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## A STUDENTS' JOURNAL

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literature

CULTURE

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Dear Readers,

Can you imagine a scholarly institution (and, small as it is, our Institute's *Koło Naukowe* definitely is one) functioning without its own web page in the new Millennium? Well, neither can we. Therefore, by the time this issue of our journal reaches your hands, The Students' Society for the Humanities (or, if you like, *Koło Naukowe*) will probably have its own page ready. Naturally, some part of the page will be devoted to 'FOLIO' and those of you who are interested in the essays published in the first issue of our journal will be happy to find its contents there, ready for printing or downloading. And in the future, each issue of 'FOLIO' which is out of print will be placed on the web page. Those which are still available can be currently obtained either at the Institute of English Studies, Warsaw University (please ask for *Graciarnia*, which is our office) or by mail order. Those of you who choose the latter option, please enclose postage stamps for 3zł per copy of the journal ordered.

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The Editors

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Agnieszka Ziemkiewicz

The Arabesque Fissure.
Metafiction in Edgar Allan Poe's
'The Fall of the House of Usher' *

> The logic regulating the text is not comprehensive ... but metonymic; the activity of associations, contiguities, carryings-over coincides with a liberation of symbolic energy, ... the work ... is **moderately** symbolic (its symbolic runs out, comes to a halt); the Text is **radically** symbolic....[1]

The self-reflexivity of 'The Fall of the House of Usher' is evident as soon as one considers the story's well-recognised status as an arabesque. The fissure—appearing in the walls of the building—can be an arabesque figure and a metaphor for the way in which metafictionality works in the tale.

The concept of the arabesque was elaborated in the nineteenth century. In formulating it, Friedrich von Schlegel drew upon the patterns of Arabian carpets as he traced their influence on Arabo-Oriental literature.[2] The 'arabesque' came

> [t]o indicate an intricate geometric or abstract narrative design into which incongruity in detail and antithesis in character and structure are consciously insinuated. In the arabesque, the relationship between a framing narrative and one or more story strands severely strains or calls into question overt narrative illusion, which may be further undermined through involuted narrative conventions, complex digressions, disruptions or incongruities, and

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the blurring of levels of narrative reality. The writer of the arabesque calls attention to the narrativity of the text, the fiction of its mimesis, the artifice of its conventions....[3]

The structural pattern of the story resembles largely the arabesque. There is a salient framing and numerous mingling repetitive elements, almost of a symmetrical order. The frame is provided by the first person narration. The narrator changes the tale into a succession of images of the house reflected in the pool and in his mind. Such reflexivity splits the story into several narrative levels, which remain, however, interconnected. The narrator, who is also a character, makes each of the orders vulnerable to being invaded by hierophanies of the other orders.

The Fissiparous

The intertwining of the narrative levels is a result of the specific position of the narrator as well as the extreme repetitiveness of the story. Characteristic of the arabesque are

[h]ighly intricate patterns of geometric designs ... involving structurally repeated, symmetrically developed lines, loops, concentric and interpenetrating curvilinear, triangular, rectilinear, and quincunxial structures. ... The basic symbol is repeated within repeated patterns within repeated borders to suggest infinity.[4]

The display of repetition is immediately noticeable in the plane of language, where certain epithets and motifs recur. The frequent use of "wild," "sullen," "silent" or "air," "light," "inconsistency" becomes the tool of weaving the story's pattern. The tarn near Usher's mansion is first described as sullen, then as silent. Later on these adjectives are coupled to be the index of the pool – it is a sullen *and* silent one. Eventually, the adjectives are turned into adverbs: the tarn is what "closed sullenly and silently over the fragments of the '*House of Usher*.'"[5] In a similar vein, the house and its inhabitants, and the narrator, are turned into events; presented initially as a set of static features, their description progresses through a spawning of seemingly complementary qualities, to end in a grand happening. Roderick Usher's oversensitivity is replenished with cataleptic disease (decease) of his twin sister, which leads to a spectacular vision of destruction, and which appears to be, as a whole, a working of the narrator's fancy.

The two comparable curvilinear presentations are coupled, and continuously uncoupled, throughout the story. First the house is antropologised,

then Roderick Usher is depicted with the same adjectives as the building, e.g., his "web-like" hair is reminiscent of the "web-work" fungi hanging from the eaves, and the cadaverous paleness of his skin reflects the discoloration of the walls. The relationship between the house and the character is primarily metonymic. It is overtly indicated by the name: the "House of Usher". The appellation, the same for the family and the mansion, is the mark of their reciprocal influence.[6]

However, the reading of the story as a series of reflections invites metaphor. The half-decayed house may be easily interpreted as a metaphor or allegory for the impaired mind of Roderick Usher. This is done explicitly – the allegorical reading of their relationship is present in the story in the form of a ballad composed by Usher. The poem repeats the structural elements of the two descriptions—the constitution of the building and the countenance of Roderick—uncoupling the two planes at the same time. The metaphor induces their detachment from each other, and the actual impact of the house on Roderick Usher—on his very identity—is refuted by the narrator as being merely imaginary.[7]

Yet, there is another consideration, which serves to deconstruct the allegory, and which prevents the allegorical interpretation from organising the entire story. The allegory is a *mis-en-abyme* that reduplicates the tale. Similar to the image of the house in the tarn, however, this copy is essentially "re-modelled and inverted," blurred and equivocal.[8] Despite the clarity of the allegorical representation, the poem is merely a fragmentary quotation of Usher's work. Allegedly faithful to the original, the ballad lacks music, which the words were only to accompany but which is inevitably muted in the text. Furthermore, the narrator considers a work of another kind of art—a painting—an instance of the perfect representation. "If ever mortal painted an idea, that mortal was Roderick Usher."[9] Yet, for the reader, a different picture of lesser achievement is accounted for in words. The allegorical representation is, indeed, an imperfect and partial reflection of the whole story.

These metaphors of the story's metafictional character turn the text upon itself, conjugating as they uncouple the different planes of the tale. This movement, parallel to the one of linguistic-descriptive strategies, is that of a spiral. The spiral circularity—a circle that uncoils itself—seems to generate the structure and the symbolic texture of the story.

> If we consider the simplest spiral, three stages may be distinguished in it, corresponding to those of the triad: We can call 'thetic' the small curve that initiates the convolution centrally; 'antithetic' the larger arc that faces the first in the process of continuing it; and 'synthetic' the still ampler arc that continues the second while following the first along the outer side. And so on.[10]

The synthetic arc of the spiral as described by Nabokov can be equated with the metafictional strategy, which is of a twofold character in Poe's story. It is simultaneously analeptic and proleptic; the text's self-reflexivity is both retrospective and prophetic. In the ballad, the text both uses and departs from the metaphoric conventions in order to follow again the metonymic logic. The metonymy, however, surpasses simple realism, i.e., it cannot be considered a tool to represent reality.

It is the metafictional synthetic arc that manifests the fantastic turn of 'The Fall of the House of Usher'. Another allegory, the romance *Mad Trist*, blurs the distinction between fiction and reality within the narrative. On the one hand, as a romance, it remains within the convention of allegory, and it can be interpreted in this manner in relation to Poe's story, the romance characters standing for the characters in the tale (e.g., the dragon of a fiery tongue for the narrator). On the other hand, the romance ceases to be fictitious within the narrative. *Mad Trist* has a performative aspect: it is constituted in the story in the same way as the characters are. When it is being read aloud, not only do its words correspond to what is actually happening, but they invoke, or commence, the struggle of Madeline Usher to free herself from the coffin.

> And now---to-night---Ethelred---ha! ha!---the breaking of the hermit's door, and the death-cry of the dragon, and the clangor of the shield---say, rather, the rending of the coffin, and the grating of the iron hinges, and her struggles within the coppered archway of the vault.[11]

The romance feigns the reality of the story, and this effect is all the more intense because the romance is, in fact, a fictional intertext, invented by Poe. It is said to be a real book, merely quoted by the narrator. Instead of commenting and interpreting, as an actual intertext might, it induces and creates the events of the story. The romance, while pretending intertextuality, is metafictional.

The romance's role replicates the narrator's, who can hardly be considered an objective, detached observer. The narrator's interwoven citations from *Mad Trist* and reports on his hearing the sounds similar to those described in the book reveal his deep involvement in what he is telling, to the extent that the whole story can be read as his own imaginary quest, taking place inside his mind. Roderick Usher may be but a reflection of the narrator himself, who is literally an usher, introducing the reader into the house of his mind and story.

The fantastic, i.e., the hesitation between the real and the unreal, is grounded in the intense and multi-layered repetitiveness of the story. The hesitation springs from failure to distinguish the confluent narrative strategies imitating one another and fusing together. They cease to generate clear-cut

textual unites which could be called the character, the narrator, the plot, the commentary. Involved in the metafictional process, 'The Fall of the House of Usher' seems enclosed in the circle of perpetual repetition and continuously replicating itself; its structure is fissiparous.

The Fissure

The form of the spiral maintains the repetitiveness of the circle. There is, however, a crack that prevents the closure of the circle and sets off the infinitely circular movement.

> Perhaps the eye of a scrutinizing observer might have discovered a barely perceptible fissure, which, extending from the roof of the building in front, made its way down the wall in a zigzag direction, until it became lost in the sullen waters of the tarn.[12]

What motivates the appearance of the fissure is the contrast between the "excessive decay" of the substance of the house—the individual stones—and the "still perfect adaptation of parts," which presents itself as "wild inconsistency" to the narrator. The fissure refers neither to the content nor to the form (the substance and structure, the inside and outside); it is the opposition of the two that constitutes it. The fissure is a mark of the mutual repulsion or attraction of opposites. The decay of the parts affects the construction of the whole, whereas the structural perfection bears upon the corruption of the elements. The fissure is an emblem of the interaction that turns a circle into a spiral.[13]

By definition, the fissure is a cleft made by splitting or separation of parts. When it appears, it only extends the condition of internal corruption and discloses the natural weaknesses of the external construction, foregrounding the instability and foreshadowing the disruption of the whole structure. The fissure in its revelatory aspect brings what is hidden to light; it may be indicative of what has been traditionally called 'essence'. If so, it presents essence as division. This is why the story multiplies pairs of opposition, e.g., narrator-character, metonymy-metaphor, form-content, inside-outside, metafiction-intertextuality.

The hyphen is erased throughout the story, which is, indeed, a story of the grand opposition – I/self and the Other, of its creation and dissolution. The Other is both different (female) and inherent (sister); it is co-existent with the self as its double (twin), having no origin. The opposition manifests itself at the

premature burial of Madeline Usher, still alive. The Other is excluded, yet homogeneity turns out to be impossible. However abhorred and dreadful their union may be, Madeline and Roderick are ultimately brought together. This seems final, followed by the immediate death of the two. Nevertheless, the story does not terminate in the death scene.

The Fission

Unification of I/self with the Other results in a telescopic collapse of the story's split narrative levels into that of the narrator's. His escape from the "vast house and its shadows" ("From that chamber, and from that mansion, I fled aghast") is a futile attempt to close the house-like construct of his mind—and the story—in a circular way.[14] However,

> [t]he radiance was that of the full, setting, and blood-red moon, which now shone vividly through that once barely-discernible fissure, of which I have before spoken, as extending from the roof of the building, in a zig-zag direction, to the base. While I gazed, this fissure rapidly widened—the entire orb of the satellite burst at once upon my sight—my brain reeled as I saw the mighty walls rushing asunder—there was a long tumultuous shouting sound like the voice of a thousand waters—and the deep and dank tarn closed sullenly and silently over the fragments of the "*House of Usher.*"[15]

The impression is of the moon exploding and breaking down the walls; an image which enacts the figure/ground paradox. Yet, it is impossible not only to decide what is represented (the within or the without), but also to determine what constitutes the foreground as different from the background. Both the figure (the house) and the ground (the moon) belong to discourse. The moon with its "blood-red" rays reflects the "encrimsoned" light in Usher's chamber, which is the light coloured by the windows of the building.[16] What enables the reflection is both the moon and the house. What provides illumination is the text itself: it can be compared to one of Usher's paintings, one that depicts an underground tunnel without exit, permeated with radiance of no origin.

The textual light is the very agent of the fission occurring in the story. The destruction of Usher's mansion is foreshadowed through the alleged existence of the fissure. At the end, foreshadowing becomes literal: the light coming through the fissure should cause the appearance of the narrator's shadow. Yet he fails to mention it.

Is there a shadow at all? The narrator in this text seems to be a hologram figure, one that is projected by the light of the text and therefore

unable to cast a shadow. The reproductive capability of language is responsible for the ignoring, or the non-appearance, of the shadow. It also motivates the relationship between the narrator and the siblings.

The story can be adapted and staged as a "*heroics of embodiment*, a particular account of a (de)forming struggle between letter and figure, whose stakes include the very possibility of fictional 'character'."[17] Kosofsky Sedgwick proposes to read female Gothic characters as hysterics (bodies deprived of voice), and male characters, often double and engaged in a perpetual chase of one another, as paranoids (minds enclosed in their own projections). In this context, the opposition of I/self and the Other can be transcribed as a threefold relationship of the body, language related to the body, and language related to itself.

The self-reflexivity of language comes first, the narrator being deeply affected by the fancies of his mind and drawn into "closer and still closer intimacy" with the other man.[18] Indeed, the tale proceeds to recount not the events, but Roderick speaking about himself. Language is attracted by the possibility of verbal repetition, which can become an illusion of representation. The narrator constructs a minute and repetitive description of Roderick Usher's face, which bears resemblance to the house, to gaze at him "with a feeling half of pity, half of awe."[19] Fascinated, he treats it, however, as an emblem of thoughts although he finds the carnal elements strangely excessive and evasive of his attempts to turn them into a representation. "And now in the mere exaggeration of the prevailing character of these features ... I could not, even with effort, connect its arabesque expression with any idea of simple humanity."[20] The narrator discovers, or imagines, that the face of Roderick Usher is not his own; it is identical to Madeline's, it belongs to the Other. The body is projected and brought into union with language viewed as the fe/male binary opposition.

Insofar as textual self-reflexivity conceives (of) the body, it soon ascertains its own limits. The narrator discovers "sympathies of scarcely intelligible nature" between Madeline and Roderick as if their relationship were beyond the representational power of language.[21] Madeline appears like a shadow, always adjacent to her brother. Language, which set out to delineate and delimit the body, is (in)formed by its own intimate entanglement with corporeality. What takes place in the story is the continual struggle within language, whose autotellic capacity seduces it to repudiate the body. Madeline dies while the narrator is present in the Usher house; later the same narrator, significantly, does not heed his shadow, thus evading the trace of his own materiality. Yet language cannot disentangle itself from the body. The moment

of utter enclosure of language in itself brings about a disclosure of corporeality. After Madeline has been buried, the narrator cannot but look at the altered countenance of Roderick Usher

> gazing upon vacancy.(...) I saw that he spoke in a low, hurried, and gibbering murmur, as if unconscious of my presence. Bending closely over his person, I at length drank in the hideous import of his words. (...) "Madman! I tell you that she now stands without the door!"[22]

Roderick's voice, which is language speaking for the body, replaces the narrator's. This voice proclaims the body's ascendancy. What is more, the fusion of language and the body is performed in the surrender to the literal meaning of the words uttered by Usher, and Madeline's appearance within the door is to prove the figure's submission to the letter. However, the double death of Roderick and Madeline consummates the illusion of the literal as a rudimentary union of language and corporeality. It is the figurative interpretation of death as the fusional dissolution of boundaries, further symbolically equated to the sexual act, that sustains the immanence of the body in relation to language.

The Vision

It is not totally unexpected that the union of language and body culminates in annihilation. 'The Word becomes flesh' is considered to be an act of divine omnipotence, not human. Although the narrator does escape both from the scene of death and of the fall, he cannot persevere in telling the story. When the literal seems to be obliterated in favour of the figurative, language ceases to speak, deprived of its bodily counterpart. While death means the illusion and impossibility of the literal only, the fall is the failure of the purely figurative.

It is the 'literal' language of the last scene that magnifies the dimension of the fall, and creates the impression of a total disaster. While at the beginning language deludes the reader as to its representational potential, now it magnificently feigns its impotence. The alleged catastrophe of the body and language leads to an apocalyptic vision of the destruction of the text. What the narrator can see, perhaps, buried in the tarn are "the fragments of the '*House of Usher*.'"[23] The literal and the figurative are once again reversed. At first the inverted and blurred image of the building is a reflection on the water surface, then it is substituted by the vision of the house as the text itself. Reality is but textuality, which is, however, as inaccessible as the real in a narrative. Neither

mimesis nor textuality is, in fact, tangible, i.e., experienced directly. The former is an external visual effect that becomes interiorised in the process of perception. The latter is an imaginary product that obtains in the world but cannot produce the effect of a totality.

What is the tarn, then? What are its sullen and silent waters? They initiate the series of reflections and turn the literal into the figurative only to devour the projections and put an end to the working of language. The symbolic images of the Apocalypse appear in the chronological order that is reversed in regard to its Biblical predecessor. The destruction, the end of the textual 'world' does not promise, but terminates the vision of the plenitude of meaning that is suggested by the lack of the shadow. The eschatological, ubiquitous presence of light is comparable to the way in which language exists in the text. Language is the light that attracts the narrator so much that it makes him blind to his shadow; the radiance reflected by the moon is language experienced in\through\by the body. The story shows its own incompleteness. It indicates the necessity of going beyond itself. It describes itself as a projection limited to the dimensions of its medium; it is like a painting with holes through which one could look beyond the canvas. These peepholes turn out to be blank -- blind windows. Reality is present with a shadowy presence as the excluded Other of the text. Reality exists only as the possibility of the text's external, yet it is ineluctable. The alluring plenum, the self-sufficient world of fiction is to be exploded, to be broken apart.

It is language in need of reference that inevitably requires the deconstruction of the text. The text treads the paths within itself that are to lead beyond it.

> Every exit from the book is made within the book. Indeed, the end of writing keeps itself beyond writing. If writing is not tearing of the self toward the other within a confession of infinite separation, if it is a delectation of itself, ... it destroys itself. It is true that to go toward the other is also to negate oneself.... But—and this is the heart of the matter—everything that is exterior in relation to the book, everything that is negative as concerns the book, is produced *within the book*. ... One emerges from the book within the book, because ... the book is not in the world, but the world is in the book.[24]

Perhaps the spiral is but an illusion. Its uncoiling movement -- either outwardly towards mimesis or inwardly towards textuality – is a twofold way in which the text, and the world, is perceived. As if the circle with its infinite repetition was unbearable for us. Thus, in our eyes "the spiral is a spiritualized circle. In the spiral form, the circle, uncoiled, unwound, has ceased to be vicious; it has been set free."[25]

Notes

[1] Barthes, p.158

[2] cf. Barth

[3] Thompson in Barth, p.318

[4] Barth, p.315

[5] Poe, p.1475

[6] Poe, p.1464

[7] cf. Poe, p.1467

[8] Poe, p.1463

[9] Poe, p.1467

[10] Nabokov, p.211

[11] Poe, p.1474

[12] Poe, p.1464

[13] Poe, p.1464

[14] Poe, p.1475

[15] Poe, p.1475

[16] Poe, p.1465

[17] Kosofsky Sedgwick, p.vi

[18] Poe, p.1467

[19] Poe, p.1465

[20] Poe, p.1465

[21] Poe, p.1471

[22] Poe, pp.1473-4

[23] Poe, p.1474

[24] Derrida, p.75-6

[25] Nabokov, p.211

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Małgorzata Tomczak

A Feminist Reading
of *Surfacing* by Margaret Atwood*

> Men's novels are about men. Women's novels are about men
> too but from a different point of view. You can have a men's
> novel with no women in it except possibly the landlady or the
> horse, but you can't have a women's novel with no men in it.
> Sometimes men put women in men's novels but they leave
> out some of the parts: the head, for instance, or the hands... [1]

One can look at feminism from various angles; since the beginning of
the movement many different definitions appeared, serving as examples of the
diversity of thoughts and beliefs among feminists. The most popular definition
of feminism is that men and women should be equal politically, economically
and socially. A number of other definitions emerge such as Amazon feminism,
Cultural feminism, Ecofeminism, Femme feminism, Radical feminism and
many more which only demonstrate the gap between members of the
movement. Some claim that feminism has failed in the past because of feminists
themselves arguing over who is right and who is wrong. Critics argue that
instead of taking social harmony into the consideration, they looked more at
'gender equality'.

English and American critics pointed to the fact that women writers
had been silenced and excluded from literary history, and they insisted on a
status and recognition for women authors, but also wanted to write the history
of a tradition among women themselves. Thanks to feminism, female writings

and writers have at last been given the attention they deserve. It is difficult, however, to create a definition for feminist literature, as opposed to the male. Various elements have been presented to describe literature written by women, many of them however belong or appear in male writing as well. Moreover, the variety of feminist positions make it difficult to establish a perfect criteria for feminist narrative. Besides, it is almost impossible to draw a clear line separating 'the feminist' texts from any 'woman – centered' literature, that places a woman's experiences, ideas, visions at the center of a piece of writing. However, one can say that autobiographical texts, texts associated with a new 'woman – centered' literature or the narrative of female self - discovery as in Margaret Atwood's *Surfacing* serve as examples of the increasing influence of feminism.

Margaret Atwood, in the 1970s, became known first for her Canadian nationalism, then for her feminism. She herself has frequently compared the powerless status of Canada to that of women. Whether or not she belongs to the so called group of feminist writers is a disputable issue. Many critics have claimed so and many critical analyses of Atwood's texts have been written from this point of view. However, the author herself rejects being considered an exclusively feminist writer and she refuses that label. She admits to reading *The Feminine Mystique* by Betty Friedan from 1963 behind closed doors, like many other young women did at that time. Atwood claims to be generally interested in human beings, their relations with others, their basic rights being limited and oppressed , in other words in any kind of social changes and as in feminism as a part of them. Being an active member of Amnesty International herself, she often pays attention to the oppressed and marginalised.

Surfacing, her novel published in the 1970's, was reviewed differently in the United States and in Canada. In the States it was considered as a feminist and ecological treatise and in Canada it was viewed almost exclusively as a nationalistic one. Therefore, the interpretation of her book *Surfacing* can operate on several levels. One possible reading of the text is a feministic one. While speaking of an 'interior' nature of writing by women, Atwood uses her texts, concentrated around a female protagonist, as a continuing process in which her own self-definition is involved. In her book *Surfacing* many characteristics, that are sometimes treated as typical for women's writing can be found. In general, women consider two things to be very important: language and communication - which they rarely find in the modern world. They stress it as if they were afraid of losing this fading art. of connection among human beings. The language they use in their writings seems to be more spontaneous and intuitive and contributes to so called 'fluid writing' style as compared with

linear and ordered texts characteristic for male authors. "...Language is intrinsically involved with that which has to be done; the constitution of forms of social life as containing practices..."2 In Atwood's work language is considered to be both a vehicle of exploration and something which has the ability to signal process even within its products; as exemplified by the present - participle title *Surfacing*. The title already itself suggests a particular journey of an unnamed author.

In connection with this, one can examine what Helen Cixous has stated: "... A feminine textual body is recognized by the fact that it is always endless, without ending; there is touch, and this touch passes through the ear..." 3 The ending of *Surfacing* leaves the reader with some suggestions as the protagonist plans to go back to civilization: "... This above all, to refuse to be a victim. Unless I can do that I can do nothing. I have to recant, give up the old belief that I am powerless and because of it nothing I can do will ever hurt anyone ..."4 and to her lover: "...If I go with him we will have to talk, ... we can no longer live in spurious peace by avoiding each other, the way it was before, we will have to begin ... I can trust him ..."5 We are also left with our own conception and belief whether or not she is going to do it: "...To trust is to let go. I tense forward, towards the demands and questions, though my feet do not move yet..."6

While there are three basic types of feminine narrative presented by Rita Felski: autobiographical woman - centered narratives, confession - personal history that seeks to express the essential nature, the truth of the self and the third type, perhaps most clearly identified with contemporary feminist writing is the narrative of female self discovery. The novel of self discovery presents a complexity of the process of separation. First comes the recognition of an estrangement, then individual liberation from existing ideological and social constraints towards a degree of self - determination.

The protagonist of *Surfacing* is introduced to the reader while driving away from the city where she experienced some unpleasant treatment. In order to free herself from the uncomfortable situation, she decides on a journey into her childhood memories, the journey into nature and most of all the journey into herself. Annis Pratt in her essay '*Surfacing* and the Rebirth Journey' writes: "...The journey into the solitary world of the psyche is the a process which feminist theoreticians are beginning to recognize as transformational in both the individual and the collective sense..."7 Pratt further argues that this description of the process of partial or complete rebirth appeared already in Jungian philosophy and can mean employment of some characteristic of a supernatural figure who in case of *Surfacing* seem to be protagonist's lost or dead father.

Another aspect here can be seen in the fact that, women for a very long time were associated with childbearing and rearing or domestic obligations. The first attempt in feminist writing is to break up with that so called 'women's world'. Therefore, the contemporary self - discovery feminist narrative, does not necessarily end in marriage or death, as can be seen in *Surfacing* . It is often only after the experience of marriage that the heroine is able to see through and reject the seductive myth of romance as the key to female self - identity, so the journey to self - discovery occurs at a relatively late stage in the protagonist's life. The protagonist in *Surfacing* has withdrawn from the marriage and this is the point of recognition, as well as starting point for her interior journey into her self. The status of marriage as the goal and endpoint of female development is called into question. The beginning of the text thus typically introduces a negative model, an image of female alienation which will be overcome throughout the text.

> ... I keep my outside hand on the door in spite of it. To brace myself and so I can get out quickly if I have to. I've driven in the same car with them before but on this road it doesn't seem right, either the three of them are in the wrong place or I am...[8]

The sense of female identity is constantly presented as lack, a problematic absence, the protagonist, unable to see herself except in the relation to the needs and desires of others. The heroine of *Surfacing* experiences the world as a remote distance: "...I watch the side windows as though it's a TV screen ..."[9] This sense of remoteness, isolation from a preferable destiny which the protagonist feels unable to change is typically described as a splitting of inner and outer self. Another element of women's feeling of alienation derives from the lack of understanding. The heroine of *Surfacing* never talked to her parents about her escape from home and from husband and child because they would not understand her. Actually, she never talked to anybody about it as she was afraid of being first misunderstood and then criticized and accused.

Undoubtedly an important feature, occurring in feminist writing, is that of the power of language and its function in misunderstanding between men and women. Shannon Hengen in her book *Margaret Atwood's Power* mentions the remark of a critic, Carol Giligan that "...men and women may speak different languages that they assume are the same using similar words to encode disparate experiences of self and social relationships..."[10]. The protagonist of *Surfacing* admits herself that "...It was language again, I couldn't use it because it wasn't mine..." [11] She learned about that even before: "...My throat constricts, as it learned to do when I discovered people could say words that would go into

my ears meaning nothing. To be deaf and dumb would be easier..."[12] It is one of the characteristic of the marginalized groups to remain mute up to a certain point, when a move from the stage of alienation, a sense of lack to a conscious self - discovery and identity appears to be of the greatest importance. Moreover, the main character feels a constant suspicion of language. "...My hand touches his arm. Hand touched arm. Language divides us into fragment, I wanted to be a whole..."[13] Speaking would be a necessary compromise and a betrayal of self. Speechless seems to be more authentic. The power of the patriarchal order, and language is a part of it, derives from the fact that women are presented in the way men would perceive them and similarly female figures in texts are affected by men[14]. In the case of *Surfacing* however, the situation is a bit different. Undoubtedly, the main protagonist is speechless and lost in her search for identity at the beginning, as a result of being defined in relation to men. However, she manages, first of all, to recognize her 'imprisoned' position and to seek a way out. This way out is done through "...a complex journey back to her mother, 'mother' country, and mother tongue..."[15]

Sexuality rarely plays a dominant role in the self - discovery process. Knowledge, rather than desire is emphasized as the key to any kind of relationship among humans. "...Love is taking precautions. Did you take any precautions, they say, not before but after. Sex used to smell like rubber gloves and now it does again..."[16] Atwood presents a woman as one who has to uncover herself in order to let others know about her needs and feelings.

> ...I didn't love him, I was away from him, it was as though I was seeing him through a smeared window or a glossy paper; he didn't belong here, But he existed, he deserved to be alive. I was wishing I could tell him how to change so he could get there, the place where I was...[17]

Frequently two motives occur in the feminist narrative: nature and community. Nature is often viewed as an extension of some kind of 'feminine' principle; the violation of the natural world is perceived to reflect the oppression of women.

> ...In the Canadian novel, for example, nature - culture opposition serves to demarcate national as well as gender boundaries; the celebration of wilderness, in *Surfacing* can also be read as the celebration of a distinctive cultural identity in the face of the homogenizing and imperialistic tendencies of as American culture which is identified with the most negative aspects of modernity...[18]

Atwood presents a negative view of civilization as confronted by a positive one of nature. In *Surfacing* the protagonist discovers in the wilderness the destroying power of hunters from the city who, have lost completely their

understanding of nature. Her friends are false and artificial, rejecting their families and the past. This trip into nature, to the island, which the heroine undertakes, is the voyage of a woman and an artist; it is her attempt to find her self, her past and her identity. As Pratt argues in her essay, the lake on the island is the key, the door to self - understanding of Atwood's hero. "...The island in the Canadian Lakes constitutes a green world of childhood and is locus of transformation or rebirth..."[19] The self-understanding is more internal than public and is possible only by withdrawing from the city world, leaving family behind and going to the wilderness...

> ...They never knew about that and why I left. Their own innocence, the reason I couldn't tell them .... They didn't teach us about the evil, they didn't understand it, how could I describe it to them ...[20]

The experiences that the protagonist undergoes are often difficult and painful, but are necessary to gain maturation.

> ... I feel deprived of something, as though I can't really get here unless I've suffered, as though the first view of the lake which we can see now, blue and cool as redemption, should be through tears and a haze of vomit ... [21]

The novel of self - discovery can be further divided into the Bildungsroman model and also to the Novel of Awakening, where a voyage inward not outward is of a greater importance. The withdrawal from society may be temporary. The protagonist, feeling as an outsider, seeks for symbolic identity; first to be able later to participate in the social world. In *Surfacing* the heroine, while returning to the Canadian wilderness and the place of her home, childhood is remote, deprived of ability to feel. "... It is true, I am by myself: this is what I wanted, to stay here alone. From any rational point of view I am absurd; but there are no longer any rational points of view..."[22] Being left alone, after her friends departure, she destroys all her possessions, which belong to civilization and she immerses herself in the natural world, experiencing mystic visions. She gains power, gains sources of energy through the mixture of symbolic national myths, mystical hallucinations and childhood memories. As a result of this, the heroine probably decides to go back to the city and to her lover. This awakening is already indicated in the title *Surfacing* itself. It means existing but not yet on the surface, slowly coming up - awakening. "...But nothing has died, everything is alive, everything is waiting to become alive..."[23]

The uniqueness of *Surfacing* lies in the fact that the heroine undergoes a whole transformation and is determined to 'surface'. Moreover, she moves from the position of a victim to a hero, rearranging at the same time her 'reality' so that it will not limit her any longer. Thus, while it would seem possible to call

this a feminist text, it cannot be seen as a feminist manifesto. Howells claims, *The Feminine Mystique* by Friedan would be a better example of such manifesto as it includes all the anger and frustrations shared by women in the 50's and 60's in America[24]. Atwood goes beyond this and she calls more for self - acceptance and advises women to search for their position in the contemporary society. She offers this change, which can come only through a certain process like that which the protagonist of *Surfacing* undergoes. Instead of marching in Women Liberation demonstrations, she withdraws from her society and acquires knowledge through a close contact with nature, memories and mystic visions. At the end it is up to her own decision whether or not to return to the community and share her acquired knowledge. From what we know of Atwood's attitude in regard to the 'true' feminist rebel, it could be speculated that the protagonist goes back to the city, now that she is able to place herself, to position herself in her society. This seems to a more proper Atwoodian kind of 'manifesto', one in which she calls women to self - understanding and self - discovery. It could be said that we owe a great deal to writers such as Atwood, as:

> ... They have made of women's fiction a pathway to the authentic self, the roots of our selves before consciousness of self, and shown us the way to the healing waters of our innermost being...[25]

Notes

[1] Atwood, 1995, p.27

[2] Giddens, quoted in Felski, p. 65

[3] Cixous, quoted in Felski, p. 35

[4] Atwood, 1983, p. 206

[5] Atwood, ibid, p 207

[6] Atwood, ibid, p 207

[7] Pratt, p.139

[8] Atwood, 1983, p. 8

[9] Atwood, ibid., p. 11

[10] Hengen, p. 29

[11] Atwood, 1983 p. 115

[12] Atwood, ibid., p. 12

[13] Atwood, ibid., p. 157

[14] in Hengen, pp. 35,45

[15] Hengen, p. 47

[16] Atwood, 1983, p. 85

[17] Atwood, ibid, p. 156

[18] Felski, p. 149

[19] Pratt, p. 151

[20] Atwood, 1983, p. 154

[21] Atwood, ibid, pp. 15-16

[22] Atwood, ibid., p. 187

[23] Atwood, ibid, p. 170

[24] Howells, p.39

[25] Pratt, p.157

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Agnieszka Ziemkiewicz

"The Deadly Space Between".
E. A. Poe's 'The Fall
of the House of Usher' and
T. Pynchon's *The Crying of Lot 49* *

> Each couple on the floor danced whatever was in the fellow's head: tango,
> two-step, bossa nova, slop. But how long, Oedipa thought, could it go on
> before collisions became a serious hindrance? There would have to be
> collisions. The only alternative was some unthinkable order of music, many
> rhythms, all keys at once, a choreography in which each couple meshed easy,
> predestined. ... She followed her partner's lead, limp in the young mute's
> clasp, waiting for the collisions to begin. But none came. ... Jesus Arrabal
> would have called it an anarchist miracle. Oedipa, with no name for it, was
> only demoralized.[1]

Let us juxtapose two texts: Thomas Pynchon's *The Crying of Lot 49*
and Edgar Allen Poe's 'The Fall of the House of Usher'. Let us have their
parallel reading accompanied by Barbara Johnson's essay entitled *Melville's
Fist: The Execution of "Billy Budd"*. Thus, the reading will be orchestrated, but
hopefully, a miracle of dance will occur.
The title of Johnson's essay is already part of her interpretative work.
It introduces the double reading of the word "execution", displaying the split of
language into the literal and figurative. In order to show the significance of this

cleft within language, Barbara Johnson recalls two most common ways of reading Melville's story: the literal and the ironic. She proceeds to show structural similarities existing between both kinds of criticism. "Naivete and irony stand as symmetrical opposites blinded by their very incapacity to see anything but symmetry... Both readings do violence to the play of ambiguity by forcing upon the text the applicability of a universal absolute law."[2] In fact, the two ways of interpretation are ignorant of reading as an essential component of understanding. In their practice, they deny the historic character of meaning and language.

Barbara Johnson delineates the opposition between the two readings by tracing discrepancies arising within Melville's story. First, she translates the discrepancy between character and action into the opposition between being and doing. Poe's tale seems to be focused on being, and to give precedence to characters. The narrator is keenly interested in Roderick Usher's psyche, which he tries to penetrate and depict. Moreover, the strange events taking place in Usher's house are apparently a direct consequence of both the personalities of Roderick and Madeline, and of their relationship.

In Pynchon's novel, there is little attempt to analyse the personalities of the characters. Insofar as "Oedipa" is an obvious reference both to the Greek myth and its later usage in psychoanalysis, the protagonist's name is indicative of the plot, not of her character. Not devoted to Oedipa, the novel is about Oedipal plotting: an involvement deepening with efforts to avoid it, a deference of a solution the more it is sought. Therefore, the attempts on the part of Oedipa to decide whether she has discovered an underground system are doomed to be futile despite the increasing number of clues (in the form of a muted post horn) that she finds. Names given to other characters are also emblematic of events. Oedipa's husband, called Mucho Maas, suffers from a split personality. "He's losing his identity (...) He enters a staff meeting and the room is suddenly full of people, you know? He's a walking assembly of man."[3] It is his name, consonant with the Spanish phrase meaning "much more", that makes him one of many types of paranoia, which Oedipa encounters during her quest. There is no insight into the psychological causes of his illness. Drug-caused, it constitutes an element of the plot that is to foster the inflation of meaning – one of many representations of Oedipa's quest for the ultimate truth.

However, the orientation of the two texts by the being vs. doing opposition is liable to be reversed. Roderick Usher's character is claimed to result from his family history: the influence that the house exerts is derived from the Ushers' long past of excluding what is alien to them. Roderick will repeat the pattern by burying his sister alive, Madeline being presented as the Other of

his own self. What is more, minute descriptions of Usher's appearance are part of the plot leading to the story's climax. Thus, the fall of the house of Usher is connected to, and foreshadowed by, the personality and countenance of its owner, whose death cannot but lead to the destruction of the building.

In Pynchon's work, on the other hand, the narrator's comments make it possible to imagine Oedipa's will motivating the events, which will be unfolding into her personal, meaningful history. There are several such narrative comments, e.g., "If she'd thought to check a couple lines back in the Wharfinger play, Oedipa might have made the next connection by herself,"[4] which suggests that Oedipa's choice determines the plot.

This exchange discloses two concepts of language. The literal interpretation is reading at "face value."[5] It is not accidental that Poe begins his story with depictions of the outer appearance of the house and of Roderick Usher. Moreover, the description of Roderick's face imitates that of the house. Connecting the two, a ballad allegory encourages the reader to trust that the concept exists hidden behind the letter, and can be recovered or deduced from the literal. This "represents the perfectly motivated sign," in which the signified is considered "transparently readable" from the signifier.[6]

Pynchon seems to advocate strongly disbelief towards the letter's outspokenness. The only thing that becomes evident for Oedipa is the multitude of the sign's denotations. The quest reveals to her a variety of contexts, each possibly endowing the sign of a muted post horn with a different meaning.

> And [she] spent the rest of the night finding the image of the Trystero post horn. In Chinatown, in the dark window of a herbalist, she thought she saw it on a sign among ideographs. ... Later, on a sidewalk, she saw two of them in chalk, 20 feet apart. Between them a complicated array of boxes, some with letters, some with numbers. A kids' game? ...[7]

The literal level is also vulnerable to distortion. *Postage* changes into *potsage* and becomes a trace of the alleged underground mail system. The National Automobile Dealers' Association may turn into horrifying Nothingness if abbreviated to N.A.D.A. (Spanish for "nothing") and arouse an obsessive fear in Mucho Maas. Confusions of literal and figurative meanings show the distance between the signifier and the signified. For instance, Oedipa's unintentional sigh "My God" is mistaken for an apostrophe to God.

> "And I feel him, certain days, days of a certain temperature," said Mr Thoth, "and barometric pressure. Did you know that? I feel him close to me."
> "Your grandfather?"
> "No, my God."[8]

The unmitigated difference between the signifier and the signified is marked by Oedipa's inability to link her mindless exclamation to the confession of the old man. She cannot associate the God in the small-talk terms of weather conditions with the literal meaning of her sigh for meaning is to be derived from the context.

Barbara Johnson transports the opposition onto the linguistic plane, transcribing it as the split between the "constative and performative functions of language."9

> Constative language is language used as in instrument of cognition – it describes, reports, speaks about something other than itself. Performative language is language that itself functions as an act, not as a report of one.[10]

Poe's tale is an attempt to enact the compatibility between the two functions. When the narrator reads the fictive romance *Mad Trist* to Roderick Usher, the lecture both gives an account of the hero's struggle to make his way, and performs Madeline's efforts to break through the door of Roderick's room. Furthermore, the whole effect of the fantastic depends upon the apparent compatibility between the constative and performative functions of language. Although the narrator refutes Usher's acknowledgement of the mutual influences existing between the siblings and the house, the sole goal of the story is to effect them through language. Therefore, Poe's work may appear to be a "performative riddle"[11] to the reader, who finds him/herself seduced to believe the improbable.

Pynchon's novel presents itself as an "enigma for cognition."[12] The spawning of the sign's images and the proliferation of its interpretations make the muted post horn a useless indicator of the Trystero system. The ending is a dramatic enactment of the impossibility to assert the existence of the sign's denotation, or the ultimate truth of Trystero. The novel terminates before the appearance of lot 49 at the auction sale, while Oedipa is still waiting to discover the identity of its bidder, who should prove or disprove the existence of Trystero.

Melville refers to a gap in cognition as "deadly space between, which stands as a limit to comprehension. It is located between cognition and performance, knowing and doing, error and murder."[13] Therefore, in order to describe a character that seems incomprehensible (to cross the deadly space), Melville "grounds his discourse in ineradicable error. ... The place of explanation and definition is repeatedly filled, but its content is always lacking. The progress of Melville's description describes an infinite regress of knowledge."[14] In the course of Pynchon's novel, the reader gets to know various

aspects of the Trystero system: its origin in sixteenth-century Europe, its links with the Thurn and Taxis mail monopoly, its secret ways of operating in contemporary America, its possible metaphysical implications, etc. However, the fundamental fact of its existence becomes indeterminable, which deprives Oedipa of certitude in relation to anything that she happens to encounter. The world grows incomprehensible as it presents itself as either/or a dilemma. At the end, Oedipa's world is an assembly of unsolvable alternatives.

> For it was like walking among matrices of a great digital computer, the zeroes and ones twinned above, hanging like balanced mobiles right and left, ahead, thick, maybe endless. Behind the hieroglyphic streets there would be either a transcendent meaning, or only the earth.... Another mode of meaning behind the obvious, or none. Either Oedipa in the orbiting ecstasy of a true paranoia, or a real Tristero. For there either was some Tristero beyond the appearance of the legacy America, or there was just America and if there was just America then it seemed the only way she could continue, and manage to be at all relevant to it, was as an alien, unfurrowed, assumed full circle into some paranoia.[15]

"The cognitive spaces marked out by these eclipses of meaning are important not because they mark the limits of interpretation but because they function as its cause."[16] Cognitive failures in Pynchon's novel manifest themselves as the origin of storytelling. The less Oedipa can rely on her ability to differentiate between the reality and her imagination, the more stories about Trystero she discovers. Johnson claims that when they appear, discontinuities in knowledge undergo metaphysical interpretations; both good and evil are the "misreading of discontinuity through the attribution of meaning to a space or division in language."[17] Pynchon's novel represents this process of the metaphysical emergence of concepts.

> One day Genghis Cohen called, sounding excited, and asked her to come to see something he'd just got in the mail, bearing the device of the muted post horn, belly-up badger, and the motto: WE AWAIT SILENT TRISTERO'S EMPIRE.[18]

The motto miraculously fits the acronym W.A.S.T.E., which is to signify the underground mail system, and provides one more connection with the Trystero found in literary works. What takes place in this "translation" is substituting words for dots, filling up space of indeterminate meaning (thus, "empty") with the signifiers that are to refer to the Trystero system. The whole quest for Trystero may be Oedipa's projection, triggered by scarcity of information.

...she wrote *Shall I Project a world?* If not project then at least flash some arrow on the dome to skitter among constellations and trace out your Dragon, Whale, Southern Cross.

From obscure philatelic journals furnished her by Genghis Cohen, an ambiguous footnote in Motley's *Rise of the Dutch Republic*, an 80-year-old pamphlet on the roots of modern anarchism, a book of sermons by Blobb's brother Augustine also among Bortz's Wharfineriana, along with Blobb's original clues, Oedipa was able to fit together this account of how the organization began.[19]

However, the origin of Trystero for Oedipa is a performance, in which Trystero is represented as a mysterious appearance of men in black resulting in the death of the protagonist.

Niccolo leaps to his feet, (...). He cannot speak, only stutter, in what may be the shortest line ever written in blank verse: "T-t-t-t-t..."... Suddenly, in lithe and terrible silence, ... three figures, ... come capering on stage and stop, gazing at him. Their faces behind the stockings are shadowy and deformed. They wait. The lights all go out.
No hallowed skein of stars can ward, I trow,
Who's once been set his tryst with Trystero.
Trystero. The word hung in the air as the act ended and all lights were for a moment cut; hung in the dark to puzzle Oedipa Maas, but not yet to exert the power over her it was to.[20]

Barbara Johnson shows how the deadly space is contained within language itself. The empty repetition of a name reveals that

[a]t all crucial moments in the drama – in the origin of evil, in the trigger of the act, in the final assessment – the language of *Billy Budd* stutters. At those moments, the constative or referential is eclipsed; language conveys its own empty, mechanistic functioning.[21]

The less and less knowable Trystero is attributed the features of the metaphysical Other, being a symmetrical counterpart of a metaphysical God. The success of this ascription depends on the repetition of meaningless expressions such as "God knows." These exclamations interrupting the speech are caught in the automatic processes of grammar, and in this way become signifiers for the divine concept.

Now here was Oedipa, faced with a *metaphor of God* knew how many parts; more than two, anyway. With coincidences blossoming these days wherever she looked, she had nothing but a sound, a word, Trystero, to hold them together.[22]

The nostalgia for the "direct, epileptic Word, the cry that might abolish that night,"[23] may be viewed as a regretful recollection of the unity of experience as it is represented by St. Augustine. Kroker and Cook write after Cochrane that Augustine's assumption of

> [t]he embodiment of logos (the "word made flesh") meant that consciousness was to be transformed into a matter of "direct deliverance" and the sensate and the ideal would be unified by will. An *intima scientia*" would be created which would take being, will and intelligence as directly experienced aspects of human experience.[24]

Poe's story seems to be dedicated to perform the unity of the triadic experience. It ends with the collapse of the diverse narrative levels into one. Presented as intimately and inherently related to each other, the three main characters learn the impossibility of separate existence. They can be allegorically interpreted as the aspects of Augustinian human personality: memory, will, consciousness, or body, will, and vision. According to Cochrane,

> [i]n his mediation upon the trinitarian principle, Augustine discovered the necessary connection between the will and reason: the fateful connection which produced the will to truth. ... This invention of the will to truth is surely the beginning-point for a full politicization of Western consciousness; for, that is, a working of power within the interstices of will and consciousness.[25]

By making "Trystero" a representation of the incarnated word that Oedipa longs for and awaits as the guarantee of recognition, Pynchon clearly indicates implications of the embodied concept: the operation of the will to truth. "Trystero" can be derived from the old word "tryst" meaning "truth". However, the embodiment of this word takes place on the purely linguistic level, through a simple operation of adding the Spanish suffix "-ero", which serves to denote the agent. Therefore, *The Crying of Lot 49* is closer to Barbara Johnson's conception of what is between being and doing, cognition and performance (the body).

The distance between the constative and performative functions of language makes the historic character of language apparent. Historicity means that knowledge requires specifying conditions within which cognition will be possible, but which inevitably determine it. There is no absolute authority, as authority ("frame of reference") is also textual. As such, it participates in the deferential relations of cognition and performance. It cannot serve as a unifying factor; instead, it is the "deadly space between". "It is that which, within cognition, functions as an act; it is that which, within action, prevents us from ever knowing whether what we hit incides with what we understand."[26]

The difference, or the "deadly space between" Pynchon's and Poe's texts is grounded in the historic(al) cleft. Whereas Poe maintains his work within the discourse of the unified self, Pynchon transgresses the realm of modern thought as for him, the will to truth is but dead power: there is no substantial authority; the only existent authority is that of the sign.

Notes

[1] Pynchon, pp.131-132

[2] Johnson, p.1049

[3] Pynchon, p.140

[4] ibid., p.93

[5] Johnson, p.1040

[6] ibid., p.1040

[7] Pynchon, p.117

[8] ibid., pp.92-93

[9] Johnson, p.1042

[10] ibid., p.1042

[11] ibid., p.1045

[12] ibid., p.1045

[13] ibid., p.1047

[14] ibid., pp.1047-48

[15] Pynchon, pp.181-82

[16] Johnson, p.1047

[17] ibid., p.1047

[18] Pynchon, p.169

[19] ibid., pp.82, 158

[20] ibid., pp.73, 75

[21] Johnson, p.1046

[22] Pynchon, p.109. Italics mine.

[23] ibid., p.118

[24] Kroker and Cook, p.66

[25] ibid., p.69

[26] Johnson, p.1056

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Jakub Chmielewski

Some Philosophical Implications of John Ruskin's Aesthetic Theory*

> Art is but one of our human interests, and these interests, all of them, are ultimately inseparable, interdependent. The artist after all is primarily a man, and in so far as he separates himself from the common duties and principles of his fellow-men, he does them wrong, and himself irreparable damage.[1]

I have chosen this quotation as the opening passage, because as I understand it, it accurately captures the central point of concern of all the prominent figures of the Arts and Crafts movement. They were all united by the conviction that art is not the domain of sheer pleasure but should fulfil more important tasks. As Ruskin wrote, it should "contribute to (man's) mental health, power and pleasure".[2]

By the middle of the nineteenth century the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain reached its peak and enthusiasm for it was saturated among many intellectuals, especially as it failed to provide answers for the social and civilizational problems it had incurred. However, it had to be recognised as a

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social and economic fact that the massive changes it had brought about were irreversible. Therefore an urgent need arose to work out a new place for human spirituality, which had been neglected during society's rapid industrialisation.

The discussion on this matter was kindled by John Ruskin, and that is why it is him I shall primarily refer to. It would be difficult to find anyone else as influential as him at this time. He was the one that placed the burden of moral influence on beauty and combined ethics and aesthetics in one.

In the *Seven Lamps of Architecture* John Ruskin set out to collect and explicate the values that should be employed in an architect's practice. Amongst these was the notion of life. At the preliminary stage, Ruskin differentiates between true and false kinds of life, otherwise called 'active' and 'dormant', and making connection with objects made by human hands, he states that:

> Things in other respects alike (...) are noble or ignoble in proportion to the
> fullness of life (...) of whose action they bear the evidence, as sea sands are
> made beautiful by their bearing the seal of the motion of the waters.[3]

I could not refrain from quoting the last part of the sentence, which apart from being very appealing in poetic terms also, through the imagery, adds a lot to the understanding of Ruskin's theoretical ideas. I believe the choice of the sea as a simile is not accidental here. The action of natural forces imbues the passive matter with beauty just as the imprint of the artist's performance upon the material endows it with aesthetic quality. It is interesting that in both cases the properties in question (nobility and beauty respectively) are a by-product of actions which do not have a self-evident purpose. To some extent we know the mechanisms, we know how, but we do not know why. What is the sense? What initiated these actions and what were their origins?

What is also important about this simile is, again, the way, in which it combines nobility and beauty, notions from two different domains (ethics and aesthetics) in one equation, thus referring to the ancient Greek (platonic) concept of *kalos-kagatos*. In that concept, man is elevated by the presence of beauty, which reveals itself in harmony, as an aspect of the universal, divine order. Contact with beauty is an opportunity to reverse time and return to the primal, mythical act of chaos organised by the word of God. It is the opportunity to experience the static eternity and suspend dynamic transitoriness.

Since the ancient times there is a recurring concept in the aesthetic discourse that beauty is attained through imitation of Nature, however idealised the imitation might be. The emphasis put on such improvement, especially in neo-classical criticism (to name only Dryden and Reynolds), which was one of Ruskin's sources of inspiration, came from the conviction that the material

world is the compound of imperfectly realised ideas and that imitation should communicate the *potential* best of nature.

The condemnation of the matter, which in the eighteenth century is only the implication, struck a sensible note in Ruskin, for at the time of writing the *Seven Lamps of Architecture* he was a devoted Evangelical Anglican and one of the main features of this faith was the emphasis on man's fallen state. Through constant admonitions as to the temporariness of this life in sermons by prominent representatives of the church, such as John Charles Ryle, the bishop of Liverpool, or Henry Melville, to whom Ruskin was both intellectually and spiritually indebted, a Manichean note may be detected that both bodily form and matter in general are patronised by the devil. However, a few years after he had published *Seven Lamps...* Ruskin underwent a traumatic loss of belief, which marked a strong conflict in him between the extremely demanding faith he inherited from his parents and his growing dissatisfaction with the way it refused to explain the modern world and its growing complexity. Therefore his aesthetic concepts became the area of reconciliation between the mistrust he had in the matter and the pleasures he derived from his contact with nature. The elaborate concepts of Typical and Vital Beauty, which he laid out in the second volume of his major work *Modern Painters*, bear the mark of endeavours to find a justification for this pleasure.

A few words of explanation may be of use as to the term 'type' appearing in this context. Typology, (or typological symbolism) is a form of biblical interpretation based on the assumption that the anticipations of Christ are entwined in the Old Testament in the form of laws, events and characters. One of the most renown types is the prophecy in the Book of Genesis that the woman's seed shall bruise the serpent's head, which is widely accepted as the prefiguration of the Resurrection. This manner of interpretation, although much older, gained popularity in the Victorian era among mostly Evangelical preachers (Ryle was one of them) and may in this way have come to affect Ruskin's perception of nature. He believed, unlike his neo-classical predecessors, that beauty is an objective quality, and that men should perceive its aspects in the same manner because of the divine element in human nature. Typical Beauty, as he put it forward in the second volume of *Modern Painters* is "the symbolising of Divine attributes in matter"[4] and has six modes: 1. infinity, or a type of divine incomprehensibility; 2. unity, or a type of divine comprehensiveness; 3. repose, or a type of divine permanence; 4. symmetry, or a type of divine justice; 5. purity, or a type of divine energy; and 6. moderation, a type of law. Thus, the way in which Ruskin's Evangelical belief prompted his aesthetic theory becomes clear - beauty is the emanation of divinity and a

medium, through which contact with the higher order of ideas can be established. Perception of beauty gains another dimension; it is no longer the domain of aesthetics (in the eighteen century sense of the word; as the study of the pleasures of perception). It is primarily an elevating experience of a religious kind and works for the benefit of the soul.

This view, with its emphasis on the unity of perception and cognition, as with many other elements of Ruskin's theories is a legacy of eighteen century philosophy – in this case I refer to the revolution introduced by the sentimentalist theories of ethics and the emotionalist school of moral philosophy. John Locke, who in his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* endeavoured to limit the ambitions of the human mind by claiming that understanding can only operate on ideas that enter through the senses, triggered the changes. Such an inversion of priorities not only excluded the existence of innate ideas but also defied the claim inherited from Descartes that the mind is capable of immediately comprehending truth. From there, it was only a small step to relocate the burden of ethical evaluation from the mind to the emotions. The old hierarchy with the reason governing lower activities stumbled leaving place for a new, egalitarian concept of man.

Lord Anthony Shaftesbury is the one, to which Ruskin shows closest affinity as he, unlike many of his contemporaries, did not demonstrate scientific ambitions presenting a more artistic attitude. He maintained that the world is not a dead mechanism and therefore cannot be apprehended neither through reason, nor senses alone. According to him contemplation is the right path to the essence of the universe. The echo of Aristotelian *Nichomachean Ethics* reverberates in this concept, in which happiness was said to be based on the contemplation of likeness to the gods. Both of these elements; unity of animated nature and contemplation as a way to cognition were very close to Ruskin as his notion of Vital Beauty confirms. He stipulated that this notion was the inherent beauty of living things expressing the happiness and energy of life within them. This aesthetic construct demanded the employment of the emotionalist premises that affection and not reason is the proper subject for the study of ethics. Through this approach the differentiation between the unconscious processes of the mind and moral decisions was invalid and defined by the same area of interest. Through the notion of 'sympathy', crucial to the moral philosophers of the eighteenth century (to name only Adam Smith and his *Theory of Moral Sentiments*), which constituted the vital part of moral sense through which a man was said to undertake decisions as to what is good and what evil, was Ruskin able to establish an intimate link based on pleasure derived from the experience of happiness and life energy in animate nature. He followed the

understanding of sympathy as a way of entering another person's emotions and accepted that it is the imagination which carries man beyond the limitations of his senses enabling him to participate in an almost mystical communion with other being by experiencing its happiness (being does not necessarily mean only another person; Ruskin believed that elevating pleasure can also be experienced through observation of healthy and strong plants).

Now let us return to the *Seven Lamps of Architecture* and cite another passage concerning true, active life. Ruskin states that it is "the independent force, by which he (a man of true life) moulds and governs external things" and:

> (...) however humbly or obediently it may (...) follow the guidance of the superior intelligence, it never forfeits its own authority as a judging principle, as a will capable either of obeying or rebelling.[5]

Interestingly it is the force of creation which shows itself in true life. Through this man exerts his power over material creation imitating God's primal gesture. Only such life may deserve to be called true, which realises the divine element in man. This follows one of the basic doctrinal factors of the Evangelical faith, namely emphasis on the inward work of the Holy Spirit in man's heart. A strong hierarchical relation binding man with the material world is also present in this passage. Between the lines of the first quoted sentence we may hear the fear of temptation. It expresses anxiety that if a man does not keep 'external things' under control, they might become a threat. The Gnostic attitude lurking behind the heroic concept of the human condition and taken as the reflection of divinity, transforms existence into a fight with man attacking as the best way of defence. Another aspect, clearly apparent in the second passage, is its disbelief – perhaps, in part, of Romantic origin – in reason. Intelligence is here called 'superior', but only on the vertical line; more 'higher in place' than 'higher in rank'. It is the overt, superficial and comprehensible element in men, which is subject for analysis. The mystery is in depths; it is 'a will capable either of obeying or rebelling', 'a judging principle', the authority to make choices, which comes directly from God.

This duality marks Ruskin's individual conflict, which led him from the stern faith of Evangelicalism, through agnosticism to a mild, religious humanism, but it is also emblematic of the evolution that nineteenth century spirituality was undergoing under the pressure from massive civilizational changes. A new theodicy had to be negotiated and a new place for man found. To quote James R. Moore: "In this process the locus of the sacral moved from noumenal towards phenomenal, from the eternal towards the temporal, from another world towards this world."[6]

Notes

[1] Ruskin, 1940, p. xviii

[2] ibid., p.7

[3] ibid., p.151

[4] Ruskin, vol.4, p.210

[5] Ruskin, 1940, p.152

[6] Moore, p.155

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Julia Dudkiewicz

Victorian Ladies of Shalott*

First things first. This essay consists of two independent parts. A historical survey of the Victorian 'Ladies of Shalott' is based on secondary sources, whereas a critical analysis of one of those representations is carried out by the author of this work on the basis of the painting itself.

The Lady of Shalott is a legendary heroine with medieval ancestry who inspired repeated pictorial images.[1] The earliest record of the tale is *Lancelot du Lac*, a collection of manuscripts and miniatures from about 1316 – 20. Another record of the story is Malory's book[2], first printed by William Caxton in 1485. In fact, Alfred Tennyson's poem entitled 'The Lady of Shalott' was based on the latter source. In this poetic vision the Lady is imprisoned on an island, forbidden to look directly at the world. She weaves the reflection of the reality seen in a mirror into a tapestry web. She is yearning for real experience and dreams of her own 'loyal knight', but she is under the curse. When the image of Lancelot appears in her mirror, she suddenly breaks the ban. The Lady of Shalott leaves the tower, finds a boat and drifts down the river, singing as she dies. Lancelot is among those who watch as she arrives, saying: "She has a lovely face; God in his mercy send her grace." Consequently, this poem served as a primary source for the members of the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood who illustrated it eagerly.

The first representation of the Lady of Shalott was completed by Elizabeth Siddal on December 15, 1852 (fig.1). Most probably it was the first finished drawing by any Pre–Raphaelite on a theme from Tennyson.[3] Siddal's rendering of the Lady of Shalott is the only Pre–Raphaelite image of this poem to show a correct weaving technique, with the upright loom reflected in a round mirror so that the pattern, which is woven from the wrong side, can be seen by

the weaver. Of course, the Lady is seated at her loom, turning fatefully to look through the window at Lancelot. Despite its characteristic early Pre–Raphaelite awkwardness, Siddal's work is highly significant as it may have influenced Hunt's choice of this poem to produce a detailed image for engraving in Edward Moxon's *Tennyson* of 1857. [4]

Hunt's work is quite controversial because it is criticised extensively and referred to as the greatest Pre–Raphaelite picture at the same time (fig.2). According to Anthony Hobson:

> Hunt is seduced by a concentration on detail which fatally weakens his narrative power. He confines the Lady of Shalott within the low embroidery frame where it must have been agony to work day after day a few inches from the floor and where she cannot possibly make the prescribed three paces through the room, and by turning her gaze neither to the mirror nor to the window, either of which would have been acceptable in the context of the poem. [5]

However, it is not a coincidence that this particular author happened to criticise the notable illustration by Hunt. As it is commonly known Hunt's engraving inspired Waterhouse, who did not only choose to capture the same moment of the tale ('The curse is come upon me, cried the Lady of Shalott'), but duplicated the composition of the Moxon illustration as well. [6] As Hobson specialises in Waterhouse he simply wanted to defend his subject of study by means of unjust criticism.

For the same volume Rossetti produced an image from the end of the poem, showing Lancelot gazing at the Lady. What is worth mentioning is that Rossetti, unlike other members of the Brotherhood, decided to go back to the earliest records of the story and in his search for the original, he discovered *Lancelot du Lac*. One of the miniatures shows Lancelot leaning over the body of "la damoisele de Scalot" (fig.3) in a pose that is undoubtedly the source of his preliminary drawing for the Lady of Shalott (fig.4). Not only the poses of the principal figures but also the water in the background and the crowd of onlookers in the final version (fig.5) echo the organisation of the fourteenth–century illustration.

In 1858, William Maw Egley produced a High Gothic version full of antiquarian detail (fig. 6). As Egley did not belong to the Brotherhood, his work can be classified as a relatively early example of the influence of Pre–Raphaelite medievalism on other artists. Despite the fact that one critic referred to that work as an "ill–favoured specimen of flagrant Pre-Raphaelitism", [7] modern Scholars take issue rather with its antiquarian accumulation of stage props in place of the poetic intensity of the   Pre-

Raphaelite's style, and with the authentic fourteenth-century costume, which 'clothes somewhat incongruously the patently Victorian figure of Mrs Egley, who was the model.'[8] One is certain – the claustrophobic atmosphere of the painting is fully expressive of the text.

Waterhouse was prolific enough to produce three separate versions of the story, using his favourite dark-haired model, and showing her first, in the *Lady of Shalott* (1888) (fig. 7), casting off her boat.[9] Let me once again quote the specialist in Waterhouse's painting (this time speaking of Waterhouse himself).

> Tennyson dominated the literary scene and Waterhouse's devotion to the poems is evidenced by his copy of Tennyson's collected works, in which every blank page is covered with pencil sketches for paintings. In this picture Waterhouse moves from history to romance; and also, for a brief period, to plain–air painting. Later works have outdoor settings, but they seem appropriate backgrounds for the figures; here a full-scale scene from nature, surprising us by his command of it yet testifying in its way to Tennyson's own explicit imagery. While figure and surroundings vie for our attention, Waterhouse still carefully selects the moment within the incident to hold us in contemplation – the moment between the words: 'She loos'd the chain and down she lay'. One feels the cool of the day as the doomed girl commences her last journey, but the centre scene is held by the haunting beauty of the figure.[10]

In 1894 the Lady of Shalott is entangled in threads in a manner similar to Hunt's composition (fig.8). Here it was the specific incident rather than the unfolding narrative which enthralled Waterhouse. He decided to capture the climatic moment of the poem. Condemned for so long to the watery reflected image, the Lady of Shalott breaks out to life – and to death – as Sir Lancelot "flashed into the crystal mirror". The figure of the girl is the centre of our attention. The passing knight is visible in the mirror; we take his place in the window and she looks into our eyes (we could not be more directly involved in the action). All the accessories confirm the imagery of the poem – as she whirls from the mirror and from the loom, rising from her chair to rush towards the window, the golden threads encircle her knees – 'the subtle touch by which the painter actually enforces the moment of stillness upon which the picture dwells eternally'[11]

The third version *'I am Half Sick of Shadows' said the Lady of Shalott* (1915) shows her seated at an elaborate loom, gazing languorously at the mirrored sight of young lovers and Camelot in the distance (fig. 9). Both the costume and stage properties are familiar, but never disturb the mood of the story- telling; in the window opening, the details of bridge and castle are

elaborated, while the young lovers wander past arm in arm. The picture takes us back through the poem, past the agitation at the painting of 1894, where the Lady cries out "The curse is come upon me!", and the sad departure on the river in the great work of 1888, to the subdued desires of that early stanza: "'I am Half-Sick of Shadows', said The Lady of Shalott!"

Several dozen other depictions of the Lady of Shalott could be cited. In 1985 an exhibition in the United States was devoted entirely to Victorian 'Ladies of Shalott', their sources and context,[12] which seems to be the best proof for the extensiveness of the topic. As it is no use listing further names and dates, I am going to carry out a close analysis of one of the representations of the heroine, instead. The *Lady of Shalott* by Waterhouse, painted in 1888, has always held a strange fascination for me. It is one of those paintings I cannot resist staring at, but so far I have not even tried to reflect on the degree of its artistic merit. I am going to do this now by applying four interdependent art criticism operations described by Gene A. Mittler in his book entitled *Art in Focus* (tab.1).

ART – CRITICISM OPERATIONS			
DESCRIPTION:	**ANALYSIS:**	**INTERPRETATION:**	**JUDGEMENT:**
what is in the work, discovered through an inventory of the subject matter and/or elements of art found in the work.	how the work of art is organised or put together; concern centres on how the principles of art have been used to arrange the elements of art.	possible feelings, moods, and ideas communicated by the work of art.	facts relevant to making a decision about the degree of artistic merit in the work of art

Description

The painting by Waterhouse entitled *The Lady of Shalott* illustrates one of the most famous poems by Tennyson of the same title. The scene represented by the work of art, corresponds to the last part of the poem. The first question to be given attention to is the extent to which the poetic imagery is preserved in the picture. In order to establish the relationship between the two versions of the same tale, let us have a close look at the very stanzas to which the painter apparently referred:

In the stormy east-wind straining,
The pale yellow woods were waning,
The broad stream in his banks complaining,
Heavily the low sky raining
      Over tower'd Cameleot;
Down she came and found a bout
Beneath a willow left afloat,
And round about the prow she wrote:
      The Lady of Shalott.

And down the river's dim expanse
Like some bold seer in a trance'
Seeing all his own mischance –
With a glassy countenance
      Did she look to Camelot.
And at the closing of the day
She loosed the chain, and down she lay;
The broad stream bore her far away,
      The Lady of Shalott.

Lying, robed in snowy white
That loosely flew to left and right-
The leaves upon her falling light-
Thro' the noises of the night
      She floated down to Camelot:
And as the boat-head wound along
The willowy hills and fields among
They heard her singing her last song,
      The Lady of Shalott.[13]

First of all, I am going to discuss the very moment captured by the painter. The Lady of Shalott has already found a boat, but she has not loosened the chain yet. Apparently, she has prepared the boat for the voyage carefully lining it with the tapestry that she had worked on for years, also adding a red pillow. Furthermore, she has lit the boat with candles and a lantern. And last but not least, she has brought a crucifix with her. Having done all that, she in now seated in the boat, holding the chain attached to a stone post in her hand. All those properties are Waterhouse's ideas, as such details are not included in the poem. It is hard to determine whether the trees growing near the stream are willows or not. What is certain, however, is that there are no "pale yellow woods" in the picture. Instead, the palette used by Waterhouse to represent the vegetation consists of different values of green, blue, grey, brown, and red. The boat is surrounded by reeds and water lilies. The Lady of Shalott is not the only

living creature in the picture. There are also two little birds of which one is sitting on the stone stairs leading to the castle and the other in the reeds. Undoubtedly, what the painting depicts faithfully is the look on the face of the Lady of Shalott. The "glassy countenance" manifests itself with her eyes having a fixed expression. What is interesting, however, is that this stare can by no means be referred to as being without sight or life. On the contrary, one cannot resist the impression that the Lady of Shalott is looking at him (and not "to Camelot"). But is this stare conscious? That is another question. Her complexion seems to be pale, but at the same time she is red in the face, just as if she had a very high fever or... were 'some bold seer in a trance'. Besides, her lips are parted, which can also be connected with her mind being in a sleep-like condition. Her hair is long and red, which is not surprising, as that is the colour favoured by the Pre-Raphaelites.[14] What appears to be surprising, however, is that it shows no signs of getting wet. To compensate for this slight deviation from the poem (lack of rain), Waterhouse does not only robe the Lady of Shalott in "snowy white", but makes the sleeves of the dress long enough to "fly loosely to left and right" as well. The golden ornamentation and the string of beads are the painter's original ideas.

Analysis

The main principle of art employed by the painter is emphasis. There are two types of contrasts in the picture, but each time the contrasting elements are used to direct and focus the viewer's attention on the most important part of the work of art – The Lady of Shalott. What contrasts with the brightness of the figure (fair complexion, crystal white dress, and the vividness of the lining of the boat) is the dim palette of nature, as well as the black hue of the boat. On the other hand, all those contrasting elements coexist and make up a unified design thanks to harmony, the second most important principle of art in the painting. This harmony is achieved by scattering one particular hue all over the painting, so that the greatest concentration of any colour is echoed throughout the work i.e. despite the fact that red appears to be the pillow's monopoly, it was also used to touch in the trees, the grass, the surface of the water and the flame in the lantern, not to mention the basic hue in the tapestry. In the same way, just as the crystal white of the dress echoes to the greens of the vegetation, the trees and the reeds are shaped up by means of white paint brush touches - the colours are reciprocally influenced. And last but not least, the composition of the picture is based on the principle of asymmetrical balance. Four main areas can be

I. Elizabeth Siddal *The Lady of Shalott*

II. William Holman Hunt *The Lady of Shalott*

III. Dante Gabriel Rossetti *Lancelot du Lac*

IV. Dante Gabriel Rossetti *The Lady of Shalott*

V. Dante Gabriel Rossetti *The Lady of Shalott*

VI. William Maw Egley *The Lady of Shalott*

VII. J.W. Waterhouse *The Lady of Shalott*

VIII. J.W. Waterhouse *The Lady of Shalott*

IX. J.W. Waterhouse *'I am Half-Sick of Shadows',*
said The Lady of Shalott

distinguished in the painting as far as the light and shade effects are concerned: the lightened tuft of reeds is counterbalanced by the sky and the grassland covered with bushes, whereas the front part of the boat and its dark reflection in the water is counterbalanced by the dense wood. The four areas are more or less rectangular. What is worth noticing is that the figure of the Lady of Shalott makes up an equilateral triangle. There is no movement in the painting. The feeling of stability is achieved by the use of horizontal (the contours of the boat, the stairs, the texture of the surface of the water, the lilies) and vertical lines (the pose of the Lady, the wood, the reeds etc.) and the absence of diagonal lines. In fact it is this particular element of art (line) that does not only contribute to the perfection of the painting's composition, but to its interpretation as well. Despite the fact that the painting is not symmetrical, a vertical axis divides it into two equal areas (it cannot be just a coincidence that a thick tree trunk, an elongated piece of design on the tapestry and its reflection in the water form a continuous line crossing the painting right in the middle).

Interpretation

It is this vertical axis that forms the basis for all possible interpretation. All the properties employed by the artist prove that the two halves of the painting represent two distinct worlds separated by an invisible dividing line. The Lady of Shalott is just about to loosen the chain and cross the mysterious border. The passage between the realm of life and... death is both inevitable and irreversible. The boat is not just a meaningless element of the tale of the Lady of Shalott. The girl could have sacrificed her life in many other ways (i.e. Ophelia's death by drowning) and yet she "found a boat... afloat". First of all, the boat symbolises fate and predestination. In Greek mythology the souls of the dead were taken across the rivers Styx and Acheron to Hades by Charon, the ferryman. That is why the boat began to symbolise death and the transmigration of souls. Finally, the boat can also be associated with danger, misfortune and doom.[15] The voyage taken by the Lady of Shalott can even be interpreted as a desperate attempt to honour and celebrate the last moments of her miserable existence. In order to demonstrate that those two mutually exclusive worlds are present in the painting, I will discuss the symbolism of all the major elements of its imagery with reference to the tale itself. The eyes of the viewer are directed towards the left side of the picture first for the obvious reason of the Lady's propinquity. Despite the fact that the composition of the work is based on rectangular shapes the figure of our heroine is inscribed in the shape of an

equilateral triangle. The triangle symbolises life, light and fire. It also stands for the trinity of concepts such as beauty, strength and wisdom. The beauty of the Lady is unquestionable, whereas the sacrifice that she is about to make, as well as the fact that she has devoted every day of her life to galley-slave's work without any purpose, both testify to her strength. The tapestry lining the boat is also the testimony to the Lady's perseverance and patience, as well as the performance of her duty. The white dress symbolises innocence and virginity. The Lady of Shalott has no experience of the real world as she had only lived in the world of shadows. In this sense the dress reflects her naivety concerning the real world which she has suddenly found herself in. White is also the colour of transition from one state to another e.g. people receiving the sacraments are dressed in white. The Lady of Shalott has prepared herself for the transition from life to death. In addition, white was the colour of sacrifices offered to Roman gods. And as I have already mentioned, The Lady is aware of the fact that she is to die as a sacrifice. Last but not least, white is the symbol of mourning and shroud. The reed symbolises life and God's care. The cracked reed stands for the soul driven to despair. No matter how sick of shadows the Lady is, she is desperate for life, now when she has found her "loyal knight". It is worth noticing that the reeds are also inscribed in a triangle. Let's hope that if the girl is taken care of by God, she will be miraculously prevented from loosening the chain, and crossing the sinister border. The stone post to which the boat is attached as well as the stairs and the castle point out that the Lady of Shalott is affiliated with the realm of life. All in all, it is the living and not the dead who erect castles. Besides, the man-made architectural elements make it possible to locate the scene in space (it is no longer in the middle of nowhere). The presence of the two birds serves a very similar purpose. They do not only symbolise life but they also imply the proximity of land. By the way, reeds grow exclusively in close proximity of land. What is worth noticing is that the left side of the painting is lit with natural light, whereas the only source of light for its right counterpart are the candles and the lantern fixed to the bow. The candle symbolises martyrdom, sacrifice, worship of the departed and prayer for their souls. In the past it was believed that the burning candle frightened and kept away all the wicked spirits and demons and for this reason people would light candles at the moment of birth and death. Most probably the candles are there to provide protection against all evil for the helpless Lady of Shalott. The candle also stands for the passage of time, transitoriness of human life and evanescence. The following words uttered by Macbeth seem to be a relevant illustration to the tragedy of the Lady of Shalott. However, they acquire a slightly different meaning in the context of the tale:

> Out, out, brief candle!
> *Life's but a walking shadow*, a poor player
> That struts and *frets* his hour upon the stage,
> And then is heard no more: it is a tale
> Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
> Signifying nothing.[16]
> [*all italics mine*]

The verse, "Life's but a walking shadow", sounds particularly ironic in reference to the poem by Tennyson, whereas the verb 'to fret' should simply be taken literally, as the Lady has really woven her hour.

The lantern would be lit in sacred places in the Old World to protect against the spirits of evil and the demons of darkness as well as to show the way to the Kingdom of the Dead to the souls who had been led astray. The lantern is an emblem of the souls of the departed. It also symbolises the presence of God, God's care, guidance and mercy. Here no comments are necessary as the symbolization of the lantern is parallel to that of the candle. The Cross stands for suffering and fear, martyrdom, punishment and death. What is certain is that the girl is in fear and that her lonely voyage is going to cause enormous suffering to her. But martyrdom is not contingent on disobedience. The Lady of Shalott has suffered throughout her life. In fact, her breaking of the ban does not result in punishment. On the contrary, it enables the Lady to put an end to all the suffering that she has ever borne. The Cross also symbolises the martyrdom of Christ, crucifixion, sacrifice and Christianity.

Judgement

In order to make a decision about the degree of the artistic merit of *The Lady of Shallot* produced by Waterhouse, let us look at the painting with the eyes of the supporters of three distinct theories of art which are most commonly referred to in discussions on art. According to *imitationalism*, the most important thing about a work of art is the realistic presentation of the subject matter. According to *formalism* the work of art is successful if the elements of art are organised effectively through the use of the principles of art. The supporters of *emotionalism* claim that the most important aspect of a work of art is the vivid communication of moods, feelings, and ideas to the viewer. As for the literal qualities of the work under consideration, its fairy-like scenery and painterly nature do not contradict its photographic quality. Besides the painting is a scrupulous and conscientious illustration of the poem by Tennyson, and not just a 'variation' on it. The visual qualities of the work by Waterhouse have

been discussed in detail in the analysis. It has been proven that skilled usage of colour and line results in harmony balance and emphasis. And the principles of art, in turn, make up a unified design. No additional comments are necessary as far as the expressive qualities of the work of art are concerned – no other painting has ever moved me to tears. As one critic said:

> The harmony of the willow-green, darkened with rain and closing day, of the shadowed white of the dress, the black prow, and the grey light afloat on the water, has the cool open- air unity of French naturalism. Gold and rose of the embroidered web, dipping unheeded into the green shadow of the boat, the candles, taken from the inner quiet air of some shrine to burn failingly in the drift, are imagery that paint more than the vision in the poem... *It is art which for its appreciation needs at least a capacity for realising the alliance between our thought and the romantic vision gathered in literature from Homer to Tennyson.* [17] [*italics mine*]

All in all, the *Lady of Shalott* (1888) by J. W. Waterhouse is a work of the highest possible artistic merit. Nevertheless, it is hard to read his, or the other, images as anything but an oblique account of the confined and restricted world of the Victorian woman – accursed and prohibited by virtue of her sex alone – and the dire consequences attendant on rebellion. The rejection of seclusion in the shadowy sphere of prescribed femininity, where the approved activity is weaving or embroidery, leads immediately to ostracism and social death.

Notes

[1] Elaine, 'Shalott' and 'Astolat' are alternative versions of the same name.

[2] Lancelot's love for Guinevere is central; it is strained by his relations with Elaine the Fair Maid of Astolat whose death ends the queen's jealousy.

[3] According to Rossetti, Tennyson was Siddal's favourite poet whose poems were discovered by her on a piece of paper used to wrap butter. This piece of information can be found in Faxon, p. 78.

[4] In 1854 Tennyson's publisher, Edward Moxon, decided to do an illustrated version of the writer's *Poems,* a collection originally published in 1842. The artists that he engaged were Millais, Hunt, Landseer, Stanfield, Maclise, Creswick, Mulready, Horsley, and Rossetti, who was reluctant to participate at first. He finally agreed to do woodblock

illustrations in 1856 and managed to convince the publisher to give him thirty pounds for each illustration, rather than the twenty-five received by all the others. Rossetti delayed the whole book until delivery of his final illustration in February 1857. So frustrating was the whole enterprise that a rumour that 'Rossetti killed Moxon' circulated when the publisher died soon after *Tennyson* finally appeared in 1857 (Faxon, pp. 90-91).

[5] Hobson, p.53.

[6] Waterhouse's familiarity with Hunt's illustration must have accounted for an unusual number of preliminary sketches in which, particularly by the use of a rectangular mirror, he seems consciously to have tried to avoid duplicating the composition of the Moxon illustration; of course, in the end, the circular mirror obviously contributed more to the composition. (Hobson, p.53)

[7] Marsh, p.150

[8] ibid. See also Banham, J., Harris, J. [eds.] *William Morris and the Middle Ages*, Manchester, 1985, p. 168

[9] It is not certain whether the same women modelled for the three versions of the story or not. According to Hobson (p.77) it is Watehouser's wife who sat for each of those paintings.

[10] Hobson, p.78

[11] ibid., p.53

[12] The information concerning the exhibition is given by Marsh, p.150

[13] Krajewska, p.160

[14] The cult of red-haired girl owes a great deal to the Pre-Raphaelites, as Stacy Marks noted in one of his humorous songs about 'a P.R.B., one of the chosen clique', beginning 'No vulgar daily life for me' and ending:

> But that which most delights me is a woman with red hair,
> Which cheers the young Pre-Raphaelite all of the present time.
> She must have red hair.

[15] All the symbols discussed in this work can be found in Kopaliński

[16] Shakespeare, p.79

[17] Sketchley, R.E.D. (1909) Art Journal

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[θɪəˈretɪkl̩
ənd
əˈplaɪd
lɪŋˈgwɪstɪks]

Joanna Roszkowska
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When Mary is Hungry
and Peter Comes Home, or
Montague Grammar for Dummies*

Formal semantics, as presented during the course[1], has two basic features – firstly, it uses the metalanguage of logic and, secondly, it is truth-conditional.

The idea of constructing a metalanguage for semantics came from a basic belief that language cannot (and should not) be defined in terms of itself. Natural languages are seen as ambiguous, vague and imprecise: those weaknesses make them inadequate to describe language in terms viewed as acceptably rigorous. The hypothesis of a new, precise language, based on mathematics and logic was put forward by Montague and after his premature death continued to inspire linguists to try to produce a fuller theory based on his work.

The theory is based on syntactic rules. The rules are usually consistent, which means that for each syntactic rule the theory produces the appropriate semantic rule (Rule-to-rule hypothesis). The semantic rules are written in formal language. But this language is used not only for rules, but also for the truth-conditions of a given sentence. The basic assumption as far as meaning is concerned is that the core meaning of a sentence is its truth-conditions - conditions under which it could be true. A metalanguage is used to avoid

statements like: *The book is on the table* iff (if and only if) the book is on the table.

Formal semantics (perhaps this is one of its weaknesses) analyses only declarative sentences, expressing propositions. A proposition describes a state of affairs, which means that it is either true or false. But truth-values cannot be assigned in vacuum: they need a model. And although truth-conditions remain the same, the truth-value of a given sentence will vary with respect to the analysed model. Models are based on set theory. The denotations of lexemes (abstract constituents underlying different grammatical forms) are presented here as sets containing entities or ordered sets of entities.

Each analysis in terms of formal semantics will thus need a model. consisting of an ontology (things that exist in the model) and the denotations of those things. It will need also all the necessary rules. During further analysis truth-conditions will be stated and truth-values assigned with respect to the model.

The aim of the paper is to show the Montague theory in practice. The object of our analysis will be a Polish sentence:

Marii nie dano obiadu, a jeśli Piotr przyszedł do domu, to nie posprzątał.

We cordially encourage you to go through our reader-friendly paper. There is no easier way of understanding formal semantics – so it is now or never.

Problems that emerge in further analysis

1. 'Dokonane' or 'niedokonane' [Perfective/Imperfective]

In Polish, verbs are either 'dokonane' (the activity is finished) or 'niedokonane' (not finished), like 'gotować' and 'ugotować'. In English the verb is the same, and to show that the activity is finished or not, different grammatical structures are used.

Maria ugotowała obiad. → Mary has cooked dinner.
Maria gotowała obiad → Mary was cooking dinner.

So, we have a problem, because we can treat pairs like 'gotować' and 'ugotować' either as two different verbs, or as the same verb 'gotować', but in two possible varieties, marked as

gotować [+DOK]
gotować [- DOK]

This has the advantage of simplicity, and we usually aim to keep things as simple as possible. Introducing such symbols would reduce the number of verbs - maybe not in our model, since we have only verbs that are [+DOK] - but in any model which uses both categories.

Polish is very rich and sometimes it is not so easy to assign such pairs. For example, one of our verbs from the model is 'posprzątać', so according to the suggested rule, it should be marked as sprzątać [+DOK]- that is what our intuition says. But what can appear after the substitution is not only 'posprzątać', but also 'sprzątnąć', which complicates the matter. Moreover, there are many cases where not only aspectual meaning changes, but also lexical meaning (e.g. 'czytać'–'wyczytać'). And even if we make a decision to treat those pairs which have the same lexical meaning as one entry in the lexicon, and as two entries when the lexical meaning is different, it is not always possible to decide whether it changes or not.

So, for the sake of clarity, because of possible lexical changes, and also simply because of the fact that in our model we have only verbs that are [+DOK], I am treating those verbs here not as [+DOK] form of something else, but simply as independent entries. Polish is very complicated morphologically and creating simple semantic rules for 'dokonane' and 'niedokonane' is likely to remain a major challenge.

2. Transitive / Intransitive
Przechodni / nieprzechodni

In English the division is more clear-cut. When the verb is intransitive, it means that no passive form is used and that it does not take an object. When transitive, that it takes one object, and when diatransitive, two objects.

e.g. Mary smiled.
Mary kicked John.
Mary gave a cake to John.

And it is unusual, for example, to say 'Mary gave.*', except as a reply to a question which previously suggests an object.

In Polish it is not so manageable, as the number of arguments taken varies, some of which are optional and also some do not appear in shortened/elliptical sentences.

According to *Słownik poprawnej polszczyzny PWN*[2], verbs can be divided into transitive (occurring both in active and passive) and intransitive (only in active). This does not say anything about the arguments that the verb takes. And the English notion of a diatransitive verb is connected with the fact that sentences in which a diatransitive verb is a predicate can form two possible passives, e.g.: 'Mary gave Julie a dress.' has two passive paraphrases:

> 'A dress was given to Julie'
> 'Julie was given a dress',

whereas in Polish the second kind of passive is not used. Since in Polish such verbs as 'ugotować' and 'dać' both have one possible passive paraphrase, I will not use the distinction into 'transitive' and 'diatransitive'.

Now, what to do with the number of objects?
'Ugotować' is transitive, which means that it can be passivised → 'Zupa została *ugotowana*'. And we can clearly see that it usually takes one object. It may happen that there will be no objects:

Maria ugotowała → as a statement it sounds bad, but in answers it works:
Kto ugotował zupę?
Maria ugotowała. (in English it would be 'Mary did' in this case, so English-speakers do not have this problem)

It is similar with 'dać'.

Maria dała psu obiad. (full declarative statement)
Maria dała psu.
Maria dała, for example in this context:

> (during the wedding) 'Czy to prawda, że żadne z twoich dzieci nie dało młodym prezentu?' (Is it true that none of your children has given a present to the newly wedded?)
> *Maria dała!* (Mary did!)
> *Maria.* is impossible here

All those sentences are possible in some context. We have to notice, however, that in formal semantics sentences should be evaluated in isolation. The theory analyses declarative statements, which can be assigned a truth-value, so we follow this reasoning also.

With 'przyjść' we have a problem – although it is intransitive (no passive), it very often takes a prepositional phrase, as in our example: 'do domu'.

...przyszedł do domu.

We can compare this verb to English verbs that take adverbial complements, like 'go home'.
The first observation is that prepositions are attached to nouns:

Dokąd idziesz?
Do domu.
Domu. *,

so we cannot put them together with the verb. It seems that 'do domu' should be treated as an adverbial complement ('dom'), taken by the verb.

Another problem we have to deal with is with the verb 'posprzątać'. Although it is transitive (the passive form exists), it does not take any object in our sentence. The problem may be easily solved in two ways: for one verb there may be more than one rule: one rule when it behaves like a transitive verb taking an object, another rule when it does not take any object. Another possibility is to treat it as a transitive verb, with some arguments optional, and looks promising, since the fewer rules the better.

Regardless of the rules, a verb is always transitive or not transitive (either it is possible to passivize it or not) – so 'posprzątać' will be always transitive even if an optional object is dropped, and 'przyjść' will be always intransitive even if it takes a complement.

3. Impersonal form

Dano Marii obiad.

What can be done with this sentence? We are not able to guess what the subject is, that is who gave a dinner to Mary.
But 'dano' means that it must have been someone who did it. This someone (or something – why not?) is unknown, but belongs to our ontology. It should not be treated as an empty space. So, in our analysis, we will put it in this form:
dać' (x-A, obiad', maria'), although at first sight it looks strange that 'pies' can give "obiad" to "Maria". In our model it could be, however, possible, although some people would probably argue that we should restrict x to [+HUMAN]. But

such restriction would come from the extra-linguistic context. It is not in the verb itself ('To doświadczenie dało mi siłę przetrwania', with 'doświadczenie' being [-HUMAN]). It is probably in the impersonality of the form of the verb, since I cannot find an example in which we could imagine that in the state of affairs described by a sentence starting with 'Dano', the giver was [-HUMAN]. I can't do it because I analyse it in terms of the reality of our everyday life, which is itself a very extended model. It is arguable that if we create our own independent model, rules of common sense do not exist in it automatically: they could, but only if we call them into being.

4. Inflection

Should we mark it in any way or not?
It seems that in logic the cases are not important. They are needed, however, in syntax, because of the flexible order of Polish sentences. In: 'Maria pocałowała Piotra' we know only from the cases who kissed and who was kissed, because order may be easily changed: 'Piotra pocałowała Maria.' So, the order is not important for the understanding, but the forms of the nouns are.
The importance of inflection is clearly visible also in those examples:

Maria ugotowała psa. (dop. bliższe)
Maria ugotowała psu. (dop. dalsze)
or:
Maria zjadła łyżkę. (dop. bliższe)
Maria zjadła łyżką. (okolicznik sposobu)

It is clear that we have to find a way to mark such differences.
In syntax I will mark it near the NP, e.g. NPAcc, although then it shows first the form, and only then the function. The inflectional form, in languages in which the order of a sentence is flexible, is only a way of showing the function of a noun, which in other languages is shown through a different grammatical structure, or order.

Let us try to find a way that would work well in logical notation.
A verb takes none, one or more objects.

Maria zjadła psu obiad łyżką.
zjeść' (maria', obiad', pies', łyżka')
zjeść' (kto', co', komu', czym'). It is the possible ordered set for the verb 'zjeść', which does not mean that all the elements are always present. In other words, some elements are optional.

Maria zjadla psa.
zjeść' (maria', pies', -, -)= zjeść'(maria', pies')

Maria zjadla lyżką.
zjeść' (maria', -, -, lyżka')→ where '-' means that information is not given in the sentence (although the slots may be easily regained from the context).

In this way, when the structure is always preserved in our, and any other analysis, we will without a shadow of a doubt know what functions are assigned to the nouns (direct and indirect objects that are present in the sentence), whereas in the language of syntax, we will use what I proposed earlier (NPAcc), and we will get the form first, and only through the form, the function. (Because then we think: aha, if it is Accusative, it must be the thing that is eaten, because direct objects are put in accusative).

5. Podmiot domyślny

...a jeśli Piotr nie przyszedl do domu, to nie posprzątal.

The lack of a subject in the second sentence would be problematic, if there were not a rule in Polish saying that if we have two conjoined sentences and in the second sentence the subject is (physically) non existent, it must be the same subject as in the first sentence, since the omission of the subject would not be possible if it were not the same subject. I will use this rule here and propose that putting the same subject in the last sentence would be justified. In logic, however, there is no rule of ellipsis, because *logically* the subject is there.

6. Past tense?

Although it was not used in the analysis of English, we would prefer to use it here, simply to put [+PAST] before the verbs that are in the past.
There is still another reason for considering the past tense. Since the verbs that are used here bear perfective aspect, they cannot be uses in present:

*przyjściuje**
*ugotowuje**
*posprzątuje**,

Failing to give an analysis of tense would radically limit the scope of the model.

7. Gender

In syntax we need gender. Both in English and Polish there is a gender for nouns, but only in Polish gender is marked on verbs (and of course adjectives). Thus we need gender for syntax to recover the sentence. We need it for nouns, as they determine the gender of verbs. We need it to be marked on verbs, as it gives them the appropriate form (always in accordance with the noun). We assume, that in logic, conversely, the information about gender is redundant. In 'Maria posprzątała', the information, that it was she, not he, is hidden in both 'Maria' and 'posprzątała' and we do not have to double this information, as happens in syntax to make the sentence recoverable. For getting the core meaning of a sentence gender is in fact redundant (Meaning grammatical gender, not that Mary is a woman, because it is something different). It is more visible if we take a noun such as 'obiad'. For the core meaning it is not important in any way that the noun is masculine, since what is important is its extension and denotation. In other languages this noun may be feminine (*la comida* in Spanish) or may not have any gender, as in English, and still, if we describe the same event in the three languages we may mean the same 'dinner'.

I had dinner with Peter yesterday.
Tomé la comida con Pedro ayer.
Wczoraj jadłam obiad z Piotrem.

Grammatical gender does not affect the meaning in any way that would be palpable in formal semantics, so it is absolutely redundant.

The analysis

First of all, a model has to be created, with respect to which the sentence will be dealt with. The model will resemble a small world, in which we decided to have a few entries, a few actions possible to be performed, and a few relations between the entities in connections with the actions performed.

1. The model

My model will be denoted by M_A.

$$M_A = <<A, F_A>>$$

The set of entities A defines the ontology of the model and the value assignment function F_A defines the connection between the object language expressions and the entities in A.

A = {WOMAN, MAN, DINNER, HOUSE, DOG}

F_A(maria`)=WOMAN

F_A(piotr`)= MAN

F_A(dom') = HOUSE

F_A(pies`) = DOG

F_A(ugotować') = {<WOMAN, DINNER>, <DOG, DINNER>, <DOG, MAN>, <WOMAN, DOG>, <WOMAN, MAN>[3]

F_A(posprzątać') = {<DOG, HOUSE>, MAN}

F_A(dać`) = {<WOMAN, DINNER, MAN>, <WOMAN, DINNER, DOG>, <MAN, DINNER, WOMAN>}

F_A(przyjść') = {WOMAN, DOG, <MAN, HOUSE>, <DOG, HOUSE>}

To write a syntactic representation of our sentences, we need to have some syntactic rules operating on Polish sentences, that we can follow in the process of transformation.

2. Syntactic rules

Rule S1	S → S1 Conj S2
Rule S2	S → jeśli S1 to S2
Rule S3	S → NP1Dat nie Vt[+FIN][-PERS][+PAST]NP2Gen
Rule S4	S → NP1Nom Vi[+FIN][+PAST]do NP2Gen
Rule S5	S → NP1Nom nie Vt[+FIN][+PAST]
Rule S6	NP → NPf
Rule S7	NP → NPm
Rule S8	V → Vf
Rule S9	V → Vm
Rule S10	NP → N
Rule S11	NP → Npr
(Rule S12	jeśli NPVP1 to VP2 → jeśli NPVP1 to NPVP2)
(Rule S13	jeśli NPVP1 to NPVP2 → jeśli NPVP1 to VP2)

Note: Explanation of the abbreviations used above:

S1, S2 → sentences

Conj → conjunction

NP1, NP2 → noun phrases

Vt → transitive verb

Vi → intransitive verb
[+FIN] → finite
[-FIN] → not finite
[-PERS] → impersonal
NPf → noun phrase of feminine gender
NPm → noun phrase of masculine gender
N(P)Nom → noun (phrase) in nominative case
N(P)Gen → noun (phrase) in genitive case
N(P)Dat → noun (phrase) in dative case
N(P)Acc → noun (phrase) in accusative case
Vf → verb of feminine gender
Vm → verb of masculine gender

Together with syntactic rules we apply respective semantic rules to get the semantic interpretation of our sentence. Therefore we need to establish those rules as well.

3. Semantic rules

Rule SL1	$S \rightarrow (S1\text{'}ConjS2\text{'}) \rightarrow t \rightarrow (t1Op2t2)$
Rule SL2	$S \rightarrow (S1\text{'} \rightarrow S2\text{'}) \rightarrow t \rightarrow (t1 \rightarrow t2)$
Rule SL3	$t \rightarrow Vt\text{'}(x \in A, NP2\text{'}, NP1\text{'}) = Pred (e \in A, e2, e1)$
Rule SL4	$t \rightarrow Vi\text{'}(NP1\text{'}, NP2\text{'}) = Pred (e1, e2)$
Rule SL5	$t \rightarrow Vt\text{'}(NP1\text{'}) = Pred(e)$
Rule SL6	$NP\text{'} = N\text{'}$
Rule SL7	$NP\text{'} = Npr\text{'}$
Rule SL8	used to translate syntactic rules S3 and S5

$S \rightarrow \sim(S\text{'}) \rightarrow t \rightarrow \sim t1$

Now we need to show how the SL symbols translate into the metalanguage.

Conj = {&}
Op2 = {→}
Vt' = {posprzątać'}
Vt' = {ugotować'}
Vt' = {dać'}
Vi' = {pójść'}
Npr' = {piotr'}
Npr' = {maria')
N' = {dom'}
N' = {pies'}

4. Truth conditions

Truth-conditions are invariant across the model and necessary to derive the truth-values of our sentences. Therefore we will write here down those that will be useful later on, adding nothing but the symbols denoting our model.

Given a model $M_A = <<A, F_A>>$:

1. For any constant α, $[\alpha]M_A$ is $F(\alpha)$.
2. If f is an n-place predicate, and $\alpha 1,...,\alpha n$ are individual constants, than$[f(\alpha 1,...,\alpha n)]$ M_A is 1, iff $<[\alpha 1]$ $M_A,...,[\alpha n]$ M_A > belong to $[f]$ M_A, otherwise $[f(\alpha 1,...,\alpha n)]$ M_A is 0.
3. If u is a formula, then $[\sim(u)]$ M_A is 1, iff $[u]$ M_A is 0. Otherwise, $[\sim(u)]$ M_A is 0.
4. If u and w are formulae, then $[(u\&w)]$ M_A is 1 iff $[u]$ M_A is 1 and $[w]$ M_A is 1. Otherwise $[(u\&w\})]$ M_A is 0.
5. If u and w are formulae, then $[(u\rightarrow w)]$ M_A is 1 iff $[u]$ M_A is 0 or $[w]$ M_A is 1. Otherwise $[(u\rightarrow w)]$ M_A is 0.

Now everything is ready for the derivation of the sentence, stating its truth conditions and determining its truth-value in our model.

Derivation

Marii nie dano obiadu, a jeśli Piotr przyszedł do domu, to nie posprzątał.

S1/SL1	S $\rightarrow$ S1ConjS2
	t $\rightarrow$ t1Op2t2
S2/SL2	S $\rightarrow$ S1Conj(jeśli S3 to S4)
	t $\rightarrow$ t1Op2(t3 -> t4)
S3	S $\rightarrow$ (NP1Dat nie Vt1[-FIN][-PERS][+PAST] NP2Gen)Conj (jeśli S3 to S4)
SL3+SL8	t $\rightarrow$ ($\sim$(Vt1'(x$\in$A, NP2', NP1'))Op2(t3 -> t4)
S4	S $\rightarrow$ (NP1Dat nie Vt1[-FIN][-PERS][+PAST] NP2Gen)Conj ((jeśli NP3Nom Vi[+FIN][+PAST] do NP4Gen) to S4

SL4   t → (~(Vt1'(x∈A, NP2', NP1'))Op2((Vi'(NP3', NP4'))→ t4)

S5 +S12   S → (NP1Dat nie Vt1[-FIN][-PERS][+PAST] NP2Gen)Conj
             ((jeśli NP3Nom Vi[+FIN][+PAST] do NP4Gen) to (NP3Nom
             nie Vt2[+FIN][+PAST])

SL5+SL8   t → (~(Vt1'(x∈A, NP2', NP1'))Op2(((Vi'(NP3', NP4'))→
             (~(vt2'(NP3)))

S6,7,8,9   S→ (NP1fDat nie Vt1[-FIN][-PERS][+PAST] NP2mGen)Conj
             ((jeśli NP3mNom Vim[+FIN][+PAST] do NP4mGen) to
             (NP3mNom nie Vt2m[+FIN][+PAST])

S10,11   S → (Npr1fDat nie Vt1[-FIN][-PERS][+PAST]N2mGen)Conj
             ((jeśli Npr3mNom Vim[+FIN][+PAST] do N4mGen) to
             (Npr3mNom nie Vt2m[+FIN][+PAST])

SL6,7   t → (~(Vt1'(x∈A, N2', Npr1'))Op2(((Vi'(Npr3', N4'))→
             (~(vt2'(Npr3)))

Lexical insertion:

Marii nie dano obiadu, a jeśli Piotr przyszedł do domu,
to (Piotr) nie posprzątał.

(~(dać(x∈A,pies',maria')))&((przyjść'(piotr', dom'))→
(~posprzątać'(piotr')))

Checking the truth-value of the sentence:

By 4: The formula [(~(dać(x∈A, pies', maria'))) & ((przyjść'(piotr', dom')) →
(~posprzątać'(piotr')))] M_A = 1 iff u = [(~(dać(x∈A, pies', maria'))) M_A = 1
and w = ((przyjść'(piotr', dom')) → (~posprzątać'(piotr'))) M_A = 1. The
formula is false otherwise.

By 3: u = u = [(~(dać(x∈A, pies', maria'))) M_A = 1 iff (dać(x∈A, pies',
maria'))) M_A = 0.

By 2: (dać(x∈A, pies', maria'))) M_A = 0 iff <[x∈A] M_A, [obiad'] M_A, [maria']
M_A > does not belong to FA(dać'). Since <MAN, DINNER, WOMAN> belong
to F_A(dać')and MAN∈A, (dać(x∈A, pies', maria'))) M_A = 1. Conclusion: u is
false in the model.

Conclusion: since, by 4, u&w = 1 iff u = 1 and w = 1, and u = 0, [(~(dać(x∈A, pies`, maria')))  & ((przyjść'(piotr`, dom')) → (~posprzątać'(piotr')))] M_A = 0, which means that **our sentence is false in the model.**

Notes

[1] This paper is a combination of two papers submitted as a credit requirement for Professor Ewa Mioduszewska's course on formal semantics and is based on Ms Mioduszewska's lectures given during the course and hot discussions happening in the class. We take this opportunity to thank Professor Mioduszewska for this interesting and thought-provoking course, which inspired one of the authors so much that she changed the specialization.

[2] Doroszewski, W. (ed.), PWN, Warszawa, 1980

[3] Although in practice this means that in our model men are being cooked (salted, spiced, garnished and probably eaten) by women, we hope no male readers will feel offended while considering this paper. It is nature that makes females bloody-thirsty creatures (→ mosquitoes), not civilization or ourselves.

Małgorzata Zając

Projection, Phrase Structure and Chains in the Minimalist Framework*

For many years linguists have been trying to find out what the nature of language is and how language is constructed. Noam Chomsky, in his works, also aims to answer the basic question: 'How 'perfect' is language?' The Minimalist Program is such an attempt to answer this question and discover the nature and the structure of language. Specificity of language might result from our unique language faculty; its other source could be conditions imposed at the interface, which are called "bare output conditions" (Chomsky, 1994a:390). The next part of this work is devoted to the summary of Chomsky's Minimalist Program and in particular to the process of derivation. Then, it is compared to the system proposed by Michael Brody in his article 'Projection and Phrase Structure', kept in the spirit of the minimalist framework.

Each language determines a set of pairs drawn from the A-P (articulatory-perceptual system) and C-I (conceptual-intentional system) interface levels. The level A-P has generally been taken to be PF; the status and character of C-I have been more controversial but generally is taken to be LF. Another standard assumption is that a language consists of two components: a lexicon and a computational system. The lexicon specifies the items that enter into the computational system, with their idiosyncratic properties. The computational system uses these elements to generate derivations and expressions of language. The derivation of a particular linguistic expression, then, involves a choice of items from the lexicon and a computation that constructs the pair of interface representations. So, each language will

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determine a set of pairs (p, л) (p is drawn from PF and л from LF) as its formal representations of sound and meaning (Chomsky 1993:168-169).

P is a PF representation and л is a LF representation. They consist of legitimate objects that can receive interpretation, each at the relevant interface level, PF or LF. If a given representation consist of such objects, it is said to satisfy the condition of Full Interpretation (FI). What is more, there are only two interface levels, PF and LF, and there is no interaction between them. The derivation, involving a set of linguistic operations (computations), converges at one of the interface levels, if it satisfies FI at this level; otherwise it crashes. The derivation must converge at both levels to be grammatical (Chomsky, 1995:219).

One of the most important questions is whether C_{HL} is derivational or representational? If it is derivational it involves successive operations leading to (p, л) (if it converges), and if it is representational it probably selects two such representations and then computes to determine whether they are properly paired, or selects one representation and derives the other. Chomsky (1994:391) thinks that derivational approach is correct. Under this approach, computation involves simple steps expressible in terms of natural relations and properties, with the context that makes them natural 'wiped out' by later operations and not visible in the representations to which the derivation converges. Thus, in syntax, crucial relations are typically local, but a sequence of operations may yield a representation in which the locality is obscured. For, head movement is narrowly local, but several such operations may leave a head separated from its trace by an intervening head (Chomsky, 1995:223).

Chomsky assumes that the computational system C_{HL} is strictly derivational and the only output conditions are the bare output conditions determined externally at the interface. C_{HL} introduces only elements (lexical items) satisfying the output conditions (Chomsky, 1994a:392).

C_{HL} maps the array of lexical choices to the pair (p, л). The numeration, which contains lexical choices and the number of times a lexical item, is used by the computational system. The operation Select selects one lexical item and introduces it into derivation. The selected item already has some intrinsic features that are listed in the lexicon and cannot be predicted. Other optional features are added in the numeration. The next operation Merge constructs new syntactic objects resulting from combining two other syntactic objects б and в. In result, there is a new object K = {б, в} that must be further specified by a label г, so the new object has finally the form K = {г {б, в}. Next, there is an operation Move that is driven by the requirement of feature checking. It can apply before or after Spell-Out, the point where the derivation splits into two

parts: one forming p and the other forming л. Movement before Spell-Out is overt and more costly to that happening after Spell-Out, where movement is covert. Most economical derivations are preferred. Overt movement of a feature involves 'pied-piping', carrying along whole categories together with a given feature because of the requirements of PF. Covert movement is restricted to feature rising (a set of formal features is also raised with the relevant feature of the lexical item) without pied-piping, which is more economical. The operation Move creates a chain (or probably two chains), or even three chains if the operation is overt. This is a very short and selective summary of Chomsky's theory of derivation; only the minimum that is needed for continuing the discussion and presenting another approach to syntax offered by Michael Brody.

Brody (1998) proposes a strong version of the minimalist hypothesis; that is, he adds one assumption to the standard system of grammar in which the relationship between meaning and sound is mediated by two interpretative systems applying to some interface representation(s) generated by syntax. Namely, these apply to the same representation, the level Lexico-Logical Form (LLF) (Brody, 1995a). In this view Spell-Out operation of the minimalist framework corresponds to the post-LF semantic processes. Syntactic computation can then be considered as determining certain basic properties of this interface representation, in particular those that deal with the relation between such representations and the elements provided by the lexicon, from which these are composed. Syntax generates (L)LF representations, either in the representational mode or in derivational one. In Brody's version it is suggested that (L)LF interface conditions reduce to 'bare output condition,' that is conditions forced on (L)LF representations by the interpretative systems applying to them.

According to Brody (1998) there exists a separate component of syntax, a set of conditions that do not follow from the nature of the interactive systems. These conditions, relating lexical item and (L)LF representations, could largely, and perhaps completely, follow from the necessity of relating lexically stored elements and the representations that contain them. Apparent complexities are due either to independently motivated properties of the interpretative components or to the interaction of these with the syntactic module. The properties of this system are consequences of the need to relate lexical items and (L)LF representations. This system can be viewed as more perfect than the assembly system of the standard minimalist framework.

There should be no syntax-internal conditions on this system (e.g. uniformity, MLC, c-command, Last Resort). Furthermore, there should be no

representational-derivational duplications of nearly identical concepts (e.g. Chain and Move, or the representational definitions of well-formed syntactic objects in addition to actual derivations. A more restrictive framework such as this also eliminates the possibility of using representational-derivational distinctions like deletion (interface visibility) and erasure (invisibility for the syntactic computation). Additionally, we would be able to dispense with economy conditions and the serious computational complexity that some of these create. These restrictions are consequences of the assumption that apparent imperfections in the system, relating (L)LF to its lexicon, result from syntax-external considerations. The theory meeting them can be called Perfect Syntax (PS). In the light of recent advances in the minimalist framework, this ambitious program of PS seems quite reasonable (Brody, 1998:368).

In his article, Brody discusses a system that could be a part of the theory of Perfect Syntax. He presents, among others, a set of necessary conditions on categorial projections and the theory of phrase structure, which will be now described. Phrases (XPs), words (X^0s), and their heads (X^{min}s) in an X-bar projection are said to share properties; shared properties of the phrase and the word are inherited from the category (labels arise through projection, ultimately from the element dominated by the labelled categories). It seems that each non-X^{min} category must share properties with some lexical X^{min} head; there are no 'pure' phrases (otherwise, it would be incompatible with Chomsky's principle of inclusiveness[1]). In other words, phrases and non-X^{min} can only arise through projection. Here we have the Principle of Categorial Projection (PCP) which says: "every (non-X^{min}) word and phrase is projected by a category that it immediately dominates" (Brody, 1998:369). Given Chomsky's principle of inclusiveness, the additional assumption is that all phrases, like everything else at the interface, must consist of lexical features (Brody, 1998: 369).

The term 'projected' is understood as 'is a partial copy of'. Thus, X^{min} is a copy of a lexical item, non-X^{min} words are copies of syntactic and morphological features, whereas phrases are copies of syntactic features only of that lexical item. Brody assumes that the element can be copied only once, so there cannot be two distinct projections of some category C such that both dominate C but neither dominates the other. That means that there cannot be 'upward-branching' projections. A phrase is maximal if it is not immediately dominated by its copy. The PCP ensures the locality of the projection relation (Brody, 1998:370). Chomsky, on the other hand, adopts Kayne's (1994) Linear Correspondence Axiom (LCA). It says that order reflects structural hierarchy universally. It states that asymmetric c-command (ACC) imposes a linear ordering of terminal elements; and any category that cannot be totally ordered

by the LCA is barred. There is a universal specifier-head-complement (SVO) order and specifiers are in fact adjuncts. A head-complement structure, then, is necessarily an XP, which can be extended exactly once to a two-segment XP (Chomsky, 1994a:413). When we compare the PCP with LCA, which entails that in certain configurations phrases have nonphrasal heads[2], we see that LCA does not entail that phrases and their heads share properties and it does not ensure locality[3]. To give some examples supporting this view:

a) $[_{XP} [_C X^{min}]]$;

b) $[_{XP} [_{YP} X^{min} [_{YP} Y^{min}]]]$ (Brody, 1998:370).

Examples in a) and b) are excluded because of the principle of locality. In a) YP may be wrongly interpreted as an intermediate-level projection or as a segment of adjunction. Also, in b) locality is not ensured because there is an asymmetric c-command relation between X^{min} and Y^{min}.

But the PCP alone does not suffice for the whole theory of phrase structure. Some other additional assumptions are necessary. First of all, we need to distinguish words (X^0s) and phrases (XPs). Brody thinks that it seems incorrect to consider all X^0s to be lexical items given open-class incorporation phenomena showing syntactic movement properties. He calls the object headed by an X^{min} and licensed by the PCP (i.e. the X^{min}, the copy of X^{min}, the copy of the copy, etc. – each related by the immediate domination relation to the next) a projection line (PL) (Brody, 1998:370). Both, a non-X^{min} X^0 and a nonmaximal XP are intermediate projections, they are neither maximal projections nor lexical items. But they must be distinguished somehow. To avoid violating inclusivity, Brody assumes that the word-phrase boundary on the PL is marked by the fact that words but not phrases carry morphological features.

Secondly, it must be ensured that all and only non-word-internal heads project a phrase. Brody calls this principle the extended structure preservation restriction. It says:

a) Every non-word-internal head projects some phrase.
b) No word-internal head projects a phrase.

Chomsky (1995) assumes that point b) results from a morphological condition stating that morphology does not tolerate phrases (Chomsky 1994a: 405). He rejects point a) because he adopts a relational definition of projection levels[4] and assumes instead that a non-word-internal head that has not projected is both minimal and maximal. Such element can thus occupy specifier, complement and X^{max}-adjoined positions, which are reserved for maximal projections.

Chomsky, then, rules out the presence of a 'moved' nonroot X^{min} or X^0 in such positions using the principle of uniformity[5] (Chomsky, 1994a:406), which disallows chains whose members do not all have all the same projections-level characteristics. However, such an approach to the principle of the extended structure preservation restriction fails to capture the suggestive symmetry of this condition (Brody, 1998:371). We will return to the discussion of this problem later in this work.

Thirdly, the uniqueness of the relation between phrase and a head needs to be ensured: "every phrase is projected by a unique category" (Brody, 1998:371). It ensures that two heads cannot project a phrase. LCA would also exclude such cases because they violate the requirement that all terminals must be ordered by an asymmetric c-command relation between categories dominating them. But LCA would not exclude cases where multiple categorial projections do not occur in a configuration where more than one head is immediately dominated by the offending phrase. For example LCA allows $*[_{X/ZP}\ Z\ [_{XP}\ X]]$ that is a head-complement structure where XP is the complement of Z (Brody, 1998:371).

The PCP includes the locality requirement and also entails that every non-X^{min} X^0 and XP have an X^{min} head, namely the one that ultimately projected it. Together with the uniqueness and the extended structure preservation restriction, the PCP also entails that every phrase must have a unique head.

To sum up so far, the PCP expresses the idea that syntactic categorial structure is projected from the lexicon. It states that all syntactic categories are related to the lexicon: they are partial copies of (full copies of) lexical items (i.e. of X^{min}s). It follows that phrases and words must have X^{min} heads, given the necessary assumption that PLs must be of finite length. The extended structure preservation requirement ensures that a not-properly-word-internal lexical element must and that a word-internal element cannot project a phrase. That a phrase must not have more than one head will follow from extended structure preservation and the PCP together with the locality and uniqueness assumptions (Brody, 1988:372).

According to Brody's theory (Brody, 1995a) there are three operations: Project, Chain, and Insert. There is also some additional operation that selects a lexical item (LI) from the lexicon and creates a copy (LIC), that is X^{min}, for syntactic use. The operation Project creates another copy of a subset of the features of this copy, F(LIC), and establishes the relation 'immediately dominates (F(LIC), LIC).' Project can apply only once to any category, and it can create only one copy in any application. This ensures that there are no

'upward branching' PLs. However, Project can reapply to the F(LIC) it creates, thus creating further copy. Single or multiple applications of Project that involve copies of features of a given LI result in PL: a set of copies, originally of an X^{min} (the LIC created by the selection operation), each related to the next by immediate domination. A PL can consists at most of three categories: an X^{min} LIC, an F(LIC) with morphological and syntactic features (X^0), and an F(LIC) with syntactic features only (XP) (Brody, 1998:376). This is of course true only if the speculations considering intermediate projections are correct.. The next operation Chain creates a copy of PL (multiple copies in the case of chains with more than two elements). This is either a copy of the whole PL (XP chains) or the copy of the lower morphological part of the PL, up to the word-phrase boundary (X^{min} and X^0 chains).

Chain and Project create the (syntactic) input list – a concept perhaps not so much similar to the notion of Chomskian numeration but definitely related to it. The input list is a set of PLs (chain is not a member of the input list). Although the objects in the input list (PLs) may be complex, they all involve copies of a single X^{min}; they are all copies of a single lexical item.

Then, the operation Insert applies to PLs, the elements of the input list. Insert establishes immediate dominance relations between members of distinct PLs. Relations created by Project remain fixed and cannot be modified by Insert. The operation establishes the relation between two PLs and it can apply only once to any given PL: a PL can be inserted into one PL only. 'Upward-branching' structures are therefore impossible both PL-internally and PL-externally. Here is the example of such a procedure (Brody, 1998:377):

(1) a. Marie embrasse Pierre.
       Marie kisses Pierre
    b. $[_{IP} NP^{1'} V' + I [_{VP} (NP^1) (V) NP^2]$
(2) a. Project: $NP^1 > N^1$, $NP^2 > N^2$, $VP > V$, $IP > I^* > I$
    b. Chain: $NP^{1'} > N^{1'}$, V'
    c. Insert all
(3) a. V', $VP > V$ $NP^2 > N^2$, $NP^{1'} > N^{1'}$, $NP^1 > N^1$, $IP > I^* > I$
    b. $IP > NP^{1'}$, $I^* > V'$, $IP > VP$, $VP > NP^1$, $VP > NP^2$ (where $X > Y$ means 'X immediately dominates Y').[6]

In the example, Project creates the PLs in (2a), and Chain adds two more as in (2b): the higher members of the (V',V) $X^{min/0}$ chain and of the phrasal XP chain ($NP^{1'} > N^{1'}$, $NP^1 > N^1$). Chain and Project in (2a-b) create the input list, an unordered set of PLs, shown in (3a). Finally, insert (2c) applies, relating

elements in the input list by simultaneously establishing the further immediate dominance relations in (3b).

Summarizing, the theory is built on two core concepts: the concept of copy and the structural concept of immediate domination. Both concepts are involved in projection: a projection of an element is a (partial) copy that immediately dominates this element. Only the notion of copy is involved in lexical item selection and Chain, and only the notion of immediate domination is involved in Insert. One of major advantages of that system is that the structure is built in one step; there are no intermediate syntactic structures (i.e. no structures distinct from LF where lexical items are related to each other). Although the input list consists of structured objects (PLs), it is not a syntactic structure: all members of the input list and all (immediate dominance and copy) relations involve only a single lexical item. The theory is thus able to explain the basic minimalist generalization that no conditions can hold on noninterface structures: the generalization holds because noninterface structures do not exist (Brody, 1998:377).

Project applies before the syntactic structure is created by Insert, and it applies separately to each LIC. Hence, two LIs cannot be involved in projecting a given phrase, and no "foreign" projection can ever intervene between an X^{min} head and its projections in the input list. Since Insert cannot modify the relation established by Project, we have fully formed syntactic representations (Brody, 1998:379).

The impossibility of word-internal phrases has been explained earlier by the fact that morphology does not tolerate such constituents. However, the assumption that syntax does not tolerate them either would be a nice modular solution but incorrect, because, in fact, both, phrases and nonphrasal elements (X^{min}s and X^0s/words) appear to play a role in syntax. Brody reconsiders this idea in the context of the system of (L)LF assembly. The modular solution is achieved by the separation of Project, where words play a syntactic role, and Insert, where they do not. So, Insert is modular in the sense that it "relates words to words (morphological application) and phrases to phrases (syntactic application)" (Brody, 1998:379). It means that all non-word-internal heads must project a phrase. If an X^{min} projects, only an X^0 and does not project a phrase, then only morphological Insert can apply to it; hence, it will be word-internal. Also, there can be no word-internal phrases; again, they could arise only if Insert was to combine words and phrases in a nonmodular fashion.

This system does not create intermediate syntactic structures; that is why, they are unavailable. Thanks to that it is a system building syntactic structures in one step from the input list. The theory of (L)LF assembly

involving Chain, Project and Insert also explains three basic properties of the theory of phrase structure: extended structure preservation, uniqueness, and locality.

At this point, the chain formation proposed by Brody should be presented. Both X^0 and XP chains involve linking elements (PLs) that were created (copied) from a single lexical item. The formation of the chain involves 'pied-piping' of the rest of the chain – that is, filling out all the copies with material additional to this highest head. Pied-piping occurs because the selectional requirements apply recursively, subject to the nondistinctness condition on chain members. Copying a PL with a phrasal element forms XP chains. There must be a nondistinctness requirement on copies in chains to ensure that the same argument and selectional structure is inserted in all members of this PL. Both theories, Brody's and Chomsky's, assume that chains are formed on a single element of the head or phrase that ultimately is the member of the chain; in Chomsky's account it is a checking feature and for Brody this element is the head of the chain member. The crucial difference is that Brody's approach views pied-piping as a consequence of LF conditions (for which he gives several reasons not discussed he:e) (Brody 1998:379-380)

Brody supposes that the distinction between covert and overt movement does not pertain to syntax at all, but that it is only a matter of Spell-out positions: in overt movement a higher copy, in covert movement a lower copy is subject to Spell-Out. That is because in the framework where there are no covert Ā-movement relations, there is no reason to claim otherwise (Brody, 1998: 381).

If we have ensured the nondistinctness of chain members by interpretive condition, the Chain operation of the assembly system appears to be partly redundant. The identity of the top PLs of chain members appears to be forced both by Chain and by the interpretive nondistinctness condition, which says that corresponding PLs in all chain members must be identical, based on the same LI. But, in fact, this condition is not strong enough to ensure the identity of the top PLs of chain members because it allows nonselected PLs (adjuncts) to be omitted. The highest PL in a chain member must be present in all chain members, but it is often not a selected element. Hence, nondistinctness condition will not require this PL to be present in all chain members. That is why, some other principle is necessary. If Chain would be eliminated from syntax, then the theory of (L)LF assembly could be stated as a fully representational condition in the form of structural licensing:

> (L)LFs partition into PLs (Quasi-lexical units). PLs are linked to each other by the modular immediate domination relation between their member categories.
>
> (Brody, 1988:383)

So, the Chain operation (a) creates additional PLs, (b) links the additional PLs to other PLs created by Project, (c) ensures that the linked PLs involve the same LI, and (d) ensures that they contain an identical set of copies of the features of this LI. The operation (d) rules out nonuniform chains in which, for example, one member is an XP and the other an X^0). For (a) Chain is not necessary, this can be achieved by reselecting the relevant LI and, where necessary reapplying Project. Point (b) can be fulfilled by simply randomly marking linking elements at LF that belong to the same chain. But this marking still violates the principle of inclusiveness according to which LF representations consist of nothing other than lexical features. Another option is to assume that chains are not marked at LF and that they are constructed randomly, subject to nondistinctness and other conditions, by the interpretive principles applying to LF representations. This view would necessitate a global recoverability link between post-LF interpretation and PF, which needs the chain structure information to operate properly. As for (c) apart from the nondistinctness condition that refers to chain-member-internal elements, we need a full identity requirement (which also ensures (d)) on the highest PL of the chain members (Brody 1998:383).

When discussing categorial projections we must consider a very important and pervasive condition – the Generalized Projection Principle (GPP) – which effects in that categorial projection is restricted to root positions of chains. However, there are reasons[7] to doubt that this claim is valid. The generalization constrains the relation of chain members to their chain-external environment. Apart from categorial projections, it refers also to thematic selectional requirements, to semantic and syntactic selection in general. Therefore, Brody assumes GPP to be a principle of interpretive component. All these requirements hold in the root positions of chains. The full definition of GPP is: "Projectional (categorial, thematic, selectional) features that link a member of chain C to its C-external environment must hold in and be satisfied by the root position of C." (Brody, 1998:384).

The system of phrase structure defended by Brody assumes nonrelationally defined distinction between X^0s and XPs – that is, between words and phrases. Words and phrases are inherently different: only the former carry morphological features. Chomsky's definition of projection levels does not specify whether a substructure that is an intermediate projection is an X^0 or an X' (i.e., a nonmaximal XP). However, the distinction is necessary. Syntax and morphology seem to treat X^0s and phrases differently. X^0, but not intermediate phrasal projections, are assumed to be available for chain formation (movement). Since only X^0 and maximal XP projections are

accessible for the computational system, The uniformity condition on chains predicts that only (X^{max}, X^{max}) and (X^0, X^0) chains exist (Brody, 1998:387).

Given Chomsky's definition of projection levels it is easy to construct nonuniform chains, as the examples below show (Brody, 1998:388):

(4)

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
 & Y & \\
 & \diagup\diagdown & \\
X_i\,(X^{max}) & & Y
\end{array}
\qquad
\begin{array}{c}
X^{max} \\
| \\
X_i\,(X^{min/0})
\end{array}
$$

(5)

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
 & X & \\
 & \diagup\diagdown & \\
X_i\,(\text{not } X^{max}) & & Y
\end{array}
\qquad
\begin{array}{c}
Y \\
| \\
X_i\,(X^{max})
\end{array}
$$

According to usual assumptions these structures are ill formed: minimal projections cannot move to positions that are not word (X^0)-internal, and it is always the target of movement that projects (only chain-root positions can project). These configurations, (4) and (5), provide evidence for the uniformity condition.

This system has also additional empirical evidence represented in the behavior of clitics. Chomsky's definition of projection levels allows a category to be both a maximal and minimal projection, a lexical item that does not project further. This is in the case of clitics, which have properties of both minimal and maximal projections. As X^{min}s they occur word-internally; but they seem to be linked to arguments positions that are maximal. Furthermore, they can often form chains that ignore intervening heads, again suggesting (in the context of Head Movement Constraint) that they are maximal. Thus, clitics may be treated as both X^{max} and $X^{min/0}$ at the same time (Brody, 1998:388).

So, first structure (4) is a special instance of illegitimate structures where a nonphrasal X^0 element is immediately dominated by some YP, not projected by it. This is ruled out by the modularity of the Insert operation. Second example (5) could not even arise under his theory since a given PL can

include only a single XP level, whether or not this belongs to a root or nonroot chain member. The third structure (6) shown below is ruled out by the GPP: a nonroot $X^{min/0}$ can neither select nor project an XP (Brody, 1998:390).

(6)

$$XP \qquad\qquad XP$$

$$X_i^0 \qquad YP \qquad X_i^0$$

It seems that the uniformity condition is not necessary to rule out nonuniform chains (especially if there are some objections to that principle). Chains consist of copies. Given the intrinsic characterization of projectional status, the copy of an X^{max} is an X^{max}, the copy of an X^0 is an X^0. This suggests that the grammar should contain no contextual definitions of projection levels. Since chains consist of copies, uniformity is unnecessary in general because there are no means to violate it (the optimal theory should not make it possible to violate this condition: the theory should not provide devices that can create nonuniform chains) (Brody, 1998:390).

    To summarize, Brody's article presents a system of principles relating (L)LF representations and lexical items that aims to dispense with the idea of externally forced imperfections in syntax. The main assumptions of the theory are: phrase structures are viewed as projection lines (PL), that is, lexical items and their projections, linked by an Insert relation. By that, he explains uniqueness and locality of projection. Since only PLs involve projection, and PLs contain the features of only a single LI. For the same reason, it must be local. The PL of some lexical item LI cannot be interrupted by a projection of some different LI. Only one LI is accessible for the projection relation. Phrases and nonphrasal elements can immediately dominate each other only when they are part of the same projection line. Brody provides also a convincing explanation for the Generalized Projection Principle.

    On the whole, the main advantages of the theory are that the operations like Insert, Project, or Chain are not complicated in their application. Also, there is a minimal number of necessary conditions dealing with phrase structure which have to be fulfilled and, additionally, they are very simple. In his article, Brody notices some imperfections in the theory proposed by Chomsky. However, it is possible that also his work has some hidden flaws. Brody's theory is very tempting for the reasons already mentioned, that is, its simplicity

and obviousness. But, it must be remembered that it follows from completely different fundamental assumptions which consequences may appear significant. And partly, this is the reason for not evaluating both theories and not opting for one of them.

Notes

[1] Principle of inclusiveness: Interface levels consist only of arrangements of lexical features (Chomsky 1995, p. 225).

[2] "A phrase that immediately dominates no nonphrasal element and at least two phrases that contain terminal elements violates the LCA. A headless phrase that either contains nothing, or contains a single phrase of a different type, or contains two or more phrases that in turn dominate nothing does not seem to violate LCA." (Brody 1998, p. 370)

[3] Locality: If X^{min} directly or indirectly projects an X^0 or an XP, then there is no category C such that X^0/XP dominates C, C dominates X^{min}, and C is not a projection of X^{min}. (Brody 1998, p. 370)

[4] "Minimal and maximal projections must be determined from the structure in which they appear without any specific marking; (...) they are relational properties of categories, not inherent to them" (Chomsky 1994a, p. 396). A maximal projection (X^{max}) is one that does not project further: minimal projections (X^{min}) are the lexical items itself; intermediate projections (X') are elements that are neither maximal nor minimal (Chomsky 1994a).

[5] A chain is uniform with respect to phrase structure status (Chomsky 1994a).

[6] Asterisks and superscripts are used only as presentational aids.

[7] See also in Chomsky 1993, 1994, 1995.

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Agnieszka Kasprzyk

Niepokój – What is it?*

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This paper analyses one of the emotion concepts through the prism of its Polish name – NIEPOKÓJ. In the conclusion of the paper I will try to construe its explanation in accordance with Anna Wierzbicka's theory of semantic primitives.

The main problem with NIEPOKÓJ (like other Polish emotion words) is that rendering its meaning into English doesn't allow the English speaker to understand this concept from the perspective of the Polish native speaker. The English speaker, given the explanation that NIEPOKÓJ means "fear, anxiety, uncertainty" will conceptualize the emotions denoted by these English words but not those denoted by NIEPOKÓJ.[1]

One solution to this problem might be to provide a detailed description of things and situations which cause NIEPOKÓJ, the feelings and reactions which accompany it and compare it with other related emotion words.

Let us therefore look closer at what is denoted by NIEPOKÓJ and what connotations it carries. Several Polish speakers, asked when and why they feel NIEPOKÓJ, answered:

> Odczuwam NIEPOKÓJ przed egzaminem, gdy nie znam pytań, nie wiem, co się zdarzy, czy zdam czy nie. (I feel NIEPOKÓJ before an exam when I do not know what the questions are, what will happen or whether I will pass or not) *(female, 20)*

> Czuję NIEPOKÓJ, gdy jestem sama i myślę o swojej przyszłości, co się ze mną stanie (I feel NIEPOKÓJ when I am alone and I am thinking about my future, what will happen to me) *(female, 45)*

Czuję NIEPOKÓJ, gdy mój tata spóźnia się z pracy do domu i nie wiem, co się z nim dzieje (I feel NIEPOKÓJ when my dad is late from work and I don't know what has happened to him) *(male, 12)*

Niepokoję się, gdy sądzę, że coś mi zagraża, ale nie wiem, dlaczego i co; kiedy nie wiem, jaki obrót przybierze obecna sytuacja; kiedy nie wiem, co się dzieje z moją rodziną lub moją własnością; kiedy wiem, że coś złego może się stać, ale nie mam na to żadnego wpływu (I feel NIEPOKÓJ when I think I am in danger but I cannot tell what makes me think so; when I do not know how the situation I am in will end; when I do not know what will happen to my family or to my property; when I know something can go wrong but I cannot change it) *(female, 45)*

Kiedy czuję NIEPOKÓJ, to zwykle wtedy, gdy myślę o mojej przyszłości lub co się stanie ze światem, czuję NIEPOKÓJ, gdy nie mam wpływu na coś, co mnie dotyczy, gdy jest to ode mnie niezależne (When I feel NIEPOKÓJ it is usually because I think about the future – mine or that of the whole world, I feel NIEPOKÓJ when something which concerns me is independent of me. I have no influence on something) *(male, 25)*

Czasami czuję NIEPOKÓJ, kiedy zastanawiam się, co stanie się, gdy umrę. Wierzę, że pójdę do nieba, ale czasem moja wiara nie wystarcza, nie wiem, czy to się odbędzie tak, jak w to wierzę. (Sometimes I feel NIEPOKÓJ when I think about what will happen when I die. I believe I will go to heaven, but sometimes my faith is not enough, I don't know if it will happen exactly the way I try to believe it will) *(male, 76)*

What is common for these explanations is something like 'I think that something can happen or has already happened but I don't know enough about it to tell whether it is a good or bad thing, I don't know what will happen next and I feel bad about it (about this whole situation)'.

Another component of meaning of NIEPOKÓJ can be extracted from the descriptions of the physical sensations accompanying NIEPOKÓJ. People feeling NIEPOKÓJ usually feel such things as:

- a lump in the throat (literally: clenched throat, one's heart and stomach rising up to one's throat)
- limp, shaking legs (literally: one's legs are bending under him)
- waves of cold and heat
- being on the verge of vomiting, crying or fainting
- loosing one's footing (literally: the ground falling away from under one's feet)
- helplessness
- stomach-ache

- dizziness (literally: everything whirls around in one's head)
- the desperate need for escape and shelter
- general restlessness (literally: one cannot find his place, cannot sit down calmly)
- obsessive concentration of thoughts on the undefined object of their NIEPOKÓJ
- the desire to be with some close relative or friend
- distraction, general arousal (*siedzieć jak na szpilkach* = literally: sitting as if on pins, *być podminowanym* = literally: to be undermined) [2]

and do such things as:

- biting one's lips and nails
- wringing one's fingers

Such sensations and behaviour indicate something like 'I do all these things and I feel all these things because I cannot do anything about this bad thing which can happen'.

All my interlocutors, asked whether there is any other word describing exactly the same feeling, answered negatively. At the same time most of them emphasized the aspect of uncertainty and claim that NIEPOKÓJ is 'bad' (i.e. that feeling NIEPOKÓJ is something bad).

The confirmation of these observations as well as material for further ones is provided by the dictionary of Polish idioms and collocations.

NIEPOKÓJ is: *ciągły* (continuous), *gorączkowy* (feverish), *nieustanny*, *niekończący się* (unstopping), *rosnący* (growing), *stały* (constant, permanent).

One can feel NIEPOKÓJ about a person, a thing or a situation but the aspect of uncertainty prevails over that of fear (therefore NIEPOKÓJ felt in such cases is closer in meaning to STRACH (roughly: fear).

One can have NIEPOKÓJ *we wzroku (wzrok pełen niepokoju), w głosie, wymalowany na twarzy,* (literally: in one's look (look full of NIEPOKÓJ), in one's voice, painted on one's face).

NIEPOKÓJ *ogarnia, nurtuje, trawi, dręczy, przejmuje, wzrasta w duszy, wkrada się do serca, miota kimś, napawa kogoś* (seizes, pervades, rankles, consumes, torments somebody, gives somebody a thrill, rises in somebody's soul, (fig.) creeps into somebody's heart, tosses somebody here and there, fills somebody).

NIEPOKÓJ *jest budzony, wzbudzany, wywoływany* (literally: is wakened, is called out). [3,4]

This data gives another aspect of NIEPOKÓJ: it is a gradually accumulating feeling of quite a long duration and oppressive character, visible in the behaviour and appearance of the subject feeling it.

The concept of NIEPOKÓJ is also partially self-explicable on etymological grounds: the word NIEPOKÓJ is morphologically complex, consisting of two parts:

NIE=not + POKÓJ=peace, calmness
(NIE**SPOKOJ**NOŚĆ (dated) = unrestness, **SPOKÓJ**=rest, peace)

Therefore NIEPOKÓJ can be rendered as 'lack of peace, lack of calmness (in one's soul and heart)'.

Analysis of the data from the corpus of written and spoken Polish[5,6] provides us with some further observations concerning NIEPOKÓJ. It has almost the same frequency of use as STRACH (roughly: fear). However, the verb BAĆ SI (roughly: be frightened) (corresponding to STRACH) is over 20 times more frequent than the verb NIEPOKOIĆ SI (roughly: be anxious) (which corresponds to NIEPOKÓJ).

From my own observations I can further claim than in general the words belonging to the word family connected with STRACH (like STRASZNY (frightening), WYSTRASZYĆ (to frighten somebody), WYSTRASZYĆ SI (to get scared), PRZESTRASZONY (frightened, scared), STRACHLIWY (somebody who can be easily scared) and other words like OBAWA (roughly: misgivings), PRZERAŻENIE (roughly: terror), PRZESTRACH (roughly: sudden fright), are more frequently used than those connected with NIEPOKÓJ (for instance NIEPOKOJĄCY (making somebody anxious), ZANIEPOKOJONY (anxious)). It seems as if human beings tend to talk and write more about more easily definable, 'palpable' emotions and feelings and avoid those elusive, indefinite, amorphous ones, which are more difficult to express.

My interlocutors confirmed this saying that NIEPOKÓJ affects them internally. They concentrate on their feelings and thoughts and often avoid any communication with their immediate environment being unable to express what oppresses them.

On the other hand, STRACH, as evoked by more definite factors, is followed by quite impulsive reactions: those who feel STRACH cry, faint, curse, run away, or even show aggression towards the cause of their STRACH. STRACH is also more primitive, like a bodily reaction to some material incentive "Boję się=czuję strach kiedy widzę złego psa, albo kiedy jest burza, albo kiedy mijają mnie jacyś pijacy" (I feel STRACH when I see a fierce dog, or when there is a thunderstorm, or when a pack of drunken men passes near me) (female, 13).

Moreover, STRACH seems to be felt much earlier in life: when I asked children at the age of 6-7 what is STRASZNE (roughly: scary) they answered

"potwór, ciemność, błyskawice, jak ktoś krzyczy" (monsters, darkness, lightning, somebody shouting) while, when asked about NIEPOKÓJ (what is NIEPOKOJĄCE =causing/evoking NIEPOKÓJ, and even given some prototypical situation in which the older persons felt NIEPOKÓJ), they said "I don't know". They claimed that they felt STRACH or even asked me what NIEPOKÓJ meant.

It seems that NIEPOKÓJ is more sophisticated than STRACH. One needs to acquire more life experience to feel the former whereas STRACH is observed to develop in human infants during the first year of their life. [7]

This naturally leads to one of numerous psychological distinctions between 'emotion' – basic, physiologically marked reaction or, in other words, a primitive feeling and a higher 'feeling' – characteristic exclusively of the human being as a member of society, emerging from the human interrelations and development of the civilization. Emotions are organic, feelings are intellectual.

Therefore, many contemporary psychologists and philosophers include the emotion denoted in Polish as STRACH in their lists of primitive emotions while on none of these lists can NIEPOKÓJ be found. [8]

What kind of feeling is NIEPOKÓJ as described by psychology and psychiatry?

Polish psychiatrist Antoni Kępiński writes in his book entitled *Lęk*:

> W zaburzeniach psychicznych lęk przybiera różne postacie i różne jest jego nasilenie. Najlepiej znany jest lęk nerwicowy.(...) Najpowszechniejszym [jego rodzajem, A.K.] jest nieokreślony niepokój.
> (In the case of mental disturbances there are different types of fear and its intensity varies. Best known among them is neurotic fear. The most widespread [of its subtypes, A.K.] is an indefinite NIEPOKÓJ.) [9]

According to Kępiński, such NIEPOKÓJ consists of a feeling of inner strain attacking the body and the *psyche*. This feeling completely paralyses the person stricken with NIEPOKÓJ. Such a person is unable to think and to take logical decisions, he is in mental and physical pain and feels helpless. NIEPOKÓJ is objectless: one is afraid of something but he doesn't know of what, he would like to change the situation but he doesn't know how to do it.

Kępiński strongly emphasizes the fear of unknown future as a component of NIEPOKÓJ. NIEPOKÓJ emerges from the disparity between the subjective future (future which is planned) and the objective future (the realization of future). This potential disparity constitutes the source of continuous inner tension characteristic for human beings, which forces them to project themselves onto future events in order to test and choose the best

realization of their life plan. Those who feel NIEPOKÓJ are weaker than the future awaiting them, they lose the conviction that they can win over the unknown. They usually overexploit their physical and psychological strength trying to cope with NIEPOKÓJ which leads to a kind of vicious circle: the more they think about future, the more they try to combat their fears, the more strength they lose, (such people often call themselves 'wypaleni' = literally: burnt out, alluding to the internal fire which consumes them, or they say that "zżera ich NIEPOKÓJ" = NIEPOKÓJ consumes them).

Although NIEPOKÓJ is connected in a way with the past it is not evoked by past situations or things. People do not feel NIEPOKÓJ about things which have already happened, but mainly they are afraid of the future effects of what happened and they want to escape from the baggage of the past. When escape from the past interferes with fear of the future, another symptom of NIEPOKÓJ occurs: the feeling of being trapped. This is accompanied by the claustrophobic difficulties in breathing (*globus histericus*). A person feeling NIEPOKÓJ sees all the ways of escape blocked and he desperately wishes somebody or something would deliver him from this impasse. [10]

This NIEPOKÓJ can be connected with existential fears, though some of their aspects might be debatable, for instance fear of death (my Polish interlocutors claimed that they rather feel STRACH when thinking of or encountering death, while NIEPOKÓJ is identified as connected with the uncertainty of life-after-death). Existentialists claim that NIEPOKÓJ is the main life force and an inborn emotional state[11], but this is also debatable unless some improvements are added to the definition of NIEPOKÓJ: as I mentioned earlier, small children do not seem to be able to recognize the feeling of NIEPOKÓJ. Finally, NIEPOKÓJ does not have to be individualized and internalized: a group of people, e.g. a family, can feel NIEPOKÓJ when the youngest granddaughter is to take an entrance exam for the university, not because something bad can happen to them but rather to her. These existential fears are always personalized by the person who is subject to them (even the question about the sense of life is rather a question about the sense of **one's** life). Therefore the notion of NIEPOKÓJ may include some elements of existential fear or vice versa but they ought not to be used interchangeably.

The general idea of NIEPOKÓJ as 'fear of unknown' is also presented in the final chapter of Antoni Kępiński's *Lęk*, entitled 'Demonologia lęku' (The demonology of fear), where its author, Jan Mitarski, writes:

> Niepokój można uważać za rodzaj słabo wyrażonego lęku (...)
> W [tym, A.K.] lęku wypełnia się pustkę nieznanego niebezpieczeństwa obrazami własnej imaginacji. (NIEPOKÓJ can be considered as a kind of

weakly expressed fear. (...) While feeling [this, A.K.] fear, one tries to fill the emptiness of unknown danger with images produced by one's own imagination.) [12]

Mitarski's explanation is echoed by Jean Delumeau:

[N]iepokój, obawa, melancholia [należą, A.K.] raczej do trwóg. (...) [Trwoga odnosi się, A.K.] raczej do nieznanego. Strach ma określony przedmiot, któremu można stawić czoło. Trwoga nie, i jest przeżywana jako bolesne oczekiwanie na niebezpieczeństwo tym groźniejsze, że nie zostało w sposób jasny zidentyfikowane: stanowi ona globalne poczucie braku bezpieczeństwa. Będąc stanem organicznym i zarazem uczuciowym przejawia się w sposób słabszy (niepokój) przez "dyskretne uczucie ściskania w gardle, przez uginanie się nóg, drżenie" połączone z troską o przyszłość. (...) Niepokój zbyt długo odczuwany może wytworzyć stan dezorientacji i nieprzystosowania, uczuciowe oślepienie, niebezpieczne rozprzestrzenienie się domeny wyobraźni.
(NIEPOKÓJ, misgivings, melancholy, [belong, A.K.] rather to anxieties. (...) [Anxiety concerns, A.K.] the unknown. Fear has the definite object which must be faced. Anxiety does not, and it's experienced as a painful awaiting of danger, the bigger because of its indefiniteness: anxiety constitutes the global feeling of a lack of safety. As a physical and emotional state, at the same time it manifests itself in a weaker way (NIEPOKÓJ) as a "lump in the throat, shaking legs, shivering" accompanied by a worry for the future. (...) A NIEPOKÓJ which is felt too long might produce a state of disorientation and a lack of adaptation, emotional blindness and a dangerous spreading of imagination.) [13]

A similar description appears e.g. in Bulgakov's *The Master and Margarita*:

And a sense of danger, of some unknown but awesome danger crept into Rimsky's heart. (...)
Something else filled Rimsky with burning anxiety, but, strain his feverish mind as he could, stare as he could at Varenukha, he could not identify it. [14]

Going back to the problem of explaining the Polish emotion words to English native speakers, it seems, however, that even all the descriptions given above still do not render the exact meaning of NIEPOKÓJ. Words such as 'oppression', 'helplessness', 'impasse', 'disorientation' belong to Anglo culture as well as the translation of NIEPOKÓJ, i.e. fear, anxiety, uncertainty) and they cannot be used to render the Polish word. There are at least two reasons for this: firstly, English words never evoke exactly the same network of relationships and meanings as the Polish ones. Secondly, there is a risk of a circulatory defining of some emotion words *via* another and so on, *ad infinitum*, without any possibility of elucidating the meaning of the word in question.

In response to these questions Anna Wierzbicka has proposed a culture-independent analytical framework which provides a means of studying. comparing and explaining cultures and their concepts.

As Anna Wierzbicka writes:

> If we want to posit universal (i.e. understood by anybody, A.K.) human emotions we must identify them in terms of a language and culture-independent semantic metalanguage (NSM), not in terms of English folk words for emotions (or in terms of English scientific expressions such as "a loss of situational self-esteem" for shame-like emotions) [15]

Natural semantic metalanguage is based on a set of lexical universals which exist in all known and investigated cultures. [16,17] Wierzbicka postulates that the explication of any emotion can be constructed of these primitive linguistic building-blocks and it should then be understood by non-native speakers as well.

Before attempting to compose such an explication, let us, however. remind ourselves of the most important pieces of information about NIEPOKÓJ recorded in this paper. The most obvious aspects of NIEPOKÓJ are:

- thinking that something bad can happen
- uncertainty over what it could be
- helplessness, a feeling that one can do nothing to prevent it, to stop it from happening
- a feeling of strain, paralysis, a concentration on inner sensations and emerging from this an unwillingness to talk about one's emotional state
- oppressiveness and the long duration of NIEPOKÓJ

All these aspects might be represented in the following explication:

X feels NIEPOKÓJ

X feels something because X thinks something
sometimes a person thinks something like this:
     something bad can happen
     I think a lot about it
     I don't know what it can be
     I don't want it to happen
     I can do nothing to stop it from happening
because of this, this person feels something bad
because of this, this person doesn't want to say anything
because of this, this person can't do other things
X feels like this
because X thinks something like this

A cultural script (explanation of the social and cultural context) given also in the terms of semantic primitives should complete the explication of NIEPOKÓJ, making it comprehensible for everybody, not only native speakers of Polish:

when something bad happen
it is not good for me to know nothing about it
it is not good for me to think much about it
it is not good for me not to be able to do anything about it
it is not good for me to feel bad about it all

An explication in accordance with Wierzbicka's theory of NSM is presently the most widely intelligible way of explaining culture-specific emotion concepts to people from different cultures. It is also the best (though not the shortest) solution for coping with the difficulties of the untranslatability of words denoting such concepts (for more on this topic see Wierzbicka 1992, 1994, 1996).

Notes

All translations from Polish were done by the author of this paper.

[1] Wierzbicka, 1994, pp. 133 - 142

[2] Darwin, 1988, chapter entitled "Smutek, niepokój, melancholia"

[3] Skorupka, 1994, pp. 222 – 223, 507

[4] Skorupka, 1996, pp. 104, 105, 206

[5] Kurcz, 1990, pp. 17, 286, 564

[6] Zgółkowa, 1983, pp. 21, 250

[7] Buck, 1976, pp. 237 - 238

[8] Spagińska-Pruszak, 1994, pp. 6, 29-43

[9] Kępiński, 1995, p.13

[10] Kępiński, 1995, p.13-20

[11] Juros, 1993, p. 58

[12] Kępiński, 1995, pp. 327, 337

[13] Delumeau, 1986, p. 2

[14] Bulgakov, 1967, pp. 174-5

[15] Wierzbicka, 1992b, p. 120

[16] Goddard, Wierzbicka, 1994

[17] Harkins, Wierzbicka, 1997

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Izabela Zygmunt

The Wanderer's Message
for the End of the 20th Century*

From our perspective, the stories of the medieval world appear to have the quality of a fable or legend. These times were so different from our own, that, at first, it is almost hard to believe that people actually lived and believed as presented in *The Wanderer*. Times have changed so enormously that it is difficult to establish a link between these two eras, to place them side by side and see that in fact they belong to one and the same world. 20th century people do not spend much time considering this difference. To us, the medieval world appears almost to never have existed, as shown in the fragment quoted below. And yet, thinking reasonably, we must find that although times have changed, people are always the same, and that beneath the strictly cultural differences, there must be something that we have in common with medieval man.

The basic theme of *The Wanderer* is the passage of time and the transitoriness of all that which is of earthly nature. The speaker in the poem says:

> Her biþ feoh læne   her biþ freond læne
> Her biþ mon læne   her biþ mæg læne
> Eal þis eorþan gesteal   idel weorþeð.[1]

> Here is life[2],
> here is friend, here is kinsman,
> here is man – all gone now after the brief lending...
> all the foundations of this earth become desolate...[3]

All passes away and even the very order of the earthly world changes. One cannot keep the worldly riches, what is more, even friends or companions ultimately leave us. Man has to face solitude, suffering and death, all being consequences of the fundamental principle of the world, i.e. the flux of time.

> Hu seo þrag gewat
> genap under nihthelm   swa heo no wære![4]

> How the times have passed,
> how they grow dark under the shades of night
> as though they had never existed![5]

Time elapses and changes the world, that which used to be is no longer, as if it never had been. To realise this, means to embark on a search for something that is permanent, because man, by nature, cannot live without believing in something that is fundamental and fixed, a purpose in life. *The Wanderer* indicates this purpose, and offers a set of guidelines on how to cope with the impermanence of life and the prospect of death.

The inevitable consequence of the passage of time is old age, which man of the late 20th century refuses to acknowledge. Our time is obsessed with youth, and old age has been pushed out of people's consciousness. It is something we must by all means try to prevent. The attitude towards being old in *The Wanderer* is very different:

> Forþon ne mæg weorþan wis   wer ær he age
> Wintra dæl in woruldrice.[6]

> Indeed, a man may not become wise
> Before he has had his number of years in the world.[7]

Old age is the time of wisdom and understanding. This is probably the other reason, apart from the fact that they were his companions, why the Wanderer laments the deaths of the young warriors at some other point in the poem: heroic death in the battlefield as such wasn't considered a tragedy, rather an honourable fulfilment. These warriors died too early, and their lives were unfulfilled: the role of a man, as it appears from the poem, was to be a warrior in youth and a thinker in old age. This is the natural way of things. Indeed, in order to find fulfilment man has to experience both action and reflection, and the latter comes with experience, i.e. with age. Thus, being old is not a sad nuisance, which one in vain tries to avoid. On the contrary, it has unique rewards of its own: knowledge and experience can be enjoyed.

Another fact that 20th century man refuses to accept is that in some situations one cannot avoid loneliness. Our times require sociability, being

together is the way to happiness, although people nowadays do not seem to need a sense of community and the basic criterion is having good time. In *The Wanderer*, the man's companions also play a crucial role, but it is similar only to a certain extent. The Wanderer mourns and laments his lost companions, but the nature of the relationship between him and these young warriors is more complex than a 20th century reader might think. They were not just his feast companions, although this aspect of their community is also important. First of all, together they were members of their lord's retinue, and shared a mission. Perhaps the most important cause of the Wanderer's tragedy is that he is no longer a member of this group of warriors, all his companions and his lord being dead, and consequently he is deprived of the possibility to fulfil his role. The tragedy in the Wanderer's fate is not just that he is alone, tired and miserable, but that he is an exile, a warrior having no-one by whose side he could fight.

There is a sense of futility and emptiness about this situation, which is symbolically expressed by the winter sea image that reappears throughout the poem[8].

> Ðonne onwæcneð eft   wineleas guma
> Gesihð him biforan   fealwe wegas
> Baðian brimfuglas   brædan feþra
> Hreosan hrim and snaw   hægle gemenged[9]

> Then afterwards
> the friendless man wakens and sees
> the dark[10] waves before him... sea birds
> bathing, and spreading their feathers...
> Rime-frost ... and snow falling... mingled with hail.[11]

This image of an expanse of ice cold, tawny coloured water corresponds to the Wanderer's condition. He has nowhere to go, no-one to stand by and nothing to do but wander around. It is very appropriate that the metaphor of this predicament of a former warrior, whose role was to fight in fiery battles, is frost cold water. The birds probably stand for the spirits of the Wanderer's companions. They are there, around him or in his thoughts, but they remain silent. At some other point in the poem it is said that they do not bring any familiar words, i.e. no matter how vivid the memory or vision of the deceased companions is, one cannot possibly communicate with them, which is perhaps the most painful thing about being alone after a dear one's death.

This brings us to the most grave subject of the poem: death. In our times it is almost a taboo. The man of our age is nearly unable to make sense of it, with doubt overshadowing its religious meaning, and with a hedonistic concept

of life that leaves no room for it. In the world of *The Wanderer* death is a tragedy, but at least it makes sense and has a purpose. In this fragment several ways of looking at death are presented:

> Duguð eal gecrong
> Wlonc bi wealle: sume wig fornom
> Ferede in forðwege   sumne fugel oþbær
> Ofer heanne holm   sumne se hara wulf
> Deaðe gedælde;   sumne dreorighleor
> In eorðscræfe   eorl gehydde

> All the proud host fall by the wall:
> war destroyed some of them, took them far away;
> a raven[12] carried one far-off over the high sea;
> the hoary wolf gave over another to death;
> a sad-faced man hid another in a chamber of earth.[13]

First of all, the fallen warriors died proudly (*wlonc*) (in contrast, by today's values, dying is almost shameful). Secondly, their death is not the end, but rather a beginning of a journey onwards. The images of the bird and the grey wolf are obscure, but most likely they are reminiscences of some old Germanic beliefs concerning the death of warriors. We can only assume that for the medieval reader they stood for what happens after death (the "high sea" as an after-world?) or for its meaning.

A death which is a consequence of a noble life is, in the world of *The Wanderer*, a glorious destiny:

> Eorlas fornomon æsca þryþe
> Wæpen wælgifru   wyrd seo mære

> The strength of spears, weapons
> greedy for slaughter, have destroyed mankind[14] –
> a glorious fate![15]

There is something very wise in this approach to death. It is the inevitable consequence of life, and therefore is treated as life's fulfilment. It is noble for a warrior to give his life in battle: it is the ultimate realisation of the set of values cherished by the Anglo-Saxons. Death understood in this way may still be dreadful, as the images of the wolf and the bird, most likely a bird of prey, indicate; it also may be sad and tragic, as shown in the figure of the nobleman burying his companions, but it is not incomprehensible, it can be, and is, accepted. After all, in the face of death (and everybody in any time has to face it at some point) all that a human being has to support him is his past life, the

goals he pursued and his achievements. The conclusion is that we do not live for the sake of living, and if there is to be sense in death there must be sense in life.

The Anglo-Saxon concepts of the passage of time, old age, loneliness and death as expressed in *The Wanderer*, are very different from our modern understanding of them. Yet these are the fundamental matters of life, ones which ultimately cannot be ignored or silenced. It follows upon consideration, that the most important difference between us and the people of *The Wanderer* consists in the way we perceive man's role in life and the purpose of life. In the Anglo-Saxon world, and in fact throughout medieval Europe, people's roles were defined and clear, and their realisation them was man's task, for which he was then rewarded. The following fragment is one of the precepts that a warrior should pursue, given by the speaker of *The Wanderer*.

> Ær he geare cunne
> Beorn sceal gebidan   þonne he beot spriceð
> Of þæt, collenferð   cunne gearwe
> Hwider hreþra gehyd   hweorfan wille[16]

> A man has to wait
> - when he will speak proudly and boast –
> until he knows which way
> they thoughts of his mind will turn.[17]

A man should be certain of his decision and sure that he is ready to fulfil his promise or boast before he makes one. This refers to a particular aspect of the Anglo-Saxon culture, the set of rules that warriors were to obey, but its meaning is more general. It is putting that which is genuine, such as the heroic deeds, above that which is superficial, in this particular context empty promises. This is perhaps the most important message that a 20th century reader can extract from *The Wanderer*. Our time is an era of superficiality. We pursue appearances and remain blind to the fundamental matters. Yet, ultimately we cannot avoid the passage of time, loneliness and death by ignoring them, as we try to. It is much more noble (by the way, the very concept of nobility in the broad sense appears almost out of place if we speak of the 20th century) to face them and cope with them in a honest and courageous way, taking all the suffering that inevitably must accompany this, the way the Wanderer in the poem does. For a typical 20th century man, with his hedonism and individualism, this message may be difficult to accept, it may be shocking to realise that what we pursue in our lives are mere chimeras, but if we think deeper about it, to realise it early enough in life is in fact reassuring. It is perhaps the greatest value of *The*

Wanderer that the poem, as the work of a very different culture, enables its late readers to look at their own lives from a different, wiser, perspective, and at the same time brings that which is genuine and fundamental back to their attention.

Notes

[1] Original text quoted after Dunning and Bliss, p. 122

[2] The translation is inaccurate here: *feoh* in OE meant "property" or "wealth". See Dunning and Bliss, p. 50, 132.

[3] Translation into Modern English by Gavin Bantock; Bantock, p. 18

[4] Dunning and Bliss, p. 122

[5] Bantock, p. 18

[6] Dunning and Bliss, p. 117

[7] Bantock, p. 16

[8] See also the below fragment of the opening passage (quoted after Dunning and Bliss, p.105, and translated by G. Bantock, p. 14):
þeah þe he modcearig / geond lagulade   longe sceolde / hreran mid hondum hrimcealde sæ
(though he for a long time in sorrowful mood / has to stir back the rime-cold ocean / with oars, with the strength of his own hands)

[9] Dunning and Bliss, p. 113

[10] The exact meaning of *fealwe* in OE was "tawny" or "fawn coloured". See Dunning and Bliss, p. 132.

[11] Bantock, p. 16

[12] This is another inaccuracy in G. Bantock's translation: *fugel* in OE meant "bird" in general, and not a particular species. See Dunning and Bliss, p. 132.

[13] Bantock, p. 17

[14] A more accurate translation of the word *eorlas* would be "noble men" or "warriors". See Dunning and Bliss, p. 131.

[15] Bantock, p. 18

[16] Dunning and Bliss, p. 118

[17] Bantock, p. 17

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Mandelstam and the Revolution. Translation
as the Manipulation of Literature*

> From the point of view of the target literature, all translation implies a degree of manipulation of the source text for a certain purpose.[1]

Translation as "the most obviously recognizable type of rewriting"[2] contributes greatly to constructing the image of an original in the target culture, particularly for non - professional readers who have no access to the reality of the source text. This image can undoubtedly be untrue, insofar as the translator can distort and manipulate reality because of the pressure of a series of constraints, which Lefevere denotes as ideological, poetical and economic, typical of the culture to which he belongs. For this reason,

> ...translation, like all (re)writings is never innocent. There is always a context in which the translation takes place, always a history from which a text emerges and into which a text is transposed[3].

Therefore it is important to acknowledge the consequences of manipulating the language and the problem of abuse of power that translation can give rise to. One must be on one's guard as, according to Lefevere, all rewriting implies manipulation, whether conscious or unconscious, of the original[4].

Hence it is essential to be aware of the ideology that underlines a translation, strategies the translator has adopted, his attitude towards the original's universe of discourse, his postponed or avoided decisions; because behind every one of the translator's solutions there is a voluntary act that reveals his history and the socio-political milieu that surrounds him.

The comparison of Mandelstam's 'Сумерки свободы' with Pollak's 'Przedświt swobody' and Pomianowski's 'Zmierzch wolności' – both Polish translations of one and the same poem - shed an interesting light on the process of constructing the image of a poet in another culture. According to Holmes, "all translations are maps, the territories are the originals"[5], and since no map is definitive, but will serve only the specific purpose for which it was made, it is necessary to have a variety of translations of a poem in order to achieve a fuller understanding of the original.

Сумерки свободы

Прославим, братья, сумерки свободы,-
Великий сумеречный год.
В кипящие ночные воды
Опущен грузный лес тенет.
Восходиш ты в глухие годы,
О солнце, судия, народ.

Прославим роковое бремя,
 оторое в слезах народный вождъ берет.
Прославим власти сумрачное бремя
Ее невыносимый гнет.
В ком сердце естъ, тот должен слышатъ, время,
 ак твой кораблъ ко дну идет.

Мы в легионы боевые
Связали ласточек - и вот
Не видно солнца, вся стихия
Щебечет, движется, живет,
Сквозъ сети - сумерки густые-
Не видно солнца и земля плывет.

Ну что ж, попробуем, огромный, неуклюжий,
Скрипучий поворот руля.
Земля плывет. Мужайтесъ мужи.
 ак плугом, океан деля
Мы будем помнитъ и в летейской струже,
Что десяти небес нам стоила земля [6].

Przedświt swobody
(translated by Seweryn Pollak)

Wysławmy, bracia, szary świt swobody -
wielką godzinę przedświtową.
W kłębiące się ponocne wody
Zapada matni las z ołowiu.
Ty w takie głuche lata wschodzisz,
O słońce, ludu, sądu słowo.

Wysławmy to wyrosczne brzemię,
Które wódz ludu bierze wśród cierpienia.
 Wysławmy władzy mroczne brzemię
I ucisk jej nie do zniesienia.
Czasie, kto serce ma, słyszy przez ziemię,
Jak tonie okręt w morzu cienia.

Myśmy w legiony bój toczące
Jaskółki powiązali - oto
Już cały żywioł zmroczył słońce,
Szczebioce, zrywa się do lotu;
Przez sieci —mroki gęstniejące -
Nie widać słońca, a na ziemi potop.

A więc cóż, spróbujemy: oporne, skrzypiące,
Niewprawne obrócenie steru.
Na ziemi potop. Męże, mężni bądźcie,
Jak pługiem oceany dzieląc,
Będziemy pamiętali nawet w Lety chłodzie,
Że ziemia kosztowała nas niebiosów wiele.

Moskwa, maj 1918 [7]

Zmierzch wolności
(translated by Jerzy Pomianowski)

Wolności zmierzch uczcijmy pieniem bratnim,
Rok zmierzchu, wielki rok zaćmienia.
Już zapadają ciężkie pętle matni
W kipiel wód nocnych, w czeluść cienia.
Słońce - lud, sędzia nasz ostatni
Wychynie w głuchy czas milczenia.

Brzemienia nieznośnego chwałę głośmy,

Co z bólem dźwignie ludu wódz na barkach.
Wysławmy ucisk władzy ów nieznośny,
I brzemię, które legnie nam na karkach.
Kto serce ma, ten pojmie znak bezgłośny -
To na dno idzie wieku barka.

Myśmy jaskółek mimolotne stada
Sprzęgli w legiony, w szyki wojownicze
I już nie widać słońcve, bo gromada
Rwie się do lotu, kwili, krzyczy.
S łońce w tę sieć jak w mrok zapada
I glob urywa się z kotwicy.

Spróbujmy więc. Szeroki, nieporadny,
Skrzypliwy obrót rudla. Byle dalej.
I ziemia płynie już otchłanie radląc.
Odwagi, bracia. I w letejskiej fali
Wspomnimy przecie, że to nam wypadło,
Byśmy za ziemię dziesięć niebios dali.

Moskwa, maj 1918 [8]

Although only certain fragments will be discussed here. the whole poems have been quoted for the sake of clarity and to get an insight into the original as well as into both Polish renditions.

Mandelstam's 'Сумерки свободы' first appeared in St. Petersburg periodical *Знамя труда* (*The Banner of Labour*) edited by the left wing of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, May 24, 1918, as one of the most prominent literary transformations of the reality of new Russia under the Bolsheviks. However, while the poems by Blok ('Двенадцатъ'; March 3, 1918), Belyj ('Христос воскресе'; May 12, 1918) and Esenin ('Инония'; May 19, 1918) are always quoted as typical of the positive reaction of the Russian intelligentsia, and those by Remizov, Gippius, Merezkovsky and Balmont as typical of a negative attitude to the October Revolution of 1917, Mandelstam's poem is usually not mentioned or referred to at all...[9]

The Russian *сумерки* is a semantic void - designatory term for which there is no monolexic equivalent in Polish. It usually denotes the dusk just after sunset (cf. *Словаръ современного русского языка*: "полутьма наступающая после захода солнца"), but it can also refer to the dusk just before dawn. In such a case it needs a qualifying word ("предрассветные сумерки", "ранние сумерки"). In order to fill this lexical void with an adequate and intelligible formulation, both Polish translators decided to single out one of the possible

connotations of *сумерки*, with profound, far-reaching consequences for the ideological meaning of the entire poem. Such solutions greatly influenced the translator's subsequent choices of words while constructing semantic and metaphorical fields, and destroyed the semantic ambiguity, which is a crucial device in Mandelstam's ode.

Averincev emphasises the vagueness of the title expression, sustained consistently by semantic and euphonic repetitions throughout the whole poem: "...the word *сумерки* has, obviously, two meanings. It denotes the dawn, the rising of freedom in Spring, 1917, and its setting in Spring, 1918."[10]

Pollak renders the title metaphor as "przedświt swobody", signifying a dark, troubled time before the appearance of a new freedom. His translation has been quoted in Leśniewska 's edition as :

> ...Mandelstam's outstanding testimony of acceptance of Bolshevism. The October Revolution for Mandelstam, as well as for the majority of the Russian intelligentsia, was the gratification of previous desires and hopes, a great symbol of liberation, "the scarlet spring" which came to "wash the world"[11].

Pomianowski, on the contrary, asserts that Mandelstam was "the one who saw the Bolshevik Revolution as the tragedy. Great, yes indeed, but the tragedy", and thus proposed his own rendition as a gloss to the discussion on Mandelstam's problematic 'conformity' and attitude towards political changes after October, 1917; and a deserved vindication of the poet's good name[12]. Arguing that the title image suggests the loss of freedom, Pomianowski challenges the meaning of 'Прославим' and thus inclines the reader to interpret it ironically:

> Wolności zmierzch uczcijmy pieniem bratnim,
> Rok zmierzchu, wielki rok zaćmienia.
> Już zapadają ciężkie pętle matni
> W kipiel wód nocnych, w czeluść cienia.
> Słońce - lud, sędzia nasz ostatni -
> Wychynie w głuchy czas milczenia.

The above passage illustrates the conscious interpretative activity of the translator, who decides to increase the level of explicitness of the original by including explanatory phrases and adding connectives to 'help' the logical flow of the target text.

In both Polish translations lines 2 - 5 of the first stanza continue and strengthen the mood of the first one, but while in Pomianowski's version the image of dusk ("wolności zmierzch", "rok zmierzchu") turns into that of stormy night, solar eclipse ("wielki rok zaćmienia", "kipiel wód nocnych", "czeluść

cienia") and god - forsaken years ("głuchy czas milczenia"); Pollak's evocative word is "przedświt" and thus the translator creates the semantic field using such phrases as: "szary świt", "wielka godzina przedświtowa" "ponocne wody". There is also a significant divergence in the aspect of time, resulting from various interpretations of the title metaphor:

> Ty w takie głuche lata wschodzisz
> O słońce, ludu, sądu słowo...

- in Pollak's rendition is a statement concerning the present moment.

> Słońce - lud, sędzia nasz ostatni -
> Wychynie w głuchy czas milczenia...

- acquires the form of the prophecy, predicting a new critical awareness to came and judgement passed on a vanishing epoch. Thus Mandelstam's poem in Pollak's translation turns into a romantic revolutionary ode reminiscent of Mickiewicz's 'Ode to Youth', while Pomianowski's rendition has much in common with the poetics of Young Poland's catastrophists and their apocalyptic imagery.

Vital are the associations of Mandelstam's imagery and apostrophes with the tradition of *The Lay of Igor's Raid* (*Слово о полку Игоръеве*) - especially the dramatic and sinister scene of the solar eclipse abruptly interrupting the solemn departure of Igor's troops for the campaign against the Polovtsi. The people, having taken this phenomenon to be a bad omen, caution the Prince that the darkness presages evil . Repeated twice exclamation: "Не видно солнца" ("The sun cannot be seen"), the mood of unrest and prophecy of disaster as well as Mandelstam's image of twittering birds obscuring the sun remind the reader of the ominous mood of the old Russian epos with the calls of birds and animals filling the dense air with menacing sounds. On this score, Pomianowski's rendition seems to be more expressive than that of Pollak. The expression: "Мужайтесъ мужи" ("Męże, mężni bądźcie" in Pollak's rendition) brings in other associations. Due to its biblical background it is often encountered in Lomonosov's religious odes as well as in old Russian poems celebrating Victories of the Russian army where it functions as the battle call of the prince trying to encourage his men and arouse faith in victory (cf. *The Lay of Igor's Raid, The history of Mamay's Battle-field*). To the imperative is added a vocative. This old Russian form underlines the reference to Igor's tale. It also restores and rejuvenates the original meaning of the verb ("to behave like man"). The fact that it was also a formula which expressed a not uncommon attitude of the period after the Bolshevik revolution is proved by Ganin's "Священный клич".

A number of words are ambiguous and open to different interpretations: the Russian *роковой* can be understood as momentous, decisive (cf. *Словарь современного русского языка*: "решающий, определяющий дальнейшее") and fatal ("имеющий тяжелые или гибельные последствия"). Pomianowski decided to render this adjective as "przemożny" and Pollak as "wyroczny". Also the verb *стоит* has a double meaning: 'to cost' and 'to be worth'. There seems to be a considerable difference when we translate 'the earth has cost us ten heavens' (stress put on the price) or 'the earth has been worth ten heavens' (stress put on what has been gained). In the sense of 'cost' the Russian verb takes the accusative. With genitive added it is translated as 'was worth'. The added "nam" complicates the matter and seems to give a preference for the translation 'cost', but not necessarily so. The vagueness of this statement should remain in the translation. Both Polish translators precised this expression: "Ziemia kosztowała nas niebiosów wiele" (Pollak) and: "...byśmy za ziemię dziesięć niebios dali" (Pomianowski).

The ambiguity of Mandelstam's poem can be evidently discussed through the imagery, stressing oppositions: light – darkness, freedom – captivity, raising – sinking, life – death, chaos – order, despair – discipline. Antithesis becomes the fundamental principle of the poem's architectonics. The juxtaposition of opposite and overlapping semantic fields emphasises the contrast between them and strengthens the effect of vagueness. Semantic contrast is furthermore emphasized by syntactic parallelism and lexical antinomies.

And therefore, if the poem is to be considered a political statement, one must take it as a whole - with its obscure imagery, varying configuration of ambiguities, literary and mythological allusions, its shifting tones and semantic tensions as well as the opposition between classical rhetoric tradition and a new political jargon and topical slogans. For Mandelstam's perspective is deeper and more realistic then that of the majority of his contemporaries extolling the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and predicting a better future for Russia, if not an utopian paradise.

Although the lack of *semantic transparency* (term derived from Husserl's logic) is deliberate and of crucial importance in Mandelstam's ' 'Сумерки свободы', both Polish translations have irretrievably lost the vagueness of meaning constituting the ideological richness of the original. For the process of translation, Prince Myshkin's words in Dostoyewsky 's *The Idiot* seem to have an enduring significance: "To attain perfection, one must first of all be able not to understand many things" [13].

Notes

[1] Snell - Hornby, p. 22

[2] Lefevere, p. 9

[3] Bassnet, Lefevere, p. 11

[4] Lefevere, pp. 1-10

[5] Shuttleworth, p.102

[6] Манделъштам, 1990, p. 483

[7] Mandelsztam, 1983, p. 163

[8] Mandelsztam, 1997, p. 89

[9] Перцов, p. 6

[10] Манделъштам, 1990, p. 483. This and all further quotations trans. by T. B.

[11] Mandelsztam, 1983, pp. 555-556.

[12] Pomianowski, p.12.

[13] Dostoyevsky, p. 595.

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