon and destroying a human body is as easy as destroying the balloon.

Charles Bon had been denied human dignity by his father, who had repudiated him and his mother depriving him of his name and the right to inheritance of Sutpen's Hundreds and the slaves. Nevertheless, Charles did not wish to regain his right to Sutpen's material possessions. He did not ever demand an official acknowledgement from Sutpen. Instead, he would have been satisfied with as little as the gesture of recognition, done in secrecy, not even words. Charles associated human dignity with human feelings such as love, compassion and understanding of another human being, and not with social recognition of wealth and power.

Nevertheless, there were moments when Sutpen had his 'humanities'[29] like Melville's Ahab. At one point during the war Sutpen showed Henry love and emotion. When Henry entered Colonel Sutpen's tent he just saluted. It was his father who made the first move.

> He [Henry] just salutes the braided cuff and stand so until the other says,
> - Henry.
> Even now Henry does not start. He just stands so, the two of them stand so, looking at one another. It is the older man who moves first, though they meet in the center of the tent, where they embrace and kiss before Henry is aware that he was moved, moved by what of close blood which in the reflex instant abrogates and reconciles even though it does not yet (perhaps never will) forgive, who stands now while his father hold his face between both hands, looking at it.
> - Henry, Sutpen says – My son. (p.353)

Paradoxically, even though Sutpen seemed to forget about such values

as love, love or more precisely unfulfilled love, became also a source of his conflict. As Faulkner said,

> The love was a part of his conflict too. He wanted that son for vanity, of course. But you – vanity is not really enough. You've got to love the thing that you can be vain because of, or proud because of. It had to be his son, not just – he could have adopted a child, you see, and carved out a plantation. That wasn't enough, it had to be his, not only to be proud of, but to represent his own blood, his own passion.[30]

On the surface Sutpen almost achieved or was very close to achieving what he had planned. He had a big house, land, slaves, a wife and children. But through his own inflexibility he lost the chance of experiencing father-son love because he repudiated his first son and by making Henry his brother's murderer he became responsible for expatriation of Henry as well as inability of make him his male heir.

To sum up, it should be mentioned once again that the story of Sutpen presented in *Absalom, Absalom!* was the sum of interpretations and conclusions drawn by the different narrators. Some of them seem more prejudiced, like Rosa Coldfield, others, like Shreve, aimed for a more detailed, but at the same time more global explanation of Sutpen's deeds. Throughout the whole novel, Sutpen never spoke for himself, which was the same technique Faulkner employed to tell the story of Caddy in *The Sound and the Fury*. With artistic mastery, Faulkner created the illusion of Sutpen talking to General Compson, but, in fact, the dialogues, or rather monologues were the products of Quentin and Shreve's imagination in trying to reconstruct the story. In spite of the fact that Sutpen did not speak for himself the story is more objective than if it had been told by just one narrator or only the hero himself. On the basis of the accounts of the several narrators, the reader is able to draw the conclusion that at the age of about fourteen Sutpen suffered from an inner conflict. The conflict was caused by the change of environment and connected with it was the exposure to a new ideology and social system which placed Thomas in an inferior position. As it was in the case of Christmas, the next factor that contributed to Sutpen's inner trouble was his attitude towards himself and the values of the Southern community that he came to live in. In order to appease his inner conflict with himself caused by humiliation at the front door, Sutpen made a choice that, in the long run, only enhanced his inner conflict because the design he conceived demanded the discarding of his former beliefs and adopting the values of the new environment.

Striving to accomplish his design Sutpen committed 'the fallacy of

misplaced concreteness'. The pursuit of the design was, in fact, the pursuit of an abstraction. On the other hand, Sutpen was a victim of his innocence which consisted in exaggerated trust in rationality. But the most important thing is that he violated the 'old verities'[31] of pity, compassion, respect and understanding of another human being. As Faulkner himself pointed out,

> He wanted revenge as he saw it, but also he wanted to establish the fact that man is immortal, that man, if he is a man, cannot be inferior to another man through artificial standards or circumstances. What he was trying to do – when he was a boy, he had gone to the front door of a big house and somebody, a servant, said, Go around to the back door. He said, I'm going to be the one that lives in the big house, I'm going to establish a dynasty, I don't care how, and he violated all the rules of decency and honor and pity and compassion, and the fates took revenge on him. That's what that story was. But he was trying to say in his blundering way that, Why should a man be better than me because he's richer than me, that if I had had the chance I might be just as good as he thinks he is by getting the same outward trappings which he has, which was a big house and servants in it. He didn't say, I'm going to be braver and more compassionate or more honest that he – he just said, I'm going to be as rich as he was, as big as he was on the outside.[32]

Notes

1 Faulkner, 1964, p. 221. All further quotations are marked in the text.

2 Björk, 1963, p. 202

3 Gammel, 1989, p. 14

4 Gwynn, 1959, pp. 97-98

5 quoted in Kartiganer, 1965, p. 303

6 Gwynn, F. L., Blotner, J. L. ,1959, p. 272

7 Brooks, 1963, p. 300

8 Brooks, 1963, p. 299

9 cf Backman, 1966, p. 107

[10] Faulkner, *Absalom, Absalom!*; quoted in Brooks, 1963,p. 306

[11] Brooks, 1963, p. 306

[12] ibid., p. 308

[13] quoted in Broughton, 1974, p. 53

[14] ibid.

[15] ibid.

[16] op. cit., p. 54

[17] see Gwynn, F. L., Blotner, J. L., 1959, p. 272

[18] see Broughton, 1974, pp. 108-157

[19] op. cit., p. 138

[20] see Railey, Fall 1991/Spring 1992, pp. 115-130

[21] ibid. pp. 115-130

[22] op. cit., p. 119

[23] op. cit., pp. 117-118

[24] Brooks, 1963, p. 298

[25] Railey, Fall 1991/Spring 1992, p. 125

[26] Kartiganer, 1965, pp. 301-302

[27] Faulkner, *Absalom, Absalom!*; quoted in Kartiganer, 1965, p. 303

[28] quoted in Kartiganer, 1965, p. 302

[29] Melville, 1967, p. 87

[30] Gwynn, F. L., Blotner, J. L., 1959, p. 198

[31] Faulkner, *Address upon Receiving the Nobel Prize for Literature* in Merrivether J.B., 1965, p. 120

[32] Gwynn, F. L., Blotner, J. L., 1959, p. 35

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
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Edyta Basiak

From the Son of Man to Superstar. The Gospel in a Musical Version*

In the 1980s, ten years after its American premiere, Andrew Lloyd Webber's *Jesus Christ Superstar* 'made the hit' in Poland and became 'the wonder of the year.'[1] Because of its subject matter, in the current political situation in Poland, the musical was frequently shown in churches serving as an updated and rejuvenated version of the Gospels. The musical seemed to fulfil the function of medieval art: to illustrate the Gospel in a vivid and intelligible manner, for the sake of plain, perhaps even gullible, people. Interestingly enough, the film was more often than not cast without subtitles, which greatly contributed to the false conviction that *Jesus Christ Superstar* was, though modernized, a faithful adaptation of the New Testament. However, the discrepancy between the musical's and the evangelists' version of the story is not grounded solely in the style of clothes and music; on the contrary, it reaches far beyond the superficialities. A scrutinised perusal of Tim Rice's lyrics can reveal that Superstar's life was quite incompatible with Christ's time on earth as presented in the Gospels, especially with regard to his divinity. Obviously, the musical desired to cast a different light on the ever-lingering story of the chaste Son of God, the accursed Judas Iscariot, and the unconcerned Pontius Pilate. And to account for the dissimilarities between the traditional and the remodelled version of Christ's life is the intended purpose of this essay.

The most important aspect of Christ's portrayal is the question of his nature, namely, was Christ the Son of God or a son of man. The four evangelists are quite unanimous with regard to the dogma of Jesus' divinity. His holy

* The paper has been submitted for the course 1511: *The Musical: on Stage and Screen* run by Ms Dorota Babilas, MA.

mission and the oneness of the Son with the Father are particularly visible in the Gospel according to Saint John, which seems to have been the main source of inspiration for Tim Rice. In this spiritual Gospel (pneumatikon), John depicts Jesus as God incarnate, as the Word and the true Light.[2] Christ himself repeatedly emphasizes his divine origin and his unity with the Father and the Holy Spirit. In the three synoptic Gospels, on the other hand, he does not stress his nature in such a powerful manner. Nonetheless, it is acknowledged, mainly by those healed, and by women, who seem to understand it much more swiftly than the Apostles. However, 'never did Jesus during his earthly existence claim he was God; he never said explicitly he was the Son of God, the Son of David. Not until in articulo mortis, during the hearing before the Jewish assembly, did he reveal his messianic majesty'[3]:

> Again the high priest asked him, and said unto him, Art Thou the Christ, the Son of the Blessed?
> And Jesus said, I am.[4]

In the musical, however, Christ is definitely more of a man than God. In a situation parallel to the above, he never openly claims to be God:

> CAIAPHAS
> You say you're the Son of God in all
> Your handouts – well is it true?
> JESUS
> That's what you say – you say that I am[5]

And later, during his conversation with Pontius Pilate, asked by the latter whether he is the King of the Jews, Jesus answers: 'Your words – not mine.'[6] And this is as far as he ever gets. Even when he talks to, or rather argues with, God in the Garden of Gethsemane, he never addresses Him as the 'Father' but as 'God' or 'Lord.'

Superstar, even when alone and in private, never seems to be fully convinced of his divinity. In the scene mentioned above, he actually bargains for his life. His argument with God is not like the humble: 'O my Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me: nevertheless not as I will, but as thou wilt.'[7] He is neither willing to comply with his death sentence, nor is he fully acquainted with the divine plan. Unlike the Gospel Christ, he does not foretell his death three times, nor even once, and when he finds himself betrayed, he feels at a loss. He is virtually unable to see what the reason for his death is and what its consequences will be. He cries out to God:

I'd have to know my Lord
[...]
If I die what will be my reward?
[...]
Why why should I die?

Like in the Bible, he asks:

If there is a way
Take this cup away from me for I
don't want to taste its poison,

but he does not accept his fate unreservedly. On the contrary, he confesses having doubts: 'I have changed I'm not as sure.' Extremely agitated he demands 'just a little of [God's] omnipresent brain' and a feasible reason, but he receives none. Yet finally, he acquiesces:

Alright I'll die!
Oh oh just watch me die!
See now see now I'll die!
Oh just watch me die![8]

He accepts but still does not understand the Scheme started not by him but by God. From his point of view God is his murderer and executioner while he is merely an 'innocent puppet'[9]:

[...] nail me to your cross and break me
Bleed me beat me kill me take me now
- before I change my mind.[10]

Also the apostles and the disciples, especially Judas, perceive Jesus as extremely captivating and charismatic – yet still only a mortal: 'No talk of God then – we called you a man.'[11] The crowds gathered around Christ observe his miraculous deeds and believe that he is the new Messiah, but according to Judas they are wrong. The figure of Christ, depicted from the point of view of

Iscariot, is indeed far from being ideal. Christ has close to nothing but his seductive charm. 'If you strip away the myth from the man' you shall see that Jesus is poorly organized, reckless, impetuous and, above all, vain:

Jesus! You've started to believe
The things they say of you

You really do believe
This talk of God is true.[12]

The relationship between Superstar and Mary Magdalene also contributes significantly to the flesh-and-blood appearance of Christ. The religious, especially Catholic, tradition wants to see Jesus as a chaste man, surely not involved in extramarital intercourse. People who are dissatisfied with this doctrine, and who try to find evidence of his sexual activity in the Bible, usually concentrate on four women: Mary Magdalene, the fallen woman from Luke 7, 36-50, Mary, the sister of Martha, and Joanna, the rich man's wife. Tim Rice decided to create a kind of hybrid, a combination of two, if not three women. From the possible candidates (to a sensual relationship with Christ), the fallen woman was chosen and given the name of Mary Magdalene. It is worth noticing that the prostitute from Luke's Gospel should not be identified with the woman from whom Jesus expelled seven demons and who was first (or one of the first) to witness his resurrection. It can also be argued that the musical Mary Magdalene has some features of Mary, Martha's sister – she also seems to have chosen the best part of Christ. Here, however, it is ambiguous whether the chosen part was spiritual or carnal. Despite those ambiguities, the relation of Mary towards Superstar is of a definitely physical kind, she touches him and strokes his hair[13], or perhaps even more, what can be inferred from her song 'I Don't Know How To Love Him.' Besides, Mary, whom the love for Jesus has metamorphosed, is the only person who gives him comfort and joy. She also seems to be the one who understands him and his needs – mainly physical in this respect:

Mary – that is good
[...]
She alone has tried to give me what
I need right here and now[14]

The love affair between Christ and Mary Magdalene, especially in the eyes of Judas, reveals another human feature of Superstar – the one of hypocrisy. Judas discerns that there is an obvious discrepancy between what Superstar teaches and what he does:

She doesn't fit in well with what
You teach and say
It doesn't help us if you're inconsistent[15]

However, the reason for Judas' reproaches is not entirely clear. On the one hand, he claims that it is not her profession that he objects to[16], on the other, the apostles themselves have their women[17]. So it seems that the reason for Judas' discontent lies in the fact that Jesus has, or should look like having, a supernatural aspect of his nature. If the apostles, as Christ's disciples, obey his directives, then it seems that he has allowed them to remain in extramarital relationships. So why was it not right for him to do what they were allowed to do? Yet, perhaps it is not true that Mary fulfils simply the sexual needs of Superstar, since it could be conjectured that she alone is able to understand his true nature. Thus, being lovers as they are, they are also (or perhaps mainly) soul mates.

There is also another instant when Christ's humanness is proved. In the Bible, the logical consequence of the crucifixion is the resurrection. In this way, the divine nature of Jesus is confirmed and henceforth he 'sits on the right hand of the power of God.'[18] In the screen version of the story however, Superstar does not rise from the dead. In the final scene of the movie all the actors get on a bus and leave, all except for Ted Neely. Probably he is left on the desert, but it should be noticed that the ending of the film is very ambiguous. At this point the boundary line between the fictitious story presented in the movie and the (film) reality is blurred.

In 451 the ecumenical synod in Chalkedon (today's Kadiköy) accepted as a dogma the dual nature of Christ, encompassing both the divine and the human element in one semblance.

> [The] deeply human side of Christ's nature helps us understand and love him, and imitate his suffering, as if it were our own. He would never touch our hearts with such faith and tenderness, and he would not be an example for us, had it not been for his warm human element.[19]

But it can also be perceived as a possible source of doubts and incertitudes. For some people, like Tim Rice and Andrew Lloyd Webber, the admission of the human in Jesus Christ may involve, or be equivocal to, the admission of his human flaws. Superstar is a man made up of flesh and blood in every respect: he is not a natural born martyr, he is vain and unorganized, he is impulsive and slightly naive, as well as hypocritical, and definitely not devoid of sexual needs. Perhaps Tim Rice attempted to show an updated image of Christ in order to bring him closer to the 20th century public. In order to create a figure close to life and easily identifiable with it, he deprived him of some of his traditional religious importance. In view of this fact, it is difficult to understand the reason for the Polish Church treating the musical as a kind of Bible in pictures.

Moreover, the representation of Christ in *Jesus Christ Superstar* is slightly simplistic and, in comparison to the complex portrayal of Judas Iscariot, does not exhaust all the possibilities.

Notes

All lyrics were written by Tim Rice.

1 'King Herod's Song'

2 John 1, 1-6, 9-15; 8, 12

3 Brandstaetter, p.139 (translation E.B.)

4 Mark 14, 61-62 ; see also: Matthew 26, 63-65, Luke 23,70

5 'The Arrest'

6 'Pilate and Christ'

7 Matthew 26, 39

8 this and above: 'Gethesemane (I only want to say)'

9 'Trial Before Pilate'

10 'Gethesemane'

11 'Heaven On Their Minds'

12 Ibid.

13 'Strange Thing Mystifying'

14 'What's The Buzz'

15 'Strange Thing Mystifying'

16 Ibid.

17 'Everything's Alright'

18 Luke 22, 69

19 Kazantzakis, p.5 (translation E.B.)

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British Children's Names Over the Past Fifty Years.*

In the modern world, each child is born with a compound name, consisting of a surname and a first name (or names), which provides an identity. The surname cannot be changed until the child reaches adult life, but the first name (or names) must be chosen by the parents, whether the choice be a completely free one, affected only by euphony, or limited for family, religious or other reasons[1].

In this essay I will try to discuss some general aspects concerning the phenomenon of naming a baby. At first I will make an attempt to determine the factors that influence the parents' final selection of a name for their infant. Then I will try to examine the changes that have occurred within the commonest parental choices in England and Wales in the last few decades. Finally, I will deal with the frequency of names by presenting lists of the most popular and unique monikers.

Factors that influence the choice of a name

Even a hundred years ago, naming a baby was an easy task. Back then, people tended to just borrow names from religious or political figures. Today's parents are looking for something different, since they want their children to be unique. The urge for individuality, which is the most visible change in the approach to child-naming in recent years[2], has resulted in the fact that parents are now reaching into a far more diverse pool of names.

* The paper has been submitted for the course 145: *The Family in the 20th Century* run by Ms Katarzyna Janitz-De La Rue, MA.

Nevertheless, although the desire for originality has considerably enriched the scope of names actually given to infants, it is not entirely faultless. According to Patrick Hanks, the co-author of the *Oxford Concise Dictionary of First Names*[3], the new *parental creativity* has unfortunately led to children ending up with names which would once been reserved for the family pet. In former times, local vicars would refuse to christen babies with unusual or extravagant names but nowadays it is impossible for the registrar to prevent someone from giving their baby a certain name. The parents who named their daughter Heavenly Hiraani Tiger Lily probably thought they were a little bit different but according to Hanks's dictionary young Heavenly could find herself making friends with Gobnat, Zenith, Bijou, Dextra or Raven. Endavour, Beige and Innana are other examples of recent parental creations.

Besides a hankering for individuality, parents today are increasingly driven by ethnic pride. Kathy Ishizuka, author of *10.000 Names for Your Baby*[4] claims that this trend is going to flourish partly because of the rise in interracial marriages. She points out that, for instance, parents of Italian origin are reaching back to their old country for names, thanks partly to the prominence of actor Leonardo DiCaprio. Particularly interesting are the names of black infants since for their parents creative naming is a longstanding tradition. Hence, they are more courageous than white parents and literally willing to just make up a new name.

Religion is yet another factor that inspires parents. Linguist Leonard R.N.Ashley in his book entitled *What's in a Name*[5] suggests that the millennium is going to bring more religious enthusiasm. More Sarahs and Joels should be expected, as well as Isaiahs and Zachariahs. But even now, the boys' charts are largely biblical, with names like Samuel, Daniel, Joshua or Matthew reaching the top. Still, it is not only Christian beliefs that impinge on parental choices. Although traditional names of saints, kings and biblical characters still have their followers, the fall in church attendance is accompanied with the rise in the influence of New Age religions[6]. There are all sorts of examples of vaguely hippy names, just to mention Stone, Raven, Asia and River as in the actor River Phoenix. Few however have been tempted to emulate Frank Zappa who named his children Moon Unit and Dweezil. A Celtic revival has brought back names such as Blathnat (an Irish queen), Esyllt (meaning of fair aspect) and Gearoid (Irish for Gerald)[7].

Political figures do not seem to be a great inspiration for parents. Royalty, though, is a slightly different matter - at least in Britain. The National Health Service Central Register reported that the number of babies named Diana, traditionally about three a month, jumped to 29 in September, after the

princess's death[8]. However, on the examination of the post-war period it can be concluded that royal names are slowly falling out of favour. In 1996 Elizabeth placed on 25th position (8th in 1954), while Charles occupied quite a far 45th position[9].

Instead, parents are becoming increasingly affected by popular culture. The bad reputation of the Oasis singer Liam Gallagher has evidently not dissuaded parents from bestowing his name on sons - it entered the top 10 boys' names in 1996[10]. As for female singers, Kylie Minogue once triggered off a wave of enthusiasm for her unusual name. Shannon, which gained popularity after the American television series *Beverly Hills 90210*, showed the greatest increase in popularity among girls' names in 1995, rising 22 places to 11th compared with 1994[11]. TV advertisements are also playing their part. Molly, the toddler featured in a campaign by the supermarket chain Safeway, was so popular that her name sprang 19 places to 28th position on the list in 1996 and appeared to be the fastest riser in that year[12]. Even certain products may sometimes lead to the increase in popularity of a name, as it was the case with Wonderbra model called Caprice[13].

Popular culture has always been a factor creating fashions for names. One need only think of a burst of Michelles christened in 1965 that can clearly be blamed on the Beatles song[14]. Some parents seem not to be bothered by the fact that by choosing names of soap-opera stars or famous pop singers they mark their offspring as children of a certain period.

Sometimes personal passions come first. More than one child has been named after all the members of a football team[15].

Some parents find it wise to consider the actual meaning of a name. This trend in naming is connected with the idea that a child will develop the feature (or features) embedded in his or her name. Thus, such parents consciously decide on either a popular or a rare name (e.g. Ann meaning `grace' in Hebrew or Edbert - an Old English word for `prosperous'), provided they like its meaning.

It also happens that a name emerges due to a completely unexpected event. In 1996, for example, Leah made its appearance as a popular girls' name shortly after the death of Leah Betts, the Essex teenager who had taken the drug extasy[16].

Americanisation is responsible for the growing use of surnames as Christian names. Lambert, Drake or Pitt are the ones most frequently employed[17].

Last but not least, an interesting connection can be observed between parents' preferences for particular names and the geographical regions they live

in. The regional breakdown in naming trends finds a North-South divide. Sara, Beth, Kate, Katherine and Abbie are only found in the top 50 in the north. Charlie, Henry, Max, George, Oliver, Harry, Nicholas, Charles and Edward are popular only in the south[18].

Most popular babies' names over the past fifty years

In 1995 the Office of Population, Censuses and Surveys conducted a first names study. The result was described as *an entertaining, informative and valuable guide to changing fashions*. The study examines the choices at 10-yearly intervals[19].

The main observation that can be made while examining the charts concerns the difference in the way of naming male and female offspring. Parents seem to be more conservative when naming sons than when choosing a first name for a daughter. Girls are generally given much wider range of names but the most popular choices frequently change. From 1944 to 1994 as many as 245 different choices appeared in the lists of the top 100 girls' names, with only six appearing every year. This compares with 196 for boys, with 27 names featuring on the list every year[20].

The most popular names in 1994 were Rebecca, given to 8.256 girls, and Thomas, given to 11.845 boys. Thomas appeared in the top 100 every year since 1944. Rebecca was not in the top 100 in 1944 but 50 years later both the traditional spelling and the alternative, Rebekah, were among the top choices. The most popular name for a girl in 1944 was Margaret, given to 17.226 babies but it left the top 100 in 1964. In contrast, John, which was given to one in 12 boys at the end of the war, retained a loyal following throughout the 50 years. The only name to hold a top 10 place in 1944 and 1994 was James, whereas none of the girls' top 10 for 1944 featured in the top 50 in 1994. Only seven girls' names - Sarah, Elizabeth, Jennifer, Catherine, Heather, Helen and Maria - appeared in the top 100 for each year. In the boys' list 28 names featured every year, including James, Daniel, Michael, Alexander, Nicholas, Charles and Mohammed[21].

The survey also showed that new names do not always prove to be lasting. Bret was 92nd and Glen 77th only in 1974. Ricky was 75th in 1984 and then rapidly lost its popularity. Royston won the last place in the top 100 in 1944 and never reappeared. As for girls, 1974 was the only year in which names Heidi and Sonia were popular (86th and 95th position respectively). Tracy was 11th in 1964 but did not appear in the top 100 after 1974 when it was 27th. Sharon also vanished from the list shortly after its appearance in a very high

17th place in 1974[22].

Most popular babies' names in the mid-nineties

The most recent changes in fashions concerning child-naming can be examined on the basis of the tables issued at the end of 1995 and 1996 in Britain as supplements to the First Names, the ranking which has been widely discussed above[23].

Thomas and Rebecca - the top names of 1994 - did not manage to defend their positions, both falling into 3rd place in 1995.

Jack, a familiar derivative of John, became the most popular among boys' names, with John only in 39th place, two places below Mohammed and several places below fast-rising Cameron and Reece. Boys' names declining in popularity included Andrew and Jonathan, both of which dropped seven places to 27th and 36th. Alex, Richard, Stephen and Mark left the top 50[24].

Parents of female offspring most frequently chose the name Jessica. It usurped more traditional names, such as Jennifer and Louise. Interestingly enough, it first appeared in the list only 11 years before[25]. Shannon showed the second greatest increase in popularity[26], rising 22 places to 11th compared with 1994. Girls' names entering the top 50 for the first time were Ellie, Abbie and Kayleigh. Chelsea, Gemma and Amber also gained higher places. Names which started coming out of fashion include Anna, Stephanie, Jade, Rachel and Hayley[27].

In 1996 Jack topped the boys' chart for the second year running. The top seven male names remained unchanged. Samuel and Joseph occupied 8th and 9th position and Liam came tenth. John fell to number 41[28], showing less popularity than Ashley, Kyle or Kieran. The only boys' name that disappeared from the list since 1995 was Nicholas[29].

Sophie overtook Jessica as the favourite girls' name for 1996, followed by Chloe, Emily and Megan. The rest of the top 10 girls' names, all falling into decline in comparison with the previous year, included Jessica, Lauren, Rebecca, Charlotte, Hannah and Amy. Leah suddenly entered the list at 36. Molly was another fast riser, jumping 19 places to 28. Jennifer and Kirsty left the top 50 and so did Kayleigh, which popularity appeared to be only a one year phenomenon[30].

A preference for informality was clearly visible from the list. Charlie was the fastest rising boys' name, climbing up the charts to number 38. Jack came 40 places higher than John, once an unquestionable favourite among

boys' names, and Katie was four times higher than Katherine (12th and 46th place respectively)[31].

Common and rare names

At the beginning of 1998 the Office of National Statistics analysed GP's patient lists from 1991 in England and Wales. The ONS list of names was drawn from the National Health Service Central Register, administered by the ONS for the Department of Health. The NHSCR, established in 1948, does not retain details of people who died before 1991. The exhaustive analysis of 823.652 current first names revealed that Margaret is the commonest name among women of all ages (688.164~cases) and that there are more men called John than anything else (1.471.990)[32]. However, both names are now on a sharp decrease - although they are the most popular names in use, in 1997 John came at the end in the top 50 male babies' names, while Margaret did not feature in the first 50 girls' names[33].

David, Michael and James - the second, third and fourth male names in popularity, all overcome Margaret in number, whereas women's names are much more evenly distributed among a number of popular choices[34]. The difference between 1st and 5th name most frequently bestowed on men is 799.514 but only 265.897 in case of women. The second name admired by girls' parents is Mary, but with its 570.001 registrations it would be placed tenth on the male list. The next positions among female names go to Susan, Elizabeth and Sarah. Similarly to Margaret, Mary and Susan did not emerge in the top 50 in the mid-nineties. Yet, the top choices of recent years, such as Chloe, Emilie or Sophie, do not appear in the overall top 50 either.

Out of 823.652 names currently in use in England and Wales, 562.030 are unique. Most people have mundane monikers; more than 37 million people have names which are shared by 100.000 people or more[35]. Some, however, may have difficulty finding their namesakes.

The impressive number of unique names is mainly attributable to variations on international names[36]. Spelling differences are the result of a diverse origin of those names. Take Julia, for instance, with its alternative forms Juliette (French) and Julieta (Spanish) or Thomas, spelt also Tomas, Tomás (Spanish) and Tomaso, Tomasso (Italian).

Even within the English language certain names have developed into several forms due to accepting the practice of using diminutive forms as independent names. This can be illustrated by Charlie and Charley or Jim,

Jimmie and Jimmy - diminutives of Charles and James. Some names, for example compounds, have their independent variant forms. The compounds of Rose and Anne are Rosanne, Rosanna, Roseanne and Roseanna. Part of the unique names may be voluntary or deliberate misspellings. The latter include such rare names as Destin (a misspelling of Dustin) or Lica (a slightly changed form of Lisa). Towson, Rosko, Taso, Rawlston and Yavel are other examples of unique male names in use while Aylmer, Mawish, Pavanjot, Linton and Romesh can be found among the least popular girls' names[37]. According to the study, there are 81 people with only a single letter as their forename[38].

As it can be seen from the presented analysis of babies' names, parental tastes differ and are constantly changing. But regardless of the diverse factors that influence their choices choosing a name for a child is always a very risky task. It is because no matter how original or common the choice is, there is not knowing what associations that name will later take on. When a namesake suddenly shoots into fame, or worse still infamy, the most innocent-sounding name can quickly turn into a millstone. One need only think of half-a-dozen John Majors from London who had lived happily in obscurity until John Major became the Prime Minister[39]. Still, the combination of personal taste and common sense in naming a baby is very likely to give a satisfactory result.

Notes

[1] *Dictionary of First Names*, p.7

[2] Hamilton, 1998

[3] Cadwalladr, 1997

[4] Hamilton, 1998

[5] ibid.

[6] Cadwalladr, 1997

[7] ibid.;

[8] Hamilton, 1998

[9] see Table 1 in the appendix;

[10] McPhilips, 1997

[11] Holden, 1995

[12] McPhilips, 1997

[13] Cadwalladr, 1997

[14] Clark, 1997

[15] *Dictionary of First Names*, p. 13;

[16] McPhilips, 1997

[17] Cadwalladr, 1997

[18] O'Neill, 1995

[19] for a set of lists including the top 10 names for boys and girls see Table 1 in the appendix;

[20] O'Neill, 1995

[21] ibid.;

[22] ibid.;

[23] for the top 10 names of the mid-nineties see Table 2 in the appendix;

[24] Holden, 1995

[25] ibid.;

[26] the increasing popularity of the name, as well as Liam, Leah and Molly has already been accounted for in the previous part of this essay;

[27] Holden, 1995

[28] a complete list of 50 most popular names for boys and girls is presented in Table 3 in the appendix;

[29] McPhilips, 1997

[30] ibid.;

[31] ibid.;

[32] for the results of this analysis see Table 4 in the appendix;

[33] Young, 1998

[34] ibid.;

[35] ibid.;

[36] ibid.;

[37] more rare names are quoted in Table 5 in the appendix;

[38] Young, 1998

[39] ibid.;

Appendix

Table 1. Most popular babies' names over the past fifty years (England and Wales)

BOYS

No.	1994	1984	1974	1964	1954	1944
1	Thomas	Christopher	Paul	David	David	John
2	James	James	Mark	Paul	John	David
3	Jack	David	David	Andrew	Stephen	Michael
4	Daniel	Daniel	Andrew	Mark	Michael	Peter
5	Matthew	Michael	Richard	John	Peter	Robert
6	Ryan	Matthew	Christopher	Michael	Robert	Anthony
7	Joshua	Andrew	James	Stephen	Paul	Brian
8	Luke	Richard	Simon	Ian	Alan	Alan
9	Samuel	Paul	Michael	Robert	Christopher	William
10	Jordan	Mark	Matthew	Richard	Richard	James

GIRLS

No.	1994	1984	1974	1964	1954	1944
1	Rebecca	Sarah	Sarah	Susan	Susan	Margaret
2	Lauren	Laura	Claire	Julie	Linda	Patricia
3	Jessica	Gemma	Nicola	Karen	Christine	Christine
4	Charlotte	Emma	Emma	Jacqueline	Margaret	Mary
5	Hannah	Rebecca	Lisa	Deborah	Janet	Jean
6	Sophie	Claire	Joanne	Tracey	Patricia	Ann
7	Amy	Victoria	Michelle	Jane	Carol	Susan
8	Emily	Samantha	Helen	Helen	Elizabeth	Janet
9	Laura	Rachel	Samantha	Diane	Mary	Maureen
10	Emma	Amy	Karen	Sharon	Anne	Barbara

Source: *The top 10 names 1944--94*, Electronic Telegraph.

Table 2. Most popular babies' names in the mid-nineties (England and Wales)

BOYS

No.	1996	1995	1994
1	Jack	Jack	Thomas
2	Daniel	Daniel	James
3	Thomas	Thomas	Jack
4	James	James	Daniel
5	Joshua	Joshua	Matthew
6	Matthew	Matthew	Ryan
7	Ryan	Ryan	Joshua
8	Samuel	Luke	Luke
9	Joseph	Samuel	Samuel
10	Liam	Jordan	Jordan

GIRLS

No.	1996	1995	1994
1	Sophie	Jessica	Rebecca
2	Chloe	Lauren	Lauren
3	Emily	Rebecca	Jessica
4	Megan	Sophie	Charlotte
5	Jessica	Charlotte	Hannah
6	Lauren	Hannah	Sophie
7	Rebecca	Amy	Amy
8	Charlotte	Emily	Emily
9	Hannah	Chloe	Laura
10	Amy	Emma	Emma

Source: *The top 10 names 1944-94; Most Popular Boy's Names, Most Popular Girl's Names*, Electronic Telegraph.

Table 3. 50 most popular babies' names in 1996
(England and Wales)

No.	BOYS	GIRLS	No.	BOYS	GIRLS
1	Jack	Sophie	26	Kieran	Rachel
2	Daniel	Chloe	27	Robert	Paige
3	Thomas	Emily	28	Andrew	Molly
4	James	Megan	29	Jamie	Holly
5	Joshua	Jessica	30	Nathan	Zoe
6	Matthew	Lauren	31	David	Samantha
7	Ryan	Rebecca	32	Bradley	Ellie
8	Samuel	Charlotte	33	Aaron	Chelsea
9	Joseph	Hannah	34	Ben	Nicole
10	Liam	Amy	35	Jacob	Natasha
11	Luke	Shannon	36	Mohammed	Leah
12	Jordan	Katie	37	Kyle	Victoria
13	Connor	Emma	38	Charlie	Alexandra
14	Alexander	Bethany	39	Jonathan	Georgina
15	Benjamin	Lucy	40	Ashley	Grace
16	Adam	Laura	41	John	Amber
17	Jake	Georgia	42	Cameron	Jodie
18	Harry	Sarah	43	Alex	Natalie
19	William	Jade	44	Reece	Abbie
20	Michael	Abigail	45	Charles	Anna
21	George	Danielle	46	Edward	Katherine
22	Callum	Eleanor	47	Scott	Louise
23	Oliver	Olivia	48	Sean	Stephanie
24	Lewis	Alice	49	Sam	Melissa
25	Christopher	Elizabeth	50	Dominic	Gemma

Source: *Popular Names*, UK Statistics.

Table 4. The top 20 forenames

No.	MEN		WOMEN	
1	John	1.471.990	Margaret	688.16
2	David	1.202.989	Mary	570.01
3	Michael	877.83	Susan	523.49
4	James	764.84	Elizabeth	449.39
5	Robert	672.48	Sarah	422.27
6	Paul	668.28	Patricia	392.45
7	Peter	656.85	Joan	312.75
8	William	647.12	Jean	302.7
9	Andrew	581.98	Christine	301.25
10	Christopher	542.3	Kathleen	287.75
11	Thomas	520.47	Dorothy	281.13
12	Stephen	506.17	Helen	263.58
13	Richard	500.05	Barbara	254.7
14	Mark	469.19	Emma	253.84
15	Anthony	394.17	Julie	253.7
16	George	386.7	Linda	249.99
17	Alan	357.19	Janet	244.27
18	Daniel	340.95	Karen	243.77
19	Ian	331.15	Ann	233.65
20	Brian	319.17	Jennifer	230.94

Source: Young R. *How John and Margaret Have Common Touch*, The Times.

Table 5. Some least popular names

MEN	
Caddus	Rosko
Chalmer	Taso
Destin	Towson
Izam	Woodward
Rawlston	Yavel

WOMEN	
Asumi	Mawish
Aylmer	Monah
Lica	Pavanjot
Linton	Renell
Maine	Romesh

Source: Young R. *How John and Margaret Have Common Touch*, The Times.

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Małgorzata Albrecht

The Scholastic Thought of Saint Thomas Aquinas and the Rise of the Isorhythmic Technique in the Middle Ages.*

The Esthetic Thought of St. Thomas and his Theory of Art

Although St. Thomas Aquinas did not write any treatise specifically on beauty, art or music (the *De Pulchro* and *Ars musica* are spurious) and his esthetic thought, scattered throughout the whole corpus of his philosophical writings (*Summa theologiae, Summa contra gentiles, De veritate, Commentum in IV libros sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi, De divinis nominibus, Questione disputata de anima*), is usually ascribed to two divergent traditions: either as an echo of the Pythagorean-Platonic theory strongly advocated by St. Augustine and Albertus Magnus, or, as a mere judicious interpretation of Aristotle and his Arabic commentators, it must be clearly stated that the scholastic esthetics of St. Thomas is consistent and entirely determined by his ingenious metaphysical system, the reflections of which can be seen in the musical practice of the 14th century.

* The paper has been submitted for the course 1401: *English Mediaeval Culture and its Continental Background* run by Mr Tomasz Zymer, MA. However, the subject of the essay is closer to the scope of the course 1011: *Secular Song and the Oral Tradition*, for which no outstanding paper has been written. Therefore, on Mr Zymer's advice, we have decided to print Małgorzata Albrecht's work, even though our principle is to publish only one essay from each course (Piotr Szymczak's essay for the course 1401 was printed in the first issue of our journal).

Considering St. Thomas' thought and his idea of beauty, the latter is most often presented as a transcendental feature of being and spoken of almost exclusively in connection with nature, man and divine creation. There are two main definitions of beauty which seem to be of the greatest significance for the esthetic practice of the Middle Ages. The first one was formulated in the following way:

"Beauty is that which, having been seen, pleases (*quod visum placet*)"[1]. St. Thomas says that beauty feeds the sense with something orderly, and only the orderly senses, that is sight and hearing, can assimilate to themselves order and measure. He also adds that beauty is really a formal cause (referring to Aristotle's classification of causes) and consequently puts form first in explaining beauty. The second definition of beauty refers to its necessary constituents: "Beauty consists in integrity, proportion and brightness (*pulchritudo est integritas sive perfectio, debita proportio sive consonantia et claritas*)[2]. For St. Thomas due proportion and consonance are the most important properties of beauty. He even suggests that the intellectual act of knowing is facilitated by the splendor of order that beauty is.

For the philosopher from Aquino every art (and also music, which due to its harmony and perfect unity of sound is the best analogy of the divinity and all creation and thus the best medium of worship) is a skill of producing beautiful, intelligible objects and a mere craftsmanship. He described art as *recta ordinatio rationis* [3], that is the right order of reason, suggesting that the role of intellect and rational calculation is essential in the artistic creation. Consequently, one who creates a work of art, be it a composer or an architect, is like a skillful craftsman who must have an over-all design of his work beforehand and who must also know the technique or general rules of production in order to realize his project.

St. Thomas considered music together with astronomy and optics to be *scientiae mediae* (*Dicuntur enim scientiae mediae, quae accipiunt principia abstracta a scientiis pure mathematicis, et applicant ad materiam sensibilem; sicut perceptiva applicat ad lineamvisualem ea quae demonstrantur a geometria circa lineam absrtactam; et harmonica, id est musica, applicat ad sonos ea quae arithmeticus considerat circa proportiones numerorum; et astrologia considerationem geometriae et arithmeticae applicat ad caelum et ad partes eius*[4]), that is disciplines which partially belonged to mathematics and physics, as they took the formal apparatus from these sciences and applied it to *materia sensibilis* i.e. matter known through senses. Music then deals with the real physical sound which is analyzed and studied within arithmetic, a science that according to Aquinas is prior and more certain as a part of the Quadrivium.

Adopting this arithmetical standpoint he maintains that music - *consonantia sonorum* - is strictly concerned with numerical proportions and ratios applied to sound; it is an exact science where the art of composing means a highly speculative process resembling that of a logical scholastic argument.

The Appearance of the Isorhythmic Technique in the 14th Century as a Sign of the New Harmonic and Scholastic Awareness.

The rise of the isorhythmic technique which was fully realized in the polytextual and often polylingual form of the motet seemed a focal point of the age of ars nova and the crowning achievement of medieval polyphony. Philippe de Vitry and Guillaume de Machaut, the French founders of the isorhythmic model of composing (the theory and technique of which is said to have been derived from Philippe de Vitry's treatise *Ars nova)* were not only the greatest composers of motets but also accomplished poets who managed to combine in this new polyphonic form the melodic-contrapuntal scheme of the work with its poetical and textual aspect so that the words or the general sense expressed in different voices always corresponded to the same musical motifs, which naturally enhanced the internal unity and integrity of the composition. The study of Vitry's motets[5] *Tribus - Quoniam, Garrit Gallus - In nova; Tuba sacrae fidei - In arboris — Virgo sum* and Machaut's: *Hareu! hareu! le feu — Helas! ou sera pris confors — Obediens usque ad mortem; Felix virgo — Inviolata genirtix — Ad te suspiramus* displays an intent preoccupation with the sophisticated intellectual design, coherence and calculated construction of the motet.

The isorhythmic technique of composing, which apart from the famous motets was also used in some ballades and masses consists in three integral units: the main pattern founded upon the pre-existing plainchant melody called *cantus firmus, cantus prius factus* or *tenor* which served as the lowest part and the basic voice of the whole composition (plainchant does not have strict rhythm - even the extreme mensuralist theories do not claim that it had regular ordines; the rhythmical patterns are imposed on plainchant in the Notre Dame school, developed in mensural notation); the two other, contrapuntal voices - *motetus and triplum* - which served to comment and complete the primary scheme of *tenor*; the division of the fundamental material of *tenor* into *talea* (the same recurrent rhythmical scheme) and *color* (the unchangeable pattern of the succession of intervals) so that these two, melodic and rhythmical schemes overlapped

Considering the isorhythmic form of the motets, it becomes obvious

that the use of this rigorous and schematic technique, based upon the three principal constituents: movement-rhythm-meter, determines all the essential and formal elements of the work; it integrates them into one coherent and solid composition with ideal proportions and exact correspondences between its constitutive parts. The isorhythmic motet like a theological *summa* or a Gothic cathedral seem to be impregnated with scholastic thought: they aim at the absolute integrity, consonance and brightness revealing the splendor of the divine order and concentrate on the symbolic representation of the universe which is realized in the abstract mathematical structure of the work.

The Reflection of the Thomist Esthetics in the Composition of the Isorhythmic Motet

Although there is no straightforward evidence for the connections between the Thomas philosophy and the isorhythmic composition of the medieval polyphony, the correspondences between the esthetic theory of Aquinas and the musical practice in the 14th century France are significant and worth considering.

First of all the harmonic composition of the three voices in the isorhythmic motet with the distinct preeminence (formal but not acoustic-sensual) of *cantus firmus* or *tenor* as the fundamental constituent ordering and integrating other voices clearly corresponds to the Thomist idea of the ordering of all things by God and that in God the three persons are *per consonantiam unum*, a scholastic thought expressed in famous *Commentatum in IV libros sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi.* Secondly, the isorhythmics as an exact method of the ordering of the musical material through the agency of *cantus firmus* that is responsible for the rhythmical, formal and melodic organization of the whole is resonant of the Thomist basic metaphysical conception of *esse* and the act of being as it was clearly stated in *Summa theologiae*. Furthermore, the Thomist esthetic principle of *integritas* and *consonantia*, also formulated in the main work of Thomist dogma - *Summa theologiae*, is fully realized within the isorhythmic form of the motet which is meant to represent the harmonic unity of the universe as well as the permanent and static ordering of being - the idea of *musica mundana.* It is also worth noticing that the isorhythmic motet lacks inner tensions, dynamic developments or the melodic progression of the main theme; it seems an organic fragment of some objective continuum consisting in the eternal return of the same and the harmony of the divine creation, which directly corresponds to the scholastic concept of nature and

beauty as described by St. Thomas in his *Summa*. Finally, the role of intellect, form and rational speculation is essential in the composition of the isorhythmic motet (the composer is like a craftsman knowing an over-all design and the appropriate technique), and thus the motet by its systematic, schematic and formal structure resembles the philosophical argument and the scholastic mode of reasoning as that developed in the medieval summas.

To sum up, as can be seen from the evidence presented above, the scholastic philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas, his elaborate metaphysical system and the esthetic thought must have had a significant impact on the musical practice of the 14th century, which gave rise to the isorhythmic technique fully accomplished in the medieval motets.

Notes

[1]Allodi, 1950, p. 567

[2] Ibid.,p. 569

[3] Ibid,p. 1186

[4] Maggiolo, 1965, lib.II, cap.III, p. 84

[5] cf Hughes, Abraham, 1960 and Dobrzańska, 1988

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Marta Kisielewska

Comparison of Paul Grice's and Dan Sperber & Deirdre Wilson's Models of Verbal Communication*

In the history of linguistics there have been various approaches to communication. The most traditional approach can be encountered in the coding-decoding model of communication. The model assumes that every meaning the speaker wants to communicate can be put into code. Therefore, for the hearer to get the speaker's meaning it is enough that, first, the hearer and the speaker share a common code (i.e. English) and, second, nothing (e.g. noise) prevents the hearer from hearing a piece of language. This claim has been rejected by less traditional scholars, according to whom communication goes beyond code. As they point out, there is a gap between the semantic representation of sentences and the thoughts actually communicated by an utterance. This gap is bridged by the process of inferencing. Linguistic decoding is only a starting point for comprehension, which is, in fact, inferential in nature. Communication is a matter of drawing conclusions from various premises, one of which is the literal meaning of what the speaker says. This kind of approach is called an inferential model of communication and it was first explicitly suggested by Paul Grice in his paper titled 'Meaning' (Grice, 1957) and then developed in his subsequent papers: 'Logic and Conversation' (Grice, 1975) and 'Further Notes on Logic and Conversation' (Grice, 1978). Thus, it may be claimed that Paul Grice is an author of the inferential approach to meaning and communication within the philosophy of language and linguistics.

* The paper has been submitted for the course 265: *Models of Verbal Communication* run by Professor Ewa Mioduszewska-Crawford.

The approach was taken up by Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson, who developed and slightly modified Gricean framework in their book *Relevance, Communication and Cognition* (1996). The purpose of this paper is to describe and compare the model of communication introduced by Grice and the one presented by Sperber and Wilson.

As far as meaning is concerned, the basic distinction that Grice makes is between natural meaning (which is not intended) and $meaning_{NN}$ (which is intended). This division is a prerequisite to develop a theory of inferential communication since, according to Grice, what is important for communication is solely $meaning_{NN}$. According to Grice, $meaning_{NN}$ is what the speaker means by language on a particular occasion; what he intends to convey in communicative exchanges with the hearer.

> The speaker A $meant_{NN}$ something by uttering a piece of language x if he, the speaker, intended the utterance of a piece of language x to produce some effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this intention.[1]

Apart from claiming that speakers mean things non-naturally, Grice admits that language itself may $mean_{NN}$ something. Thus, it may be claimed that he introduced the distinction between speaker's meaning and language meaning. As for language meaning, Grice says that a piece of language x $means_{NN}$ what its speakers normally (i.e. conventionally, 'timelessly') intend to convey by it.[2] Diverging from the general usage needs special treatment: the hearer must get the intention of the speaker on a particular occasion. When the hearer has doubts about what the speaker intends to convey, he tends to refer to the context of an utterance and choose the intention which seems most relevant or best fits in with the speaker's purpose. If the speaker does not diverge from the normal usage, i.e. what speakers mean by language timelessly, he conveys the conventional meaning of words.

The conventional meaning of words may be described in terms of what is entailed (truth-conditions) and in terms of what is conventionally implicated. What the speaker means by the conventional meaning of words (what is implicated), on the other hand, may be described in terms of the Cooperative Principle and its maxims.

> COOPERATIVE PRINCIPLE: Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.

MAXIMS:

1. QUALITY- Try to make your contribution one that is true.
   A) Do not say what you believe to be false.
   B) Do not say that for which you lack the evidence.
2. QUANTITY- relates to the quantity of information to be provided.
   A) Make your contribution as informative as is required for the current purposes of
   the exchange.
   B) Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.
3. RELATION-Make your contribution relevant.
4. MANNER- Be perspicuous.
   A) Avoid obscurity of expression.
   B) Avoid ambiguity.
   C) Be brief.
   D) Be orderly.[3]

As it was already mentioned, Grice accepts the distinction between speaker's meaning and language meaning, but, what is more important, he maintains that speaker's meaning is primary and language meaning is defined only in terms of speaker's meaning.

Sperber and Wilson, on the other hand, believe that language meaning is, first of all, handled by the linguistic coding-decoding peripheral input system. The system automatically and subconsciously decodes a natural language sentence uttered into its logical form: 'a well-formed formula, a structured set of constituents, which undergoes formal logical operations determined by its structure'.[4] A logical form underlies assumptions and may be stored in conceptual memory as an assumption schema.

An intrinsic meaning of a piece of language may be described in terms of analytic implications. An analytic implication is an implication that results from the process of deduction (a reasoning that uses deductive elimination rules) which takes as a premise a single assumption and applies to it analytic elimination rules taken from the logical entries for concepts. The rules may apply because, after the decoding process by the input system, the hearer has at his disposal a logical form which contains concepts. The concepts, in turn, have three types of links with the memory: logical, encyclopaedic and lexical entries. Logical entry 'consists of a set of deductive elimination rules which apply to logical forms of which that concept is a constituent'[5] and allow us to establish an intrinsic meaning of an assumption. Encyclopaedic entry 'contains information about the extension and/or denotation of the concept: that is about the objects, events and/or properties which instantiate it'.[6] Finally, lexical entry 'contains information about the natural language counterpart of the concept: the

word or phrase of natural language which expresses it'.[7]

As for speaker's meaning, Sperber and Wilson claim that speaker's meaning is what a speaker intends to convey by a piece of language x. A speaker intending to communicate something by a piece of language x makes manifest to the hearer his intention to make manifest the message. In other words, he makes manifest his communicative intention to make manifest his informative intention.

Speaker's meaning may be described in terms of synthetic, preferably contextual, implications. A contextual implication is an implication which results from the process of deduction which takes as premises two assumptions - the one, new, from the context and the other, old, from memory- and applies to them synthetic rules.

To sum up what has been said so far, Sperber and Wilson, like Grice, believe that there are two types of meaning: language meaning and speaker's meaning, and that speaker's meaning is primary. Yet, unlike Grice, they define the two meanings independently of each other.

As far as communication is concerned, Grice's model of communication is an inferential model of communication. It assumes that, to get speaker's meaning, the hearer is involved in inference: a process of drawing conclusions on the basis of the conventional meaning of the words uttered, the Cooperative Principle and its maxims, the context (linguistic or otherwise), background knowledge and the assumption that all the above items are available both to the hearer and the speaker. Grice's definition of inferential communication is very similar to his definition of meaning. An inferential communication consists in that the speaker $means_{NN}$ something by a piece of language x. The speaker $means_{NN}$ something by a piece of language x iff: first, the speaker has an informative intention, i.e. he intends this piece of language x to produce a belief in the hearer; second, the speaker wants the hearer to recognize his informative intention, i.e. he has a communicative intention. Finally, only when the hearer recognizes the speaker's intention to communicate something can he recognize what the speaker wants to communicate. The speaker and the hearer have communicated if they mutually know that the speaker has an informative intention, that the speaker has a communicative intention, and that the hearer can recognize the speaker's informative intention only when he recognizes the speaker's communicative intention.

Furthermore, Grice assumes that people take the trouble to recognize these intentions because they are rational and cooperative, and expect other people to be rational and cooperative. They believe that people are rational in their will to communicate and behave in the manner described by the

Cooperative Principle: they make their conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which they are engaged. The most important thing that follows from the CP is that people take the trouble to infer speaker's meaning as they have a common purpose in communication, which they are negotiating in the talk exchange.

There arises the question of how people get speaker's intentions and infer speaker's meaning. The answer given by Grice is that people get speaker's intentions by making use of the Cooperative Principle and its maxims. They get the intentions on the assumption that human verbal or non-verbal behaviour is underlain by the Cooperative Principle, i.e. that people are willing to communicate and they are rational in this will. They also get the intentions by finding out what the speaker does with the maxims.[8]

As for communication in Sperber and Wilson's approach, they call their model of communication ostensive-inferential as they equally focus on the speaker, who wants to communicate his intentions, and on the hearer, who wants to infer his intentions. According to Sperber and Wilson, communication requires two different modes : the coding-decoding mode and the ostensive-inferential one, which are distinct and cannot be reduced to one of them. While the ostensive-inferential communication can exist on its own, the coding-based communication cannot. It only strengthens the ostensive-inferential mode, thus being subservient to it.

In ostensive-inferential communication the speaker is involved in ostension. He produces a stimulus (ostensive behaviour) which is to attract the hearer's attention and make it mutually manifest to the hearer and the speaker that the speaker intends, by means of this stimulus, to make manifest or more manifest to the hearer a set of assumptions {I}.[9] Communication requires two intentions on the part of the speaker: an informative intention- an intention to make manifest or more manifest to the hearer a set of assumptions {I} - and a communicative intention- an intention to make it mutually manifest to the hearer and the speaker that the speaker has this informative intention. What communication requires on the part of the hearer is to infer the set of assumptions {I}. Communication is achieved once the audience, the hearer, recognizes the communicator's, the speaker's, informative intention since only then both intentions are recognized.

Moreover, Sperber and Wilson claim that people are interested in inferring an informative intention because every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance:

a) The set of assumptions {I} which the speaker intends to make manifest to the hearer is relevant enough to make it worth the addressee's while to process the ostensive stimulus.
b) The ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one the speaker could have used to communicate I.[10]

Thus, people assume that what they hear is directed to them and is relevant to them. An assumption is relevant if its contextual effects[11] are large and the effort required to process it optimally is small.[12] It is also assumed that people communicate since they want to extend their knowledge of the world. Each contextual effect adds to people's knowledge of the world and they listen to what other people are saying because it is relevant to them in a sense that it extends their knowledge of the world by means of new contextual effects.

As far as inference is concerned, in Grice's system the conventional meaning of words may be grasped by entailments and conventional implicatures. Entailments are derivable from what Grice presents in his papers, but he does not elaborate on them. As for conventional implicature, it is a non-truth-conditional inference which is not derived from pragmatic principles like the maxims but is simply attached to particular lexical items by convention. Although Grice says that it is part of the conventional meaning of words, he also suggests that it is the part of language meaning that is amenable to the speaker's manipulation. As far as speaker's meaning is concerned, it may be grasped by generalized conversational implicatures and particularized conversational implicatures.

One may distinguish among the various types of implicatures by means of empirical tests of cancellability, calculability, detachability, determinacy and truth-conditionality. An implicature is cancellable if it is possible to cancel it either explicitly, by adding to a sentence giving rise to implicature p a clause of the form: 'I do not mean to imply that p', or contextually.[13] An implicature is calculable if it is possible to calculate it on the basis of the meaning of words uttered, the context, the Cooperative Principle and the maxims.[14] An implicature is detachable if it is possible to find another way of saying the same in terms of truth-conditions which lacks the implicature in question.[15] An implicature is determinate if it is easy to predict. Finally, an implicature is truth-conditional if it contributes to the truth-conditions of the sentence the utterance of which gives rise to it.[16] Entailment is truth-conditional, non-cancellable and non-calculable. Conventional implicature is non-truth-conditional, hardly cancellable, non-calculable and detachable. It is not specified for determinacy by Grice. Conversational implicatures are non-truth-conditional, cancellable, calculable, indeterminate and non-detachable except for those arising due to the

Maxim of Manner.

As for inferences in Relevance theory, intrinsic meaning of pieces of language may be grasped by analytic implications, which have been already defined in this paper. What can be added is that analytic implications are claimed to be sufficient and necessary for understanding or 'grasping the content' of an assumption. To get from intrinsic meaning to speaker's meaning, the hearer must assign referents properly, resolve ambiguities, make vague terms precise and determine speaker's propositional attitudes on the basis of the context. Only then speaker's meaning may be described. Speaker's meaning of pieces of language may be grasped by synthetic implications and contextual implications. As it was already mentioned, a synthetic implication is necessarily based on two distinct assumptions. Its derivation is not a matter of having these assumptions somewhere in memory, but a matter of bringing them together in the small working memory of the deductive device.[17] A failure to grasp synthetic implications is not a failure to understand the information being offered, but a failure to grasp its logical consequences.

At this point, let me show you how the two models operate in practice.

(1) A: When are you going out?
B: I'm putting on a pair of shoes.

According to Grice's model of communication, when A hears B saying 'I'm putting on a pair of shoes', A assumes that B is observing the maxims or at least the Cooperative Principle. B flouts the Maxim of Relevance, her utterance seems irrelevant as an answer to A's question. Yet, A assumes that B is still cooperative, because, otherwise, A will not bother to examine what B is saying. In order for B to say 'I'm putting on a pair of shoes' and to be indeed cooperative, B must intend to convey that she, B, is going out in a moment. A must have inferred this basing on his extra-linguistic knowledge. He remembers that when people put on their shoes, they usually have the intention to go out in a moment. B has done nothing to stop A thinking that B has the intention to go out in a moment. Therefore, B intends A to think that B is going out in a moment and in saying that she, B, is putting on a pair of shoes, B has implicated that B is going out in a moment. The implicature is a particularized conversational implicature.

In the relevance framework the communicative exchange between A and B would be accounted for in the following way. A recognizes B's utterance as a communicative signal directed to him (B's communicative intention), because B has produced a verbal stimulus that conventionally counts as communicative and has addressed it to A. Bearing in mind the presumption of

relevance, A assumes that B's utterance is important to him, so he decides to process it. A operates on the assumption that the communicative signals recognized as directed to A are relevant to A and thus worth processing. First, A automatically decodes B's utterance, using the subconscious knowledge of the code that they share, i.e. the English language. Second, A automatically translates B's utterance into the logical form arriving at something like P(B, S).[18] Then, A finds referents of the referring expressions using contextual information, e.g. 'a pair of shoes' = the shoes that belong to B. A also finds the values of indexicals used in the utterance: 'am putting on' =am putting on now. Having done that, A arrives at the explicature (2).

(2) B is putting on her shoes now.

Having arrived at this propositional form, A can recover its intrinsic meaning via analytic implications (3), (4), (5), (6), etc.

(3) Shoes are an outer covering for a person's feet
(4) Putting on means clothing oneself with a garment.
(5) The action of putting on the shoes is in progress.
(6) Shoes exist.

In this way A gets language meaning. Then A looks for the relevance of the utterance. He refers to the background knowledge in his memory that he has about shoes and putting on. Among other bits of information he finds (7) and (8).

(7) You put on shoes when you want to go out.
(8) If someone is putting on his shoes, he will go out soon.

A looks for contextual implications of B's utterance. Taking (8) as an old assumption and (9) as a new assumption and applying to them an analytic rule $p \rightarrow q$ & $p. \Rightarrow q$, A arrives at the logical conclusion in (10).

(9) B is putting on his shoes.
(10) B will go out soon.

The contextual implication that B will go out soon provides an answer to A's question, so it is relevant to A.

When one compares the process of communication as viewed by Grice and Sperber and Wilson, he is bound to notice several similarities and

differences. As for differences, first, while Grice's main distinction is between natural and non-natural meaning, Sperber and Wilson stay within the domain of $meaning_{NN}$ and their basic distinction is between intrinsic and speaker's meaning. They take $meaning_{NN}$ as already singled out by Grice and focus on the distinctions within the communicative meaning itself.

Second, although both Grice and Sperber and Wilson distinguish two types of meaning (language meaning and speaker's meaning) and claim that speaker's meaning is primary, they define the two meanings in a distinct manner. While Grice defines language meaning in terms of speaker's meaning, Sperber and Wilson define language meaning and speaker's meaning independently of each other, the former in terms of analytic implications and the latter in terms of synthetic implications.

Third, Grice allows us to describe language meaning from two perspectives: what is entailed and what is conventionally implicated. Sperber and Wilson, on the other hand, allow us to describe language meaning just in one way: via analytic implications.

Another difference is that while Grice is not bothered with the form in which language meaning is presented and discusses that meaning appealing to our intuitions, Sperber and Wilson insist that meaning is presented in the form of assumptions which have a logical, possibly propositional, form. This may be explained by the fact that they believe that in inferencing meaning the process of deduction must apply, and what it may apply to are only logical forms.

Still another difference between the two models of communication is that while, according to Grice, speaker's meaning may be described in terms of generalized and particularized conversational implicatures, according to Sperber and Wilson, it may be described in terms of synthetic, preferably contextual, implications.

Furthermore, Grice calls his model of communication inferential and does not mention ostension explicitly. In his definition, he focuses on the process of inferencing, i.e. on how it happens that the hearer recognizes what the speaker wants to communicate. Sperber and Wilson, on the other hand, call their model of communication ostensive-inferential and they equally focus on the speaker, who is involved in ostension, intentionally making manifest his intention to make something manifest to the hearer, and on the hearer, who is involved in inference. Although Grice seems not to be concerned with how people make their communicative intention visible to other people, it may be presumed that he assumes the existence of some form of ostensive behaviour. Since he writes about the importance of recognition, he must assume the existence of something that is to be recognized.

Moreover, while Grice maintains that people enter communication since they are rational and cooperative, Sperber and Wilson claim that people enter communication because they believe that what is communicated by the speaker is relevant to them and what is relevant to them improves their knowledge of the world. The extension of the knowledge of the world is one of the basic reasons for taking the trouble to get speaker's intentions.

What is more, Grice assumes that people have a common purpose in communication and they aim to achieve that purpose in the course of communication. Sperber and Wilson, on the other hand, claim that people are interested in communication as far as it can expand their own, not their interlocutor's, knowledge of the world. Thus, people have no one shared purpose of communication: what may enrich the knowledge of one person may not enrich the knowledge of another person.

Another obvious difference is that while Grice assumes mutual knowledge of assumptions on the part of the speaker and the hearer in the process of inferencing, Sperber and Wilson postulate mutual manifestness.

Besides, Sperber and Wilson reduce Gricean maxims to one Principle of Relevance. In addition, while it is possible to violate Gricean Cooperative Principle and the maxims, it is not possible to violate the Principle of Relevance. In Grice's model of communication the hearer may get implicatures not only by observing the maxims, but also by flouting or violating them. In relevance theory, on the other hand, people get implicatures only on the assumption that the Principle of Relevance is observed.

Similarly, since in relevance theory the speaker takes responsibility for the relevance of information he wants to communicate by giving the hearer the guarantee of relevance, in the relevance framework there is no possibility of what is called 'opting out' in Grice's system.

Furthermore, according to Grice, language meaning may be described via entailments and conventional implicatures, and speaker's meaning via generalized and particularized implicatures. According to Sperber and Wilson, on the other hand, language meaning may be described via analytic implications which approximate Gricean entailment,[19] and speaker's meaning may be described via synthetic implications which approximate Gricean conversational implicatures. In the relevance framework the distinction between particularized, generalized and conventional implicatures is blurred.[20]

Moreover, Grice provides the hearer with empirical tests useful for distinguishing among the various types of implicatures. In the relevance framework, analytic and synthetic implications are distinguished on the basis of the kind of deductive rules that were applied in the process of their deduction

and on the basis of a number of premises on which the rules operated.

In addition, Grice's system does not explicitly mention the notion of explicature , which appears in Sperber and Wilson's theory. Similarly, unlike Sperber and Wilson, Grice does not acknowledge the necessity for the coding-decoding system explicitly. In relevance theory both the coding-decoding process and inferential process are claimed to be involved in human communication. Finally, the reasoning in Gricean inferential process is less explicit than the one in relevance theory.

As for similarities between the two models of communication, first, in both frameworks the distinction is made between language and speaker's meaning and speaker's meaning is recognized as primary.

Second, in both frameworks meaning is ultimately defined in terms of speaker's intentions and these intentions are twofold. There is a communicative intention and an informative intention.

Third, in both frameworks the recognition of the communicative intention is a precondition of recognizing the informative intention. Without noticing that a person wants to communicate something to us, we cannot notice what he wants to communicate. Moreover, communication is successful once the informative intention is recognized.

Furthermore, in both frameworks understanding is based on inference and communication is successful not when the hearer recognizes the linguistic meaning of an utterance, but when he infers the speaker's meaning.

On the whole, the relevance framework is the development of Grice's model of communication. Although it is much more explicit and elaborate, and it introduces many significant changes and extensions to the Gricean framework, it does not change the very basic assumption of communication that communication is inferential in nature.

Notes

[1] Grice P., p. 220.

[2] Grice P., p. 222.

[3] Grice P., pp.27,28.

[4] Sperber D., D. Wilson, p71.

[5] Sperber D., D. Wilson, p.86.

[6] ibid.

[7] Sperber D., D. Wilson, p.86.

[8] The speaker may observe the maxims, exploit the maxims, opt out of them or violate them.

[9] An assumption is manifest to an individual at a given time if the individual can mentally represent it and accept this representation as true (Sperber/Wilson 1995:39).

[10] Sperber D., D. Wilson, p.164.

[11] Contextual effects may be of three types: contextual implications, strengthening of assumptions and erasing assumptions.

[12] Sperber D., D. Wilson, p.125.

[13] Grice P., pp.39,44.

[14] Grice P., p. 31.

[15] Grice P., pp. 39,43.

[16] Grice P., p. 39.

[17] Sperber D., D. Wilson, p.107.

[18] It is a simplified version of logical form encountered in Montague grammar. P. stands for the predicator: 'putting on', B stands for the doer of the action and S stands for the object of the action: shoes.

[19] While analytic implications approximate entailments, not all entailments equal analytic implications.

[20] In fact, Sperber and Wilson question the existence of the notion of conventional implicature. There is no such entity in their theory at all.

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Małgorzata Wójcik

Interpreting a Metaphor According to the Principle of Relevance*

I. Interpreting an utterance according to the principle of relevance

Mary says to John:

1. The phonetic form is decoded into "Peter is a lion."
2. By analytic implications, using the contents of his memory, in particular his logical, lexical and encyclopedic entries for "Peter", "be", and "a lion", John establishes that Peter denotes a human being, a lion is an animal, and "be" can express existence or some kind of relation between the subject and the predicate, etc. This is a preliminary phase which triggers inferential comprehension.
3. Assuming that Mary is talking to him, John realizes that there is a set of assumptions "I" which she intends to make manifest to him by saying "Peter is a lion." The correct interpretation of this ostensive stimulus is the first accessible interpretation consistent with the principle of relevance. Therefore John first uses the immediate context.
4. John tries to fulfil his first task: **identifying the right propositional form**, that is one intended by the speaker and consistent with the principle of relevance. At every stage John chooses the solution involving the least

* The paper has been submitted for the course 265: *Models of Verbal Communication* run by Professor Ewa Mioduszewska-Crawford. We have decided to print two essays from this course, because both have been recommended by Professor Mioduszewska as equally outstanding.

effort, and abandon it only if it does not give an interpretation consistent with the principle of relevance:

1. Development of the propositional form: **explicatures**

   a) disambiguation
   John decides that "is" should not be understood as denoting existence but a relationship between the subject and the predicate.
   Here he meets a contradiction which will be solved by inferential assumptions he will arrive at.

   b) reference assignment
   Recognizing that Mary wants to make his task the least effort-requiring, John notices the fact that she has put "Peter" in the position reserved for presupposed, that is, mutually known, information. With the principle of relevance in mind John decides
   that "Peter" from Mary's sentence is Peter Smith.

   c) enrichment
   Since the utterance contains a referentially undetermined term "a lion", John looks for the first accessible enrichment consistent with the principle of relevance. He takes it to represent the whole class of lions, and accessing his encyclopedic entry for "lion" he finds some assumption schemas, e.g. that lions are ferocious and courageous.

   d) the propositional attitude
   From the linguistically encoded intonation John recognizes the mood of the utterance as an exclamation.

2. The identification of **implicatures**

   Having decoded Mary's ostensive stimulus and having developed its propositional form John is now in a position to look at it against the background of the content of his memory, and to see what contextual effects it may have when synthetic contextual deductive rules operate.

This step is presented in more detail in section III.

II. Introductory information

1. An utterance can represent things in two ways:

1. If its propositional form is true of a state of affairs, the utterance is a

description.

2. If its propositional form resembles the form of another utterance, it is an **interpretation**.
   In inferential communication an utterance is **an interpretive expression** of a thought of a speaker. The degree of resemblance is conditioned by the principle of relevance - the speaker must decide on the optimal way of representing his thought, should it be the identity of propositional forms, or merely a recoverable resemblance.

2. Literalness is the identity of propositional forms of the thought and the utterance used to represent it. It is not a norm, but an extreme: generally the propositional form of the utterance is not identical with that of the thought, but rather resembling it.

- Identity - sharing all logical properties.
  A literal utterance - has the same propositional form as the thought; is identical to it.
- Resemblance - sharing some logical properties. The identification of these properties by the speaker is guided by the principle of relevance.
  A non-literal utterance - shares less than all logical properties of the thought; resembles it.

(3) Not always is the literal interpretative expression of a thought the optimally relevant one.

If *P* (a thought of mine) is too complex to be represented literally, I can chose to communicate *Q* (an assumption), from which the set of assumptions *I* that I want to communicate is easily derivable, even though some of these assumptions are not the ones that I intend to communicate. I hope that the hearer, guided by the principle of relevance, will be able to sort out the ones that I do from the ones that I do not intend to communicate.
Q is not a thought of mine, but it is an interpretive expression of *P*. Relevance helps to distinguish those contextual implications that are shared by *P* and *Q* from those which are not.



(4) If the speaker chooses to use a non-literal way of expressing his thought, the hearer has to start computing the contextual implications in order of accessibility, using the most immediate context. Only if the immediate context is not enough to make the utterance relevant should he extend it. His aim is an overall interpretation of the utterance relevant enough to balance the effort needed to be arrived at.

III. Processing a metaphor according to the principle of relevance

(1) Mary says to John: "Peter is a lion."

1. Taken literally it is blatantly false, and therefore irrelevant. Yet literalness is not a norm, but a limiting case - an utterance is to be taken literally only if nothing less than a literal interpretation will confirm the presumption of relevance.

2. John assumes relevance of (1), so he looks for an appropriate context.

3. The encyclopedic entry for "lion" gives access to stereotypical, and therefore highly accessible, schemas:

lion - 1. the king of animals; very important;
2. a ferocious animal, very courageous.

Let's say that, although these two sets of assumptions are dominant,

given the background knowledge about Peter, John eliminates the first set. It can be contrary to his strong assumption about Peter being a rather unimportant person, it can be already present in his mind, or it can require too much effort for him to arrive at some contextual implications to be worth his while processing it at all. Thus John chooses to process the utterance in the context of the second set of assumptions, the dominant assumptions thus being "ferocious and courageous."

4. John assumes that Mary has chosen the optimal way of presenting her thought, and thus takes the first (the most accessible = the least effort-requiring) implication that comes to his mind, and checks it against the principle of relevance.
The implication is arrived at via a deductive rule of substitution:

Input: (i) X is Y
(ii) Y is Z
Output: X is Z

(i) Peter is a lion.
(ii) A lion is very ferocious and courageous.*(an implicated premise)*

(a) Peter is very ferocious and courageous. *(an implicated conclusion)*, from which he can chose one quality as more relevant, via the rule of and-elimination:
(a') Peter is very courageous.

1) (i) is new information, coming from decoding; (ii) is the contextual information retrieved from John's memory. Therefore the rule in operation is synthetic.

2) (ii) is an implicated premise, because although not stated explicitly, it is necessary for a relevant interpretation of the utterance.

5. Now John is faced with a question: assuming that Mary has chosen the optimal way of presenting her thought, why hasn't she said (a'), the assumption implied by (1), explicitly? The additional effort of activating the encyclopedic entry for lions, and of computing it to arrive at (a') must be accounted for by an increase of contextual effect. Otherwise the utterance of (1) would lack enough relevance to be processed at all.

6. John thus goes beyond the most accessible context, and expands it so as to find more implications. Some of them will be automatically discarded (if

they are contradictory to some stronger assumptions, e.g. "Peter is a human being" vs. "Peter belongs to the species of cats."). Others can give rise to additional assumptions, e.g. that Peter is extraordinarily courageous; that Peter's courage goes beyond standard human behavior; that he is wild in his behavior, etc.

In doing so, John hopes to arrive at an overall interpretation of the utterance, which would overlap with the thought Mary intended to express. The larger the range of contextual effects John arrives at, the more responsibility he takes for constructing them. Generally, the more effort is needed for arriving at an implication, the weaker it is, and the less can Mary be charged with making the hearer construct it. The speaker takes the full responsibility only for the first implicatures produced by the hearer: unless the speaker prevents the hearer from making an implication, it is taken to represent his informative intention.

7. What John can also infer from the fact that Mary's utterance is not literal, is that the quantities of Peter she wants to communicate are not easily expressed by words, that in some way they are extraordinary. Mary prefers to use a less literal from to present her thought because it was more effort-efficient, even though she had to take the risk of inducing in John some assumptions she doesn't have herself.

8. Finally John can arrive at an assumption about Mary's informative intention, which might look for example like this:

"By saying that Peter is a lion Mary intends to express her admiration of his courage and make me appreciate it as well."

If that was really Mary's intention, her ostensive behavior was successful not only in communicating her communicative, but also her informative intention.

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Anna Burdziełowska

Make the Most of Your Ear for Music or Using Songs to Teach Listening and Speaking to Young Learners*

Music is a very important aspect of human life, therefore the role of songs in teaching English cannot be neglected. We are exposed to music from infancy and almost everyone can recollect the early life experience of our mother's delicate, calming voice humming or singing to us. Even before we are born we listen to the rhythmic music of our mother's heartbeat and throughout childhood we hear lullabies with their relaxing and pacifying melody. As a child grows and develops, singing becomes this 'little something' that he/she is absolutely fond of and cannot live without, whether at home or in school.

Like mothers, who satisfy their babies' need for music instinctively, teachers of children cannot disregard this inborn necessity. Moreover, they should try to take an advantage of it by making constant use of songs in the language classroom. It may be beneficial for various methodological reasons. Firstly, songs make very good teaching material. Apart from being a common source of listening practice, they are also a rich base for reinforcing learned language patterns, extending vocabulary, getting children to produce oral English and teaching them sounds and rhythm of a language. Additionally,

* The paper has been submitted for the Academic Writing course run by Ms Maria Birkenmajer, MA. As a rule we don't publish Academic Writing essays; however, Anna Burdziełowska's paper has been recommended as a brilliant scholarly work and that is why we have decided to print it.

songs prove to be a powerful tool in class management. According to Sarah Phillips (1994) songs come in handy whenever the change of pace is necessary. Songs can serve as a signal for changing the students' focus from the previous subject to English, as a break from a more challenging activity, or as a smooth closure to the class. Last but not least, songs make the lesson a pleasure by motivating learners and letting them feel a sense of achievement. Moreover, they provide variety and fun, creating a friendly and relaxed atmosphere among the learners at the same time.

Songs for teaching English to children should not be chosen at random, however. There are several specific criteria that have to be fulfilled for a song to suit a kindergarten or a primary language classroom. (see: Philips:1994) It is very important that the words are distinctly heard, as only then will the learners feel encouraged to play/work with the song. Furthermore, the melody line should be easy to follow and imitate to let the pupils concentrate on the text, rather than on the musical aspect of the song. For the sake of comprehension simple grammatical constructions and not overly complicated language are essential. Since there is always some vocabulary or a structure aimed at being learned or reinforced through a song, a repetitive motif containing the target piece(s) of language is of crucial importance. It is also worth noticing that, if we want the pupils to memorize the song, rhymes are very helpful.

In order to improve listening different techniques of working with songs may be employed. Many of them build on children's kinesthetic modality. According to Scott and Ytreberg (1994) the most common are listen-and-do activities, which satisfy kids' need for movement and turn it into an effective comprehension check. They involve miming and moving about, which calls children's attention to acting out what they hear or sing, and hence keeps them interested and involved. In addition to moving and imitating, children love drawing. It can be applied to illustrating songs. To give an example, each pupil or group can listen to a line of the song and draw what they heard. Yet another type of activity is 'put up your hand' (which may well be 'jump', 'step out', etc.) One of the possible variations is to ask children to rise their hands whenever they hear the word, say, 'orange', or any name of a fruit, animal, color, etc. If they are assigned a cue card for a key word each, they may well put these up when they hear the word illustrated on their card. In regards to listening, it is worth pointing out that children are also able to listen for information 'hidden' in the song. They will like listening in order to restore the proper sequence to mixed-up lines or pictures corresponding to the story the song tells, as young learners are keen on putting things in order. In another activity, having been given pictures with gaps (e.g. parts of a face missing) or mistakes (e.g. red shirt instead of blue), the pupils have to listen to the song and

improve the pictures. With a monolingual class able to read one more type of exercise - a song translation - is possible, though it is very demanding and should not be used too often. The children's task is to match mixed-up lines of their native language translation with a copy of English words. If the pupils can write already, they may be asked to supply some missing key words to the song.

As listening is a passive skill, it calls for some active complementation or continuation. That is why it is often combined with speaking. This idea lies behind various listen-and-repeat activities. Depending on the age of the learners and their level, the teacher will use different types of repetition. With very young learners it is enough to repeat one word only. But as memory capacity broadens with age, the pupils may repeat key words or a grammatical construction, then a refrain or stanza, and finally the whole text. To make repetition more fun, a song may be practised in several ways. (cf. Malkoc: 1991) Pupils can be divided into two groups singing equal or odd lines respectively. Then, we can have alternating rows or, perhaps, girls versus boys repeat stanzas. If the teacher or a student feels safe enough to perform stanzas solo, the rest can join in for the refrain. Is the song easy to follow, the teacher may initiate it and point to different students to continue. There is also a lot of fun in changing the mood of a song, i.e. singing some parts high and some low, quiet and loud, etc., or making it into a competition to see which group can sing the song the fastest, the sweetest or the softest.

In conclusion, there are many good psychological and methodological reasons to promote songs in the young language learners' classroom. The range of techniques for working with songs is constantly improved and added to every day. Yet, if you are still not convinced, think what an unlimited source of pleasure songs are and what an excellent way of learning through fun they provide for kids as well as for their teacher, particularly when you have a good ear for music and enjoy singing and playing with melody and words. So, go ahead and explore them!

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